Grant v. Saunders

• Decision Date: 01 June 1903
• Citation: 95 N.W. 411,121 Iowa 80
• Parties: ROLAND GRANT, Administrator, Appellant, v. WILLIAM A. SAUNDERS, et al., Executors
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

95 N.W. 411

121 Iowa 80

ROLAND GRANT, Administrator, Appellant, v. WILLIAM A. SAUNDERS, et al., Executors

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

June 1, 1903

Appeal from Henry District Court.--HON. JAMES D. SMYTH, Judge.

THE appellant and others, whom he represents, are heirs of William G. Saunders, deceased, and he brings this action in equity asking for a construction of the twenty-third clause of the will of Mr. Saunders, which is as follows: "I will and bequeath to Barbary R. Fouche, in trust, the remainder of my estate whatever it may be, for the benefit of the poor, and to be given by her to such objects, as in her judgment is worthy of assistance, from time to time, and at such times and persons as she thinks best to help. This charity fund shall be kept where it will be safe and at interest, and all to be used for charity purposes, until all expended." A demurrer to the petition was sustained, and a judgment rendered thereon dismissing the action. The plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

Palmer & Kopp for appellant.

W. A Saunders for appellees.

OPINION

SHERWIN, J.

The appellant contends that the bequest under consideration cannot be upheld for two principal reasons: First, because it is too vague and uncertain as to the beneficiaries; and second, because it is not a charitable bequest. We shall discuss these propositions in their inverse order.

Charitable gifts have been considered by the courts from the earliest recorded judicial proceedings, and many definitions thereof have been given. Lord Camden defined a charity as "a gift to a general public use, which extends to the poor as well as to the rich." Amb. 651; Franklin v Armfield, 34 Tenn. 305, 2 Sneed 305. This definition is at once concise and comprehensive, and has been adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States. Perin v. Carey, 65 U.S. 465, 24 HOW 465 (16 L.Ed. 701). It was also approved by Chancellor Kent in Coggeshall v. Pelton, 7 Johns. Ch. 292 (11 Am. Dec. 471).

Starting, then, with the proposition that a charity must be a gift for a public use, let us analyze the language of the bequest before us for the purpose of determining whether it limits the testator's bounty to such use alone. Had he given the remainder of his estate to Miss Fouche, in trust "for the benefit of the poor," without further direction, it could hardly be contended that the bequest was not charitable, whatever might be said as to its validity in other respects; for the relief of the poor and unfortunate has afforded an almost unlimited field for charitable donations, and trusts created for their benefit have almost universally been held to be charitable and valid. Tappan's Appeal, 52 Conn. 412; Williams v. Pearson, 38 Ala. 299; Clement v. Hyde, 50 Vt. 716 (28 Am. Rep. 522); Suter v. Hilliard, 132 Mass. 412 (42 Am. Rep. 444); Jones v. Habersham, 107 U.S. 174 (2 S.Ct. 336, 27 L.Ed. 401); Phillips v. Harrow, 93 Iowa 92, 61 N.W. 434. It is contended, however, that the authority given the trustees to distribute the fund "to such objects as in her judgment" are worthy of assistance, and "at such times" and to such "persons as she thinks best to help," left it optional with her to select any one as the recipient of the testator's bounty, whether within the class designated as "the poor" or not. But to so hold would require a strained and unnatural construction of the language used, and it would further require us to disconnect it from the remaining language of the clause, and construe it without reference thereto. The bequest is specifically stated to be for the benefit of the poor, and the discretion given the trustee to select such objects as are worthy must relate back to the subject of the bequest. The objects which the testator had in mind may have been individuals among the general class named, or some institution or association having for its object the benefit of the poor. It is possible that the latter thought was in the mind of the testator in view of the discretion given as to persons. But, however this may be, it is clear that the dominant thought and intent was that the fund should be devoted to the help of the poor. The further direction that assistance be given to the persons whom she might think it best to help must also be held to mean those selected from the class designated as "the poor." If we are correct in this conclusion, the bequest is purely a charitable one, and it only remains to determine whether it is so vague and uncertain as to beneficiaries as to render it void.

Counsel for the appellant have explored the entire field of charitable uses and trusts, and have favored us with an historical review of the subject full of interest and instruction. They have argued at length the doctrines of cy pres and parens patriae, and contend that the bequest herein cannot be sustained except by the adoption of the rule cy pres. But, however interesting the subject may be, a review of its history in England and in this country, and an extended notice of the many cases in which the rule has been discussed, is precluded by the proper limits of this opinion, and, in our judgment, not necessary to the determination of the case. We may, however, briefly state in a general way the rule cy pres as applied in the English Chancery Courts. It is applied to sustain bequests "where charity is the general substantial intention" and no object is mentioned, or, if mentioned, fails for any reason, or where the mode provided for the execution of the charity is uncertain and impracticable. 2 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, 595; Boyle, Char. 147, 155; Attorney General v. Minshull, 4 Ves. 14; Fisk v. Attorney General, L. R. 4 Eq. 521; 2 Perry on Trusts (4th Ed.) section 718. After an exhaustive examination of the cases both in England and in this country, which are collected and reviewed by Mr. Justice Gray in his opinion in Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. 539, 14 Allen 539, 574-594, the learned justice states that in England there are two distinct powers exercised by the chancellor in charity cases under the doctrine of cy pres; "the one derived from the royal prerogative, and the other in the exercise of judicial authority." He notices the cases where the disposition of the charity was made by chancery under the royal prerogative, and states that the power so exercised by the English chancery "does not exist in any court in this country." The cases are also reviewed which have applied the doctrine in the exercise of a general equity jurisdiction, without reference to the royal prerogative, and the learned judge states that such application stands upon very different grounds, and is favored both in England and in this country.

In Vidal et al., v. Girard's Executors, 43 U.S 127, 2 How. 127 (11 L.Ed. 205), Mr. Justice Story reached the conclusion, after an examination of some fifty of the very early English cases, many of them decided long before the statute of 43 Elizabeth, that charitable uses had been enforced in chancery upon the general jurisdiction of the court independently of the statute of 43 Elizabeth, and was, therefore, a part of the common law independently of that statute. It may be said, then, that wherever, the cy pres power has been used by the courts of this country in enforcing charitable bequests, its exercise has been placed upon the ground of general chancery power, entirely separate and distinct from any thought of prerogative power, and for the purpose of carrying out as nearly as possible the true intention of the donor. This distinction may not have been clearly expressed in all of the judicial utterances on the subject, but we think it will be found to be the basis of most, if not of all, of the decisions wherein the doctrine is recognized. In 2 Perry on Trusts, section 724, it is said that, "when the cy pres doctrine is reduced to its elements, it becomes a very simple judicial rule of construction; and, as such, courts in all of the states can and do apply it without usurping any prerogative powers." But to sustain the charity in this case we need not go to the extent of recognizing the doctrine, if, indeed, we might do so without conflicting with our own cases. Having determined that the bequest is a charitable gift to the trustee for the benefit of the poor as a class, what is in fact the uncertainty as to the intended beneficiaries; and there can be no other uncertainty unless it be as to locality, because the trustee is named, and she is ready and willing to execute the trust. The title of the fund has been placed in her for the purpose of carrying out the trust, and she has been given the power to select those of the particular class named who shall receive it. The fund, the trustee, and the class are then definite and certain. All that remains to be done to administer the trust is the selection of the beneficiaries from the designated class, and the only uncertainty is as to who they shall be. The bequest could not well have been more specific as to the persons or objects of the testators bounty without destroying its character as a charity, because...