Granviel v. State
Decision Date | 02 July 1986 |
Docket Number | No. 69177,69177 |
Citation | 723 S.W.2d 141 |
Parties | Kenneth GRANVIEL, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee. |
Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
Appeal is taken from a conviction for capital murder. V.T.C.A. Penal Code, Sec. 19.03(a)(2). After finding appellant guilty, the jury returned affirmative findings to the special issues under Art. 37.071(b), V.A.C.C.P. Punishment was assessed at death.
Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to prove the aggravating offense of aggravated rape. Appellant argues as follows:
We have set out appellant's confession in the footnote. 1 Appellant claims that his statement "that is when Laura told me I didn't have to take it, she meant rape her and I put the knife back in my pocket and we went into her bedroom", is exculpatory, in that it negates lack of consent to the intercourse. If Laura McClendon did speak the words appellant claims she did, and with the purpose appellant attributes to them, appellant's confession shows that she spoke them early in her encounter with appellant, and not at the time of the intercourse. Many events intervened between her remark and the intercourse. Concerning the intercourse, appellant states, [our emphasis.]
The confession contains no exculpatory matter. At the point when consent is an issue, that is, at the time of the intercourse, appellant's confession states that he raped the victim; in other words, that the intercourse was without the victim's consent. The rule of Palafox therefore does not apply. Ground of error number thirteen is overruled.
In his fifth ground of error appellant contends that the trial court erred in admitting his confession over objection that it was obtained in violation of appellant's right to counsel. The record reflects that the trial court held a Jackson v. Denno hearing on the voluntariness of the confession. The trial court found that the confession was made voluntarily, and that appellant had waived his right to counsel. The court overruled the objection.
The record of the hearing reflects that on the night of February 8, 1975, at 10:11 p.m., appellant went to the Fort Worth police station, accompanied by a Rev. Spearman. Officer Raulston testified that he was on duty that night. Raulston testified that the two men came into the station together, and that Rev. Spearman introduced appellant to Raulston. Appellant stated that he wanted to talk to a homicide investigator. Raulston told appellant that he was one, and appellant "asked if there was someplace that we could talk privately." Raulston then escorted the two men to an office in the homicide section and closed the door.
Raulston testified to the sequel as follows:
Raulston testified that appellant stated at this point that he also wanted to confess "to two more that he had done that night." The Riverside Village Apartments was the site of the five murders appellant had committed the previous October (including the one for which he was convicted in the instant case). Raulston testified that he was familiar with that incident, and knew then what appellant was talking about. Raulston testified that "as soon as he told us that he had wanted to confess to the Riverside Village plus two that occurred that night, I then read him the blue card and then's when we started talking about it." Raulston gave appellant the warnings prescribed by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and also warned him of his right to terminate the interview at any time under Art. 38.22, V.A.C.C.P. In connection with this, Raulston was asked:
Raulston testified that after reading the warnings to appellant, he asked him "if there was any questions or requests concerning the warning and he advised that he had no requests or questions about it; that he fully understood it."
Raulston was concerned that one or both of that night's victims might still be alive. Raulston asked if appellant would take the police back to the site of that night's murders, and appellant replied that he would. Two more officers and an assistant district attorney joined Raulston to help with the investigation. When appellant was introduced to the assistant district attorney, appellant said that he did not want any publicity. When the assistant district attorney told him that he could not make any promises, appellant turned to him and said, "well, I don't want you posing with me and saying that you solved this crime, because I came to you." Appellant, Raulston, and the other three then drove to the murder scene, leaving Rev. Spearman at the police station.
The assistant district attorney, Rufus Adcock, also testified at the Jackson v. Denno hearing. Adcock testified that when the group arrived at the apartment building to which appellant had directed them, he said to appellant, "Mr. Granviel, do you understand you have a Constitutional right to refuse us the right of entry into your home or search it for any reason whatsoever", and that appellant said yes. Adcock then asked if appellant waived the right. Adcock testified that appellant responded, "I came to you and I'm taking you to them."
Appellant gave the police a key. Raulston and Detective Hudson entered and found two dead women inside the apartment. The Crime Scene Search Unit and the Medical Examiner were summoned. After handing the investigation of the scene over to them, the officers took appellant back to the police station.
When the group returned to the police station, Detective Hudson again warned appellant of his rights, and asked appellant if he wanted to give a statement about the Riverside Village murders. Appellant replied that he did, and began at 1:09 a.m. to give a statement to Detective Hudson. The record reflects that Hudson took down the statement in longhand, and then gave his transcription to a typist to be typed.
At 2:40 a.m., appellant had finished his first statement, concerning the Riverside Village murders. As Raulston prepared to take down the second, concerning the murders appellant had committed that night, appellant told Raulston that "he had a legal question that he would like to ask." Raulston went to Adcock. Adcock came into the room and asked appellant if he could answer the question for him. Appellant replied no, he didn't think so. Adcock then motioned toward a telephone in the room and told appellant "to call whoever he liked". Appellant "then said something and looked at [Adcock]--pertaining to an automobile title and his car." Adcock further testified as follows:
Raulston then began taking appellant's statement concerning that night's murders. Appellant signed both statements in their typewritten form. Both were introduced at trial.
Appellant contends that his expression of the desire to ask a legal question constituted an invocation of the right to counsel. The Fifth Amendment right to counsel is a product of the Miranda decision:
Miranda applies, however, to statements stemming from custodial interrogation only:
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