Pearson v. City of Fort Wayne
| Decision Date | 20 July 2015 |
| Docket Number | CAUSE NO. 1:13-CV-332 RLM |
| Parties | ESTATE OF ANTRON PEARSON, by its Personal Representative Barbara D. Pearson, Plaintiff v. CITY OF FORT WAYNE, INDIANA, and OFFICER JOSHUA FRANCISCY, in his individual and official capacities, Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
ESTATE OF ANTRON PEARSON, by its Personal Representative
Barbara D. Pearson, Plaintiff
v.
CITY OF FORT WAYNE, INDIANA, and OFFICER JOSHUA FRANCISCY, in
his individual and official capacities, Defendants
CAUSE NO. 1:13-CV-332 RLM
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA FORT WAYNE DIVISION
July 20, 2015
OPINION and ORDER
This cause is before the court on the motion of the City of Fort Wayne, Indiana and Officer Joshua Franciscy for summary judgment on the claims of the Estate of Antron Pearson. Also pending is the defendants' motion to strike the exhibits submitted by the Estate in support of its summary judgment response. For the following reasons, the court denies the motion to strike and grants the summary judgment motion.
The Estate hasn't set forth its version of the facts of this case or a statement of genuine disputes as required by Rule 56.1(b)(2) of the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana. Fortunately, the record
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contains a discussion of the facts and issues sufficient to allow a ruling on the summary judgment motion.
The events in this case revolve around actions in the early morning hours of November 26, 2011 outside Broadway Joe's, a bar in Fort Wayne, Indiana. Officers of the Fort Wayne Police Department were in the area of the bar when they heard gunfire. In the process of the investigation undertaken by three Fort Wayne police officers on the scene, Officer Joshua Franciscy shot and killed Antron Pearson outside Broadway Joe's. The Estate alleges in its complaint that the shooting was unjustified in that Mr. Pearson was unarmed and posed no threat to police officers or others at the scene.
The Estate filed suit in this court naming as defendants the City of Fort Wayne, Indiana, and Officer Joshua Franciscy, in his individual and official capacities. The Estate's claims, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, are that Officer Franciscy's actions amounted to excessive force in violation of Mr. Pearson's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and the City of Fort Wayne violated Mr. Pearson's rights by failing to properly train and supervise its employees. The Estate also asserts state law claims under the Indiana Tort Claims Act, IND. CODE § 34-13-3-1 et seq., and Indiana's Wrongful Death Act, IND. CODE § 34-23-1-1 et seq., against Officer Franciscy for wrongful death, the City of Fort Wayne for negligence, and both defendants for assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Estate also alleges liability by the Fort Wayne
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Police Department (an entity not named as a defendant in this action) in its claims for failure to train and supervise, negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The defendants dispute the Estate's version of the facts, and Officer Franciscy and the City of Fort Wayne have moved for summary judgment on all claims of the Estate's complaint.
The City and Officer Franciscy have moved to strike the Allen County Coroner's Report and the Postmortem Examination Amended Final Report submitted by the Estate in support of its summary judgment response. The defendants say that because those reports are unsworn and unauthenticated, they constitute hearsay documents that are inadmissible in a summary judgment proceeding. The Estate hasn't filed a response to the motion to strike, and the time for doing so has passed.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, as amended, provides that materials submitted in response to a motion for summary judgment need only be capable of being presented in a form admissible at trial. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(2) ("A party may object that the material cited to support or dispute a fact cannot be presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence."). While the Estate's submissions aren't verified or authenticated, the documents appear to be business
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records or public records capable of being presented in a form that would be admissible at trial. See FED. R. EVID. 803(6, 8); United States v. Given, 164 F.3d 389, 394 (7th Cir. 1999) ("A party establishes a foundation for admission of business records when it demonstrates through the testimony of a qualified witness that the records were kept in the course of regularly conducted business activity, and that it was the regular practice of that business to make such records."). In the interest of justice, then, the court will deny the motion to strike and consider the records submitted by the Estate.
Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to the interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). A genuine issue of material fact exists whenever "there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). In deciding whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, "the evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Weigle v. SPX Corp., 729 F.3d 724, 730 (7th Cir. 2013). The existence of an alleged factual dispute, by itself, won't defeat a
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summary judgment motion; "instead, the nonmovant must present definite, competent evidence in rebuttal," Parent v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 694 F.3d 919, 922 (7th Cir. 2012), and "must affirmatively demonstrate, by specific factual allegations, that there is a genuine issue of material fact that requires trial." Hemsworth v. Quotesmith.com, Inc., 476 F.3d 487, 490 (7th Cir. 2007); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)(2). "[S]ummary judgment is 'not a dress rehearsal or practice run; it is the put up or shut up moment in a lawsuit, when a party must show what evidence it has that would convince a trier of fact to accept its version of events." Steen v. Myers, 486 F.3d 1017, 1022 (7th Cir. 2007)(quoting Hammel v. Eau Galle Cheese Factory, 407 F.3d 852, 859 (7th Cir. 2005)).
To prevail under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Estate must establish that (1) Mr. Pearson had a constitutionally protected right, (2) he was deprived of that right, (3) Officer Franciscy intentionally caused that deprivation, and (4) Officer Franciscy acted under color of state law. Forrest v. Prine, 620 F.3d 739, 743 (7th Cir. 2010). The first and fourth elements aren't at issue here. A police officer's use of deadly force constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985); McKinney v. Duplain, 463 F.3d 679, 684 (7th Cir. 2006), and the parties don't dispute that Officer Franciscy was acting under color of state law. The defendants do, however, challenge the
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Estate's claims that Officer Franciscy's actions were "without legal justification or provocation and constitute[d] an unreasonable seizure of [Mr.] Pearson's person, an unconstitutional use of excessive force, and cruel and unusual punishment without due process of law." Compl., ¶ 29. The parties' arguments on the Estate's claims that Officer Franciscy violated Mr. Pearson's constitutional rights are addressed below.
The first consideration is what analysis governs the Estate's claim of a constitutional violation. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393 (1989) ("In addressing an excessive force claim brought under § 1983, analysis begins by identifying the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed by the challenged application of force."). "The scope of an individual's right to be free from punishment - and, derivatively, the basis for an excessive force action brought under § 1983 - hinges on his status within the criminal justice system." Lewis v. Downey, 581 F.3d 467, 473 (7th Cir. 2009). Cases in this circuit establish that "the protections of the Fourth Amendment apply at arrest and through the [] probable cause hearing, [Fourteenth Amendment] due process principles govern a pretrial detainee's conditions of confinement after the judicial determination of probable cause, and the Eighth Amendment applies following conviction." Lopez v. City of Chicago, 464 F.3d 711, 719 (7th Cir. 2006); see also Ortiz v. City of
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Chicago, 656 F.3d 523, 530 (7th Cir. 2011) ("Because [decedent] had not yet benefitted from a judicial determination of probable cause, . . . we agree that the Fourth Amendment applies."); Luck v. Rovenstine, 168 F.3d 323, 326 (7th Cir. 1999) ("There is, to be sure, a difference between the constitutional provisions that apply to the period of confinement before and after a probable cause hearing: the Fourth Amendment governs the former and the Due Process Clause the latter."). No probable cause hearing had taken place, so a Fourth Amendment standard governs the Estate's excessive force claim .
"[T]he Fourth Amendment prohibits the use of excessive force during the execution of a seizure. . . . [T]o decide whether the amount of force used during a seizure is 'excessive,' [the court must] examine the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the intrusion on the citizen's Fourth Amendment interests was justified by the countervailing...
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