Gray v. the Super. Ct.
| Decision Date | 16 January 2002 |
| Docket Number | E029464,4 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | SAMUEL LEE GRAY, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO, Respondent; THE PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest. E029464 COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH DISTRICT DIVISION TWO STATE OF CALIFORNIA Filed |
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for writ of mandate. San Bernardino Superior Court, Douglas A. Fettel, Judge. Petition denied.
John E. Roth, Public Defender, and Pamela P. King, Deputy Public Defender, for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Dennis L. Stout, District Attorney, Grover D. Merritt, Lead Deputy District Attorney, and Mary L. Andonov, Deputy District Attorney for Real Party in Interest.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
Acting P. J.
Petitioner Samuel Gray (Gray) is the respondent below in a proceeding brought under what is commonly known as the "Sexually Violent Predators Act" (Act). (Welf. & Inst. Code, 6600 et seq.)1 In this proceeding, he seeks to compel dismissal of the proceedings because recent psychological evaluations reflect a difference of expert opinion on whether he meets the statutory criteria for a "sexually violent predator," and is therefore subject to involuntary commitment under the Act.
A petition for commitment as a sexually violent offender was filed against Gray by the San Bernardino County District Attorney on October 11, 1996. It was supported by the expert evaluations of Drs. Charles Jackson and Dean Haddock, both of whom concluded that Gray met the criteria set out in section 6601, subdivision (d).2
The matter then languished until 1999.3 After various trial court proceedings, Gray filed a petition with this court seeking dismissal. In that petition, he argued that three new evaluations had been conducted (by Drs. Kania, Owen, and Matosich), two of which-those by Kania and Owen-expressed the opinion that he did not meet the criteria. At that point, a probable cause hearing ( 6602) had already been held, and the scheduled commencement of trial was imminent. This court denied that petition.
Trial was not held in 1999. In 2001, four more evaluations were obtained. In January, Dr. Matosich evaluated Gray and found that he met the criteria, while Dr. Jackson believed that he did not.4 In March, there was a similar split of opinion between Drs. Sheppard and Arnold.
Gray then moved for summary judgment (Code Civ. Proc., 437c) on the basis that the current state of the evaluations established that "essential foundational underpinnings of the petition cannot be established [and] pursuit of the petition is not statutorily authorized." The gravamen of his argument was that Dr. Kania's 1999 opinion was a "replacement" for Dr. Haddock's (who apparently was no longer personally available), that this created a split of opinion with Dr. Jackson,5 and that under section 6601, subdivision (f), the petition was only proper if both of the second set of evaluators (Owen and Matosich) agreed that he met the Act's criteria.6 The trial
court disagreed and this petition followed.7
The Statutory Scheme
The portions of the Act which are crucial to this case prescribe the conditions which must exist in order for a petition for commitment to be filed. As effective in 1996, an inmate who was found likely to be a sexually violent predator after an initial screening by the Department of Corrections or Board of Prison Terms, was to be evaluated by two mental health professionals. If both agreed that the inmate met the criteria, a petition could be filed. ( 6601, subd. (d).) If only one believed that the inmate qualified, a second round of evaluations by a pair of "independent professionals"8 was to be conducted, and a petition could only be filed if both of these independent evaluators found that the inmate met the criteria. ( 6601, subds. (e) & (f).)
It is not disputed that the 1996 filing was properly supported by two concurring initial evaluations, those of Drs. Jackson and Haddock. However, Gray notes that the evaluation performed in 1999 by Dr. Kania was apparently intended as a "replacement" for that of the unavailable Dr. Haddock under section 6603, subdivision (c).9 He then argues that because Dr. Kania's opinion created a "split" with that of Dr. Jackson, that section 6603 subdivision (c) requires two additional evaluations-here, those of Drs. Owen and Matosich. Because these two evaluators did not agree, Gray asserts that the petition was no longer viable.10
The basis for this assertion is the reference in section 6603, subdivision (c), back to section 6601, subdivision (f). The latter statute provides that when the original two evaluators disagree, a petition may only be filed if both of the "independent professionals" find that the inmate does meet the Act's criteria. Gray contends that the statute also requires the dismissal of an existing petition if later evaluations do not produce the concurrence required for an initial filing.
As the Supreme Court noted in Albertson v. Superior Court (2001) 25 Cal.4th 796, 805-806 (Albertson), subdivision (c) of section 6603 was enacted in response to a decision by the Court of Appeal (Sporich v. Superior Court (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 422) which held that the People were not entitled to obtain new or updated evaluations, even if trial on a petition was delayed for months or (as in this case) years. Such an evaluation may be crucial, because a commitment under the Act must be based on an inmate's "currently diagnosed mental disorder." ( 6600, subd. (a)(3).) Accordingly, it is plain that "a county seeking [ ] commitment [under the Act] would be placed in an untenable position were it precluded from obtaining access to information concerning an individual's current mental state." (Albertson, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 802-803.)
This much is clear. It is less clear, however, what the Legislature's purpose was in providing for a further set of evaluations in the event that an update (or replacement) resulted in a split of opinion.11
Gray's position, of course, is that the Legislature intended that all provisions of section 6601 relating to evaluation should apply to a split of opinion created by new evaluations, even if the application requires us either to insert language into section 6603, subdivision (c), or to construe the former section through the use of analogy.
It is axiomatic that in construing or interpreting legislation, the courts should not imply additional language in order to accomplish some supposed legislative purpose, at least not without very clear indications that the purpose was intended. (See Robert F. Kennedy Medical Center v. Belsh (1996) 13 Cal.4th 748, 756; Adoption of Kelsey S. (1992) 1 Cal.4th 816, 827.) Section 6603, subdivision (c), simply provides that if a replacement or updated evaluation results in a split opinion, "the State Department of Mental Health shall conduct two additional evaluations in accordance with subdivision (f) of Section 6601." The latter statute, in turn, provides for "independent professionals," and requires these evaluators to provide certain information to the person being examined. To this extent, subdivision (f) of section 6601 has a clear application to the new evaluations required by section 6603, subdivision (c). However, subdivision (f), as Gray stresses, also prohibits the filing of a petition under the Act unless both of the independent evaluators concur that the subject qualifies.12 This does not apply to Gray's situation.
Gray would have us amend subdivision (f) of section 6601 to read in part (with changes in the language italicized): This, however, is not what the statute says. To say that a petition may not be filed unless certain conditions are met is not the same as to say that proceedings "may not go forward" if those conditions cease to exist.
Gray's view of what the statute should say, or how it should be interpreted, is not implausible. As section 6605, and the court in Albertson recognize, the mental state or condition of a person who is the subject of proceedings under the Act may change during the pendency of proceedings, especially where they are, as here, protracted. Arguably, it would be desirable to provide that if the factors which supported the filing of a petition no longer exist, proceedings should terminate.
But neither is the contrary position unreasonable. Section 6603, subdivision (c), merely provides that the new evaluators shall conduct their evaluations "in accordance with" section 6601, subdivision (f). It does not, on its face, provide any consequences for a split of opinion between the second set of evaluators.13 Accordingly, we are unwilling to imply the drastic requirement of dismissal.
It may be argued that the purpose of the second set of evaluators required by section 6603, subdivision (c), in the event of a postfiling split of opinion, can only be to resolve the difference of expert opinion, and thereafter to lead to such further action-either continued prosecution or dismissal-as may be mandated by the new evaluations. However, the Legislature certainly knows how to provide for dismissal when it wishes to do so. Section 6602, subdivision (a), which relates to probable cause hearings, clearly requires that "[i]f the judge determines there is not probable cause [to believe that the person is a sexually violent predator], he or she shall dismiss the petition . . . ." Thus, we find it unlikely that the silence in the statutes we are considering reflects a legislative intent for dismissal. In the circumstances, we...
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