Gray v. Lee, Civ. A. No. B-74-1148.

Citation486 F. Supp. 41
Decision Date28 January 1980
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. B-74-1148.
PartiesEdward B. GRAY, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v. Blair LEE, III, Individually and in his official capacity as Acting Governor of the State of Maryland, and Robert J. Lally, Individually and in his official capacity as Secretary of the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services, and Mark A. Levine, Individually and in his official capacity as Commissioner of the Division of Correction of the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services, and Ralph L. Williams, Individually and in his official capacity as Warden of the Maryland House of Correction, and William S. James, Individually and in his official capacity as Treasurer of the State of Maryland.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Maryland

Robert B. Levin, Baltimore, Md., for plaintiff.

Stephen H. Sachs, Atty. Gen. of Md., Stephen Rosenbaum, Asst. Atty. Gen. of Md., Baltimore, Md., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM

C. STANLEY BLAIR, District Judge.

This is a class action pursuant to Fed.R. Civ.P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2) brought by Edward B. Gray, an inmate currently incarcerated in the Maryland House of Correction1, on behalf of all persons presently incarcerated in Maryland state penal institutions who are subject to the regulations of the Division of Correction of the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services which govern the treatment of inmate funds and finances. The plaintiff class bases its claim upon the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, with jurisdiction based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3).

Edward Gray, the representative of the plaintiff class, filed the subject action on October 18, 1974, alleging several constitutional violations arising out of his commitment to the Maryland penal system. In particular, Mr. Gray alleged that the Division of Correction regulations which require an inmate to surrender his or her money to the penal institution so that such funds could be placed in a non-interest bearing account for the benefit of that inmate are unconstitutional. In addition, Gray alleged that conditions at the Maryland House of Correction were such as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment.2 On November 7, 1974, the defendants responded to Mr. Gray's complaint by filing a Motion to Dismiss (See Paper No. 7) and Mr. Gray, in turn, responded by filing numerous documents with the Court, some of which raised new allegations while others were of questionable relevance.3 In addition, Mr. Gray moved for summary judgment on February 14, 1975. (See Paper No. 19). On March 26, 1975, this Court ruled on the pending motions before it and denied the defendants' Motion to Dismiss those allegations pertaining to the questionable constitutionality of the maintenance with inmate funds of non-interest bearing inmate accounts within the Maryland House of Correction. (See Paper No. 24). The defendants' Motion to Dismiss was granted as to the plaintiff's allegations of cruel and unusual punishment on the grounds that Mr. Gray's allegations were insufficient to state a claim for any deprivation of constitutional rights. The numerous documents filed by Mr. Gray which requested various forms of relief were denied by this Court for reasons set forth in the Order dated March 26, 1975. Since Mr. Gray's Motion for Summary Judgment made no mention of the matter of inmate accounts, which was at that time the only issue remaining in the case, that too was denied. The defendants then promptly moved for a summary judgment on April 7, 1975, (See Paper No. 25) on the grounds that the defendants are not depriving the inmate of his property without due process of law inasmuch as they are merely reserving the money for him until the time of his release and are not appropriating the funds forever for their own use. A Roseboro letter4 was mailed to the plaintiff on October 17, 1975, (See Paper No. 26) informing him that the defendants had moved for a summary judgment and of his rights under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Plaintiff responded with an "Opposition Motion" in which he claimed that defendants' summary judgment motion was "not worthy of an answer" and he attached thereto a newspaper article citing the Anne Arundel County Grand Jury's difficulty in effecting reform at the Maryland House of Correction. (See Paper No. 27).

On May 6, 1977, Michael J. Travieso, Esquire, entered his appearance on behalf of the plaintiff and subsequently filed an amended complaint (See Paper No. 31) which listed the issues which are presently before this Court.5 In this amended complaint brought on behalf of "all other inmates presently incarcerated in the several penal institutions under the control of the Division of Correction which require inmates to deposit funds into a Reserve Account in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Division of Correction", the plaintiff has set forth four counts which are listed as follows: (1) deprivation of property without due process of law; (2) confiscation of property without just compensation; (3) violation of the equal protection clause; and (4) breach of fiduciary duty. All of these counts relate to the allegedly unconstitutional manner in which inmate accounts are established and managed within Maryland's penal system.

On December 15, 1977, the defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss and an alternate Motion for Summary Judgment in which they defend the propriety of the various monetary policies of the Maryland Division of Correction. (See Paper No. 34). In support thereof, an affidavit was submitted by Mark A. Levine, then the Commissioner of the Division of Correction, the substance of which will be discussed infra.

On December 30, 1977, the plaintiff propounded interrogatories to the defendants (See Paper No. 36) and made requests for admissions (See Paper No. 37) in conformity with Fed.R.Civ.P. 36 and, after being granted an extension of time to respond, (See Paper No. 38) the defendants replied on March 20, 1978. (See Paper Nos. 40, 41 & 42). Answers to interrogatories were provided by William S. James, State Treasurer, and Mark A. Levine, Commissioner of the Division of Correction, and, with exceptions to be more fully discussed infra, the defendants complied with plaintiff's request for admissions.

On April 10, 1978, the plaintiff moved for summary judgment (See Paper No. 44) and on April 19, 1978, this Court ordered that the subject action be certified as a class action pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2) (See Paper No. 47) and defined the class as "all persons presently incarcerated in State penal institutions who are subject to the Regulations of the Division of Correction of the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services which govern the treatment of inmate funds and finances."6 This action is presently before the Court on cross motions for summary judgment and the defendants have moved in the alternative for dismissal.

INMATE ACCOUNTS

The subject action arises out of inmate objections to the manner and method in which money belonging to inmates is confiscated and managed by prison officials. In particular, the plaintiff objects to an inmate's inability to earn interest on funds kept within his or her "reserve account" within a given penal institution. The disposition of such a complaint necessarily requires an understanding of the institutional management of inmate funds.

Upon their initial entry into the Maryland penal system, inmates are provided with a handbook entitled A GENERAL INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE MANUAL FOR INMATES which provides an overview of the prisoner's rights and obligations while incarcerated. According to this manual, and pursuant to Division of Correction Regulation (DCR) 245-1, all money in an inmate's possession when he is received at the reception center of an institution is surrendered to the institution and a receipt is provided to the prisoner. DCR 245-1 4a. This money is then used to establish an "institutional account" for the inmate which includes not only the money surrendered by the prisoner upon his entry into the penal system but also any money received from any source outside of the institution, any money earned by the inmate while in the institution, and any money found in an inmate's possession in violation of prison regulations or directions.7 This institutional account is made up of two distinct subparts: the reserve account and the spending account. The reserve account consists of the designated amount of $20.00 which is accumulated by the prison officials withholding approximately one-third of the inmate's earnings. DCR 245-1. The spending account, on the other hand, comes into being only after the required reserve amount has been set aside. This amount may be used by the inmate to purchase goods from the institution's commissary. Any amount in excess of $25.00 which is transferred into the inmate's commissary account or used for commissary purchases within any given week must first be approved by the managing officer or his staff designee within the institution. DCR 245-1 4d(2). In his answers to interrogatories propounded by the plaintiff, Mark Levine, the Commissioner of the Division of Correction, states that an inmate within Maryland's jurisdiction may transfer funds from his spending account into an individual savings account outside of the institution.8 (See Paper No. 42). Indeed, as of March 1978, forty-one inmates of the Maryland House of Correction had opened interest bearing savings accounts with the Maryland National Bank. (See Defendants' Exhibit 4 to Paper No. 42). The question presently before this Court is whether an inmate is entitled to receive interest on the amount maintained in his reserve account and this the Court answers in the negative.

RELEVANT LAW

While it is true that "there is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisoners of this country", Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2974, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (197...

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  • Hendrix v. Evans
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana
    • March 15, 1989
    ...found that a federal prisoner has no constitutional right to draw interest on his commissary account. Id. at 599. Lastly, in Gray v. Lee, 486 F.Supp. 41 (D.Md.1980), aff'd, 661 F.2d 921 (4th Cir.1981), the district court concluded that refusal to pay interest on inmate funds did not deprive......
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