Gray v. CITY OF HAMMOND, INDIANA

• Citation: 693 F. Supp.2d 823
• Decision Date: 04 March 2010
• Docket Number: Cause No.: 2:08-CV-114-TS.
• Parties: Derrick GRAY, Yolanda Gray, Amir Gray, a minor, Derrick Gray, a minor, and Atia Gray, a minor, by their next friend, Yolanda Gray, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF HAMMOND, INDIANA, Sgt. Patrick Vicari, Cpl. Karl Eidam, City of Calumet City, and Sgt. Kevin Urbanek, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

693 F. Supp.2d 823

Derrick GRAY, Yolanda Gray, Amir Gray, a minor, Derrick Gray, a minor, and Atia Gray, a minor, by their next friend, Yolanda Gray, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF HAMMOND, INDIANA, Sgt. Patrick Vicari, Cpl. Karl Eidam, City of Calumet City, and Sgt. Kevin Urbanek, Defendants.

Cause No.: 2:08-CV-114-TS.

United States District Court, N.D. Indiana.

March 4, 2010.

Darnail Lyles, Lyles & Harris PC, Gary, IN, for Plaintiffs.

Donald Paul Levinson, Shana D. Levinson, Levinson & Levinson, Merrillville, IN, William Joseph O'Connor, Attorney at Law, Hammond, IN, Michael J. McGrath PHV, Robert Wilder PHV, Odelson & Sterk Ltd., Evergreen Park, IL, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

THERESA L. SPRINGMANN, District Judge.

This matter is before the court on the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants City of Hammond, Indiana, Sergeant Patrick Vicari (Vicari), and Corporal Karl Eidam (Eidam) DE 38.¹ In support of their Motion, the Defendants filed a Brief in Support DE 39 and a Supplemental Brief DE 46. The Plaintiffs filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion DE 48 and an Appendix DE 49. The Defendants also filed a Reply Brief DE 50. The Court has carefully considered all of the briefs and supporting exhibits submitted by the parties. For the reasons discussed below, the Defendants' Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Summary judgment is GRANTED to Defendant City of Hammond on all claims asserted against it; summary judgment is GRANTED to Defendants Vicari and Eidam on all claims asserted against them in their official capacity; summary judgment is GRANTED to Defendants Vicari and Eidam on all of the Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claims related to the initial traffic stop of their vehicle; summary judgment is GRANTED as to Derrick Gray's and Yolanda Gray's claims of malicious prosecution; summary judgment is GRANTED to Defendants Vicari and Eidam on all claims asserted against them by Atia Gray; summary judgment is GRANTED to Defendants Vicari and Eidam on all claims asserted against them by Amir Gray; summary judgment is DENIED as to Derrick Gray's and Yolanda Gray's claims of excessive force and claims of unreasonable search and seizure; summary judgment is DENIED as to Derrick Gray, Jr.'s, claim of excessive force; and summary judgment is DENIED as to Defendants Vicari's and Eidam's defense of qualified immunity.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Derrick and Yolanda Gray, who are husband and wife, initiated this lawsuit on April 14, 2008, on behalf of themselves and their minor children. (Compl., DE 1.) They filed an Amended Complaint on June 25, 2008 DE 19 and it is this Amended Complaint that now controls the case.² In their Amended Complaint, the Plaintiffs allege that the City of Hammond, Indiana, and the City of Calumet City, Illinois, are liable to the Gray family for violations of their First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights (Count I). More specifically, the Plaintiffs contend that the City Defendants failed to "properly hire, adequately supervise, and train" their police officers. (Id. ¶ 2.) Defendants Vicari and Eidam are police officers employed by the city of Hammond, and Defendant Urbanek is a police officer employed by the City of Calumet City. (Id. ¶ 1.) In addition to suing the municipalities, the Grays are suing Officers Vicari, Eidam, and Urbanek for false arrest and battery (Count II), excessive force (Count III), and abuse of process and malicious prosecution (Count IV). The Amended Complaint (like the original Complaint) does not indicate whether they are suing the three police officers in their individual capacities, their official capacities, or both. But more on this later. The Grays bring their claims via 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988.

The violations alleged by the Plaintiffs arose out of events that occurred on July 7, 2006, in Hammond. In their Amended Complaint, the Plaintiffs allege that they were in their car, and had just backed out of their driveway, when the Defendant officers "stopped the Gray's vehicle 200 yards from their home and pointed their guns at everyone in the car and ordered everyone out of the car." (Id. ¶¶ 8-9.) The Plaintiffs insist that they "were lawfully engaged in constitutionally protected activity and had committed no crime and therefore were stopped even though the police had no probable cause." (Id. ¶ 10.) The Amended Complaint states that the officers surrounded the Plaintiffs' vehicle and never asked them to produce identification, or otherwise attempted to learn their identity. The Plaintiffs maintain that "Mr. and Mrs. Gray did not resist or become disorderly, and they consistent with their First Amendment rights repeatedly asked what they had done to warrant their being stopped." (Id. ¶ 13.) The Plaintiffs contend that officers then pointed their firearms at one of their children, who was fourteen years old at the time, and ordered him out of the vehicle. Mrs. Gray then exited the vehicle after being directed to do so by the officers and was "violently tackled" by Defendant Vicari, "handcuffed, battered, and manhandled." (Id. ¶ 14.) When the Grays' seventeen-year-old son got out of the vehicle and asked why his mother was being "dragged on the ground," they allege that he was forced to the ground in "a chokehold" and held on the ground "with a gun put to his head." (Id.) The Amended Complaint makes no factual assertions concerning any physical altercation between Mr. Gray and any of the officers, although such assertions are made in the Plaintiffs' Response and Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment. Those allegations, and other details provided by the parties, will be discussed below as they become relevant to the Court's analysis.

In Count IV of the Amended Complaint, the Plaintiffs contend that some time after the events of July 7, 2006, Defendants Vicari, Eidam and Urbanek "did intentionally abuse the legal process and maliciously prosecute the Plaintiffs, Derrick Gray and Yolanda Gray." (Id. ¶ 24.) The Plaintiffs allege that "as a result of the actions of the Defendants Mr. and Mrs. Gray were criminally charged." but that they "were acquitted at trial on March 29, 2007." (Id. ¶¶ 25-26.) By way of their lawsuit, the Plaintiffs seek compensatory damages in the amount of $5 million for physical and emotional injuries suffered by all members of their family.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when the record shows that there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Disputes concerning material facts are genuine where the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In deciding whether genuine issues of material fact exist, the court construes all facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. However, neither the "mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties," id., 477 U.S. at 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, nor the existence of "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986), will defeat a motion for summary judgment. Michas v. Health Cost Controls of Ill., Inc., 209 F.3d 687, 692 (7th Cir.2000).

Summary judgment is not a substitute for a trial on the merits nor is it a vehicle for resolving factual disputes. Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir.1994). Therefore, after drawing all reasonable inferences from the facts in favor of the non-movant, if genuine doubts remain and a reasonable fact-finder could find for the party opposing the motion, summary judgment is inappropriate. See Shields Enters., Inc. v. First Chi. Corp., 975 F.2d 1290, 1294 (7th Cir.1992); Wolf v. City of Fitchburg, 870 F.2d 1327, 1330 (7th Cir.1989). But if it is clear that a plaintiff will be unable to satisfy the legal requirements necessary to establish his or her case, summary judgment is not only appropriate, but mandated. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Ziliak v. AstraZeneca LP, 324 F.3d 518, 520 (7th Cir.2003). A failure to prove one essential element "necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

The party seeking summary judgment on a claim on which the non-moving party bears the burden of proof at trial may discharge its burden by showing an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. A plaintiff's self-serving statements, which are speculative or which lack a foundation of personal knowledge, and which are unsupported by specific concrete facts reflected in the record, cannot preclude summary judgment. Albiero v. City of Kankakee, 246 F.3d 927, 933 (7th Cir.2001); Stagman v. Ryan, 176 F.3d 986, 995 (7th Cir.1999); Slowiak v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 987 F.2d 1293, 1295 (7th Cir.1993).

DISCUSSION

In their Motion for Summary Judgment, the Defendants, not surprisingly, present a very different version of the events of July 7, 2006, and contend that none of the individual officers' actions violated the Plaintiffs' constitutional rights. The Defendants also argue that the City of Hammond cannot be held liable for any of the Plaintiffs' alleged constitutional violations since they cannot establish that the City had in place a policy or procedure that resulted in any of the alleged violations of their constitutional rights. Vicari and Eidam also argue that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the Plaintiffs' claims of malicious prosecution and/or abuse of process. In the alternative, Vicari and Eidam argue that they are...