Grand Trunk Ry. Co. of Canada v. Knapp

• Decision Date: 30 June 1916
• Docket Number: 2774.
• Citation: 233 F. 950
• Parties: GRAND TRUNK RY. CO. OF CANADA v. KNAPP.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

233 F. 950

GRAND TRUNK RY. CO. OF CANADA v. KNAPP.

No. 2774.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

June 30, 1916

H. R Martin, of Detroit, Mich., for plaintiff in error.

S. A Anderson, of St. Paul, Minn., for defendant in error.

Before KNAPPEN and DENISON, Circuit Judges, and EVANS, District Judge.

KNAPPEN Circuit Judge.

Defendant is a railway carrier engaged in interstate and intrastate commerce. Plaintiff was employed by defendant as a bridge carpenter; while such employe, and while as such a member of a crew in charge of a work train, on which was a pile driver service water tank, etc., on the way to repair defendant's railway bridge used by defendant for the passage thereover of trains both in interstate and intrastate commerce, plaintiff, without negligence on his part, received serious injuries through a collision (occasioned by defendant's negligence) between defendant's freight train and the train on which plaintiff was riding. Plaintiff recovered verdict and judgment in a suit for such negligent injuries, under the federal Employers' Liability Act. Act April 22, 1908, c. 149, 35 Stat. 65, amended April 5, 1910 (36 Stat. 291, c. 143 (Comp. St. 1913, Secs. 8657-8665)).

But two questions are presented: First, whether plaintiff was at the time of the accident employed in interstate commerce; and second whether the federal Employers' Liability Act supersedes, as to plaintiff's right of action, the Michigan Workmen's Compensation Act (Act No. 10, P.A. Mich. Ex. Sess. 1912).

We have no doubt that plaintiff was at the time of the accident employed in interstate commerce, within the meaning of the federal Employers' Liability Act. The case is ruled by Pedersen v. D., L. & W.R.R. Co., 229 U.S. 146, 33 Sup.Ct. 648, 57 L.Ed. 1125, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 153, unless distinguished by the fact that plaintiff in the instant case was riding upon a train which carried also the equipment for the repair, while in the Pedersen Case the employe was walking and carrying his own repair equipment. We cannot think this difference important. The case is not brought within Ill. Central R.R. Co. v. Behrens, 233 U.S. 473, 34 Sup.Ct. 646, 58 L.Ed. 1051, Ann.

Cas. 1914C, 163. See, also, N.Y. Central R.R. Co. v. Carr, 238 U.S. 260, 35 Sup.Ct. 780, 59 L.Ed. 1298, and P., C., C. & St. L.R. Co. v. Glinn (C.C.A. 6) 219 F. 148, 135 C.C.A. 46.

The Michigan act, with certain exceptions hereafter stated so far as important, applies to all persons, firms and corporations (including public service corporations) who elect to become subject to its provisions, such election to be effected by filing with the Industrial Accident Board a written statement of the acceptance of the act and the adoption of one of several methods provided for the payment of compensation. By failing to come under the act the employer is deprived of the defenses of contributory negligence, unless willful, negligence of fellow servants and assumption of the risk. Knowledge of the employer's election to come under the act is conclusively imputed to the employe, and the latter is conclusively presumed to have consented to come under the act unless he gives written notice to the contrary. Compensation Act, pt. 1, Sec. 8, and pt. 3, Sec. 4; Mackin v. Detroit-Timkin Axle Co. (Mich.) 153 N.W. 49.

Recovery does not depend upon, and is not affected by, the employer's negligence. Andrejwski v. Wolverine Coal Co., 182 Mich. 298, 302, 148 N.W. 684. The statute is based on the theory that personal injury losses in industrial pursuits are properly chargeable to the business as a part of the cost of production. Compensation for injuries causing death takes the form of a payment of one-half the employe's weekly wages for a certain number of weeks, subject to a maximum and minimum, as respects both wages and aggregate recovery. Compensation for injuries not resulting in death is on the same general basis as for fatal injuries, the period for which compensation is paid being made to depend upon the nature and extent of the injury. The procedure to recover is by filing claim with the Industrial Accident Board and arbitration in case of disagreement between employer and employe, with a right of review by the Accident Board of the arbitrator's findings, the action of the Board being final except that the Supreme Court may review questions of law involved. Final judgment in a court of record may be entered, as of course, upon a final award.

By section 4, part 6, of the act, its provisions are made to apply to employers and workmen engaged in intrastate commerce, but not to those engaged in interstate commerce, 'for whom a rule of liability or method of compensation has been or may be established by the Congress of the United States,' except to the extent that 'their mutual connection with intrastate work may and shall be clearly separable and distinguishable from interstate or foreign commerce. ' There is also provision for express and voluntary acceptance of the act by 'any such employer and any of his workmen working only in this state,' if done with the approval of the Industrial Accident Board. The section is printed in full in the margin. ^[1] The defendant, previous to the accident, filed its election to come under the act. The plaintiff has never accepted it, unless his acceptance is conclusively presumed by his failure, previous to the accident, to give written notice of his nonassent.

Defendant being an interstate carrier by railroad and plaintiff having been employed in interstate commerce when his injuries occurred, the federal Employers' Liability Act unquestionably prescribes a remedy. The jurisdiction of Congress over interstate commerce, and thus over remedies against employers therein for injuries sustained by employes while engaged in such commerce, is paramount; and so far as Congress has occupied the field of such liability, its jurisdiction is exclusive. Second Employers' Liability Cases, 233 U.S. 1, 55, 32 Sup.Ct. 169, 56 L.Ed. 327, 38 L.R.A. (N.S.) 44; Mich. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59, 66, 33 Sup.Ct. 192, 57 L.Ed. 417, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 176; Seaboard Air Line R.R. Co. v. Horton, 233 U.S. 492, 501, 34 Sup.Ct. 635, 58 L.Ed. 1062, L.R.A. 1915C, 1, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 475. As expressed by Mr. Justice Lurton in the Vreeland Case:

'By this act Congress has undertaken to cover the subject of the liability of railroad companies to their employes while engaged in interstate commerce. This exertion of a power which is granted in express terms must supersede all legislation over the same subject by the states. * * * It therefore follows that in respect of state legislation prescribing the liability of such carriers for injuries to their employes while engaged in interstate commerce this act is paramount and exclusive.'

The defense that the employe was at the time of his injuries engaged in interstate transportation has been sustained as defeating recovery under state laws. Pecos, etc., Ry. Co. v. Rosenbloom, 240 U.S. 439, 36 Sup.Ct. 390, 60 L.Ed. 730; C., B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. Harrington, 241 U.S. 177, 36 Sup.Ct. 517, 60 L.Ed. 941.

The general doctrine that the paramount jurisdiction of Congress when actually exercised, is exclusive, has been applied to a variety of subjects, including, among others, contracts between carrier and shipper in interstate commerce, Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491, 33 Sup.Ct. 148, 57 L.Ed. 314, 44 L.R.A. (N.S.) 257; hours of service of employes in such commerce, No. Pacific R.R. Co. v. Washington, 222 U.S. 370, 32 Sup.Ct. 160, 56 L.Ed. 237; Erie R.R. Co. v. New York, 233 U.S. 671, 34 Sup.Ct. 756, 58 L.Ed. 1149, 52 L.R.A. (N.S.) 266, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 138; safety appliances on cars engaged in interstate commerce, Southern Ry. Co. v. R.R. Commission of Indiana, 236 U.S. 439, 35 Sup.Ct. 304, 59 L.Ed. 661; Texas & Pacific R.R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 41, 36 Sup.Ct. 482, 60 L.Ed. 874; Spokane & Inland Empire R.R. Co. v.

Campbell, 241 U.S. 497, 36 Sup.Ct. 683, 60 L.Ed. 1125 (decided by the Supreme Court June 12, 1916) , where, in an action upon the federal Employers' Liability Act and the federal Safety Appliance Act (Act March 2, 1893, c. 196, 27 Stat. 531 (Comp. St. 1913, Sec. 8605)), it was said that the 'employe's right to recover against his employer depends upon acts of Congress, to which all state legislation affecting the subject-matter must yield. ' There can be no doubt that the federal Employers' Liability Act provides exclusive remedy for at least negligent injuries to employes of interstate railroad carriers while actually engaged in interstate commerce.

It is urged, however, that Congress has not entered the field of liability for nonnegligent injuries to employes in interstate commerce. It was said in the Horton Case (233 U.S. 501, 502 34 Sup.Ct. 635, 58 L.Ed. 1062, L.R.A. 1915C, 1, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 475) that by the Employers' Liability Act 'it was the intention of Congress to base the action upon negligence only, and...