Graves v. School Committee of Wellesley
Decision Date | 27 December 1937 |
Citation | 299 Mass. 80,12 N.E.2d 176 |
Parties | S. MONROE GRAVES v. SCHOOL COMMITTEE OF WELLESLEY. |
Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
February 2, 1937.
Present: RUGG, C.
J., FIELD, DONAHUE & LUMMUS, JJ.
School and School Committee. Practice, Civil, Reservation and report. Mandamus. Evidence, Presumptions and burden of proof. Words "Substantiated."
Upon a reservation and report to the full court by a single justice, in his discretion and without decision, of a petition for a writ of mandamus and a demurrer thereto, the question to be determined was whether the petitioner was entitled to prevail as matter of law on the facts well pleaded in the petition.
A hearing under G L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 71, Section 42, as amended by St. 1934, c 123, is in the nature of a judicial investigation after preferment of charges and notice, and the establishment of sufficient cause for dismissal by adequate evidence is required.
A dismissal of a superintendent of schools employed by a town at discretion was not in conformity with the requirements of G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 71,
Section 42, St. 1934, c. 123, where the school committee notified him that they had chosen his successor before even intimating to him that they proposed to dismiss him, and later gave him a hearing at which they introduced no evidence in support of charges made against him. Mandamus will lie to enforce compliance with the provisions of G. L. (Ter.
Ed.) c. 71, Section 42, St. 1934, c. 123, in the dismissal of a teacher.
Disbelief by a school committee of evidence favorable to a teacher at a hearing on the question of his dismissal under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 71,
Section 42, St. 1934, c. 123, is not the equivalent of evidence to support the charges against him.
PETITION for a writ of mandamus, filed in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Norfolk on August 3, 1936.
The case was reserved and reported by Lummus, J.
L. Withington, (C.
A. Bunker with him,) for the respondents.
E. F. McClennen, (L.
Kaplan with him,) for the petitioner.
The petitioner, by this petition for a writ of mandamus, seeks to be reinstated in the office of superintendent of schools of Wellesley, and other incidental relief. The petition was heard by a single justice, not on the facts, but on the demurrer of the respondents contained in their answer. In the exercise of his discretion the single justice, without decision, reserved and reported to the full court the question arising on the demurrer. That question on this form of reservation is whether the petitioner as matter of law is entitled to prevail on the facts well pleaded in the petition, which for present purposes are admitted by the demurrer to be true. Boucher v. Salem Rebuilding Commission, 225 Mass. 18 . Police Commissioner of Boston v. Boston, 239 Mass. 401 , 406. Lawrence v Board of Registration in Medicine, 239 Mass. 424 , 427. School Committee of Lowell v. Mayor of Lowell, 265 Mass. 353 , 354. Moustakis v. Hellenic Orthodox Society, 261 Mass. 462 , 464. Clancy v. Wallace, 288 Mass. 557 , 559. D. N. Kelley & Son, Inc. v. Selectmen of Fairhaven, 294 Mass. 570 , 574.
The essential facts set forth in the petition are these: The petitioner had been employed since 1914 as superintendent of schools in Wellesley, and in 1935 was holding that position on tenure at the discretion of the respondents under the provisions of G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 71, Section 41, and was not subject to dismissal except in conformity to Section 42 of said chapter as amended by St. 1934, c. 123. In July, 1935, the chairman of the respondents asked the petitioner to resign but the petitioner refused. In October, 1935, the respondents wrote the petitioner urging him to resign before the expiration of the current school year which would occur in June, 1936. In February, 1936, the respondents at a meeting stated to the petitioner that they could no longer wait for his resignation, that candidates for his position had been interviewed, and that another had already been appointed to succeed him. Early in March, 1936, the petitioner was notified that it was the intention of the respondents to vote at a meeting to be held on April 7, 1936, that his employment would be terminated on July 31, 1936. The petitioner on March 12, 1936, requested a "written statement of the charge or charges of the cause or causes" for which his dismissal was proposed and he also requested a hearing. Under date of April 1 the chairman of the respondents sent to the petitioner a letter of the following tenor:
The petitioner answered stating that the reasons given were too general to enable him to prepare his defence and requesting specifications of details as to which his work had been unsatisfactory. This request was refused but the chairman of the respondents wrote that in order to assist the petitioner better "to understand some of our charges" it might be added: ...
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