State v. Blasko

• Decision Date: 17 March 1987
• Citation: 202 Conn. 541,522 A.2d 753
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. George BLASKO.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Page 753

522 A.2d 753

202 Conn. 541

STATE of Connecticut v. George BLASKO.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued January 14, 1987.

Decided March 17, 1987.

John M. Massameno, Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, were John J. Kelly, Chief State's Atty., and Domenick J. Galluzzo, Asst. State's Atty., for appellant (state).

Barbara Aaron, with whom, on the brief, were Albert J. McGrail, Hartford, and Patrick Tomasiewicz, Torrington, for appellee (defendant).

Before PETERS, C.J., and HEALEY, SHEA, SANTANIELLO and CALLAHAN, JJ.

PETERS, Chief Justice.

The issue in this appeal is whether the 1985 reform of the procedures governing investigatory grand juries terminated the authority of grand juries that had been duly constituted before the effective date of Public Acts 1985, No. 85-611. Because the continuing validity of a number of preexisting grand juries is affected by our resolution of this issue, this is an unusual case demanding expedited resolution. Accordingly, on January 27, 1987, we announced our decision that Public Acts 1985, No. 85-611, as clarified by Public Acts 1986, No. 86-317, did not revoke the authority of or alter the procedures governing investigatory grand juries that had been properly authorized before October 1, 1985. State v. Blasko, 202 Conn. 189, 520 A.2d 207 (1987). We indicated then that a full opinion would follow in due course.

This case arises out of an information, dated December 12, 1985, charging the defendant, George Blasko, with two counts of sale of cocaine, in violation of General Statutes § 19-480(a) (now § 21a-277[a], and two counts of sale of marihuana, in violation of General Statutes § 19-480(b) (now § 21a-277[b]. The trial court granted, in part, the defendant's motion to suppress evidence arising out of an investigation by a grand jury whose authority allegedly had been revoked by the enactment of Public Acts 1985, No. 85-611 (hereinafter P.A. No. 85-611), effective October 1, 1985. When the legislature thereafter enacted Public Acts 1986, No. 86-317 (hereinafter P.A. No. 86-317), the state filed a motion to reargue the dismissal, but the trial court, after a hearing, affirmed its earlier ruling in favor of the defendant. On the state's motion, the trial court dismissed the charges against the defendant with prejudice, and the state has appealed. See State v. Ross, 189 Conn. 42, 49-51, 454 A.2d 266 (1983).

The state does not contest the facts that underlie the trial court's ruling. On October 12, 1984, pursuant to General Statutes § 54-47, ¹ the chief court administrator appointed Superior Court Judge Anthony V. DeMayo to investigate professional gambling and related criminal activity in Torrington. ² After completing part of this inquiry, Judge DeMayo on December 12, 1985, filed with the Superior Court for the judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford a report entitled "first interim report." That same day, the defendant was arrested on the criminal charges described above.

While the grand jury investigation was pending, and prior to the defendant's arrest, the legislature enacted P.A. No. 85-611, entitled "An Act Concerning The Investigatory Grand Jury System," which became effective October 1, 1985. ³ That act repealed General Statutes § 54-47, under which grand juror DeMayo had been authorized to pursue his inquiry, and instituted far-reaching procedural reforms of the investigatory grand jury system. ⁴ The new act substituted, as authority for the appointment of a grand jury, the approval of a panel of three superior court judges, whereas under the prior law an applicant could obtain the requisite permission from the Superior Court or from the chief court administrator. Under the new act, but not under the old, an applicant requesting the appointment of an investigatory grand jury must demonstrate a reasonable belief that there is probable cause to believe that crimes have been committed. Furthermore, the new act describes in detail the information that must be furnished in the application, including the identity of the applicant and his authority to make the application, the facts and circumstances that justify his reasonable belief that an investigation will lead to a finding of probable cause, and any additional facts and evidence the panel may require to evaluate the application. The act also limits the duration of authorized grand juries to six months, subject to express but limited extension, to avoid the continuation of protracted and indefinite grand jury investigations. The grand jury investigation conducted by Judge DeMayo complied with none of these procedural requirements.

Because of the enactment of P.A. No. 85-611, the trial court granted the defendant's motion to suppress information obtained by it after October 1, 1985. The trial court relied on the legislative history of the new act, the absence of a grandfather clause that would preserve the authority of preexisting grand juries, and the explicit repeal of § 54-47, for its conclusion that investigatory grand juries appointed under the prior statute were not authorized to conduct further inquiry after the effective date of the new act. Accordingly, the court ordered the suppression of any information obtained by the grand jury after October 1, 1985, but declined to invalidate the grand jury's interim report or to dismiss the charges pending against the defendant.

Subsequent to the trial court's ruling, the legislature enacted P.A. No. 86-317, entitled "An Act Concerning Investigatory Grand Juries," which became effective as of May 8, 1986. ⁵ That act provides, in relevant part, that the authority of any investigatory grand jury to conduct an inquiry initiated under § 54-47 "shall continue until the conclusion of the inquiry and [until] a final report has been filed." General Statutes § 54-47i(a). The act further validates "any action taken" and "any evidence obtained," on or after October 1, 1985, pursuant to the authority previously conferred upon a grand jury under § 54-47.

Armed with this new statute, the state filed a motion to reargue the trial court's earlier ruling. It maintained that the 1986 statute had clarified the legislature's original intention, in P.A. No. 85-611, to preserve the validity of grand juries duly constituted under § 54-47 prior to October 1, 1985. The trial court, after a hearing, reaffirmed its prior decision. The court concluded that the retroactive application of P.A. No. 86-317 to its earlier ruling would deprive the defendant of substantive rights conferred upon him by P.A. No. 85-611, in violation of the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. U.S. Const., art. I, § 9.

In its appeal from that ruling, the state claims that: (1) the legislature's enactment of P.A. No. 85-611 did not terminate the authority of investigatory grand juries properly appointed under § 54-47; (2) the legislature's enactment of P.A. No. 86-317 clarified that it had not intended to terminate the authority of duly constituted grand juries when it enacted P.A. No. 85-611; (3) the defendant has no standing to challenge the admissibility of grand jury evidence at his trial; and (4) the defendant may not rely on the exclusionary rule to challenge the admissibility of evidence at his trial. We will address jointly the state's first two claims. Because we resolve those claims in favor of the state, we need not consider its remaining two claims.

In determining the effect of P.A. No. 85-611 on the authority of preexisting investigatory grand juries, we are guided by well defined principles of statutory interpretation that require us to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. Rhodes v. Hartford, 201 Conn. 89, 93, 513 A.2d 124 (1986); Norwich v. Silverberg, 200 Conn. 367, 370-71, 511 A.2d 336 (1986); State v. Kozlowski, 199 Conn. 667, 673, 509 A.2d 20 (1986); 2A J. Sutherland, Statutory Construction (4th Ed. Sands 1984) § 45.05. If the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, we need not look beyond the statute because we assume that the language expresses the intention of the legislature. Rhodes v. Hartford, supra; Johnson v. Manson, 196 Conn. 309, 316, 493 A.2d 846 (1985), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 813, 88 L.Ed.2d 787 (1986); Mazur v. Blum, 184 Conn. 116, 118-19, 441 A.2d 65 (1981). When we are faced with ambiguity in a statute, however, we turn for interpretive guidance to its legislative history, the circumstances surrounding its enactment, and the purpose the statute is to serve. Rhodes v. Hartford, supra; State v. Kozlowski, supra; State v. Ellis, 197 Conn. 436, 445, 497 A.2d 974 (1985).

The defendant contends that the plain language of P.A. No. 85-611 explicitly evidences the legislature's intent to revoke, as of October 1, 1985, the authority of investigatory grand juries appointed under § 54-47. His argument relies exclusively on § 9 of the act, which provides: "Section 54-47 of the general statute is repealed." (Emphasis added.) In his view, the use of the word "repeal" not only signifies the repeal of § 54-47 as authority for the impaneling of future grand juries, but also mandates the immediate termination of the authority of preexisting grand juries duly appointed under § 54-47. To ascribe so definitive a meaning to the term "repeal" is, however, inconsistent with well understood patterns of legislative usage. We recently noted, in State v. Kozlowski, supra, 199 Conn. at 675, 509 A.2d 20, that use of the word "repeal" reflects no more than the characteristic practice of the legislature of "cast[ing] acts which alter language within existing statutory subsections in the form of repeal and substitution," and "reserving the label of amendment for acts which add entirely new subsections." Standing by itself, the fact that the legislature "repealed" § 54-47 does not persuade us that the legislature intended the revocation of the authority of preexisting grand juries.

None of...