Great American Indemnity Co. v. Blakey
Decision Date | 24 March 1937 |
Docket Number | No. 9981.,9981. |
Citation | 107 S.W.2d 1002 |
Parties | GREAT AMERICAN INDEMNITY CO. et al. v. BLAKEY. |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from District Court, Nueces County; W. B. Hopkins, Judge.
Action by C. R. Blakey against the Great American Indemnity Company and another. Judgment for plaintiff against the named defendant, and the named defendant appeals.
Judgment denying recovery against other defendant affirmed, and judgment in favor of plaintiff against the named defendant reversed and rendered.
John C. North and Leslie S. Lockett, both of Corpus Christi, for appellant.
Sidney P. Chandler, of Corpus Christi, for appellee.
Appellee, C. R. Blakey, as plaintiff below, instituted this suit against the Great American Indemnity Company, and the City of Corpus Christi, seeking to recover the sum of $5,344.50, as compensation for an injury to his back, sustained by him while he was an employee of the City of Corpus Christi.
A trial was had before the court, without a jury, and judgment was rendered in the sum of $3,531.80 in favor of appellee and against the Great American Indemnity Company. Recovery against the city was in all things denied. The Great American Indemnity Company has appealed.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in not sustaining its general demurrer to appellee's petition, because said petition does not allege that the City of Corpus Christi was a subscriber under the Workmen's Compensation Law, nor does it allege that he received his injury as a result of the negligence of the City of Corpus Christi, its agents, employees, or servants.
The general rule is well established that where an employee sues a nonsubscribing employer he must allege and prove that he received his injury as the result of the negligence of the employer or his agents or servants. Article 8306, section 1, subdivision 4, R.S.1925; West Lumber Company v. Smith (Tex.Com.App.) 292 S.W. 1103; Rio Bravo Oil Company v. Matthews (Tex.Civ.App.) 20 S.W.(2d) 342; Davis v. W. T. Carter & Bro. (Tex.Civ.App.) 19 S.W.(2d) 336; Hutton v. Burkett (Tex. Civ.App.) 18 S.W.(2d) 740; West Lumber Co. v. Morris & Barnes (Tex.Civ.App.) 257 S.W. 592.
Appellee has answered this contention by pointing out, in the first place, that the City of Corpus Christi cannot become a subscriber under the Workmen's Compensation Law. City of Tyler v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n (Tex.Com.App.) 288 S.W. 409. And that in view of this fact the Great American Indemnity Company issued to the City of Corpus Christi a policy of insurance such as is ordinarily issued to subscribers under the Workmen's Compensation Act, and placed a rider on said policy styled "Voluntary Compensation Endorsement," as follows:
It is appellee's contention that this rider upon the policy gives him the right to sue the indemnity company directly and relieves him from the necessity of alleging and proving the negligence of his nonsubscribing employer, because the rider states that the company will voluntarily pay such compensation, regardless of whether or not the employee would have a legal claim under the Workmen's Compensation Law against his employer.
This contention presents a very difficult question, in view of the fact that the Workmen's Compensation Act provides (article 8306, § 1, subd. 4): "In all such actions against an employer who is not a subscriber, as defined hereafter in this law, it shall be necessary to a recovery for the plaintiff to prove negligence of such employer or some agent or servant of such employer acting within the general scope of his employment."
Article 8306, § 4, provides, in effect, that in suits by employees against employers who are not subscribers the provisions of section 1 shall be applied, and, of course, this includes subdivision 4, as above set out. See, also, section 12h, article 8306.
It occurs to us that the language of the voluntary compensation endorsement rider, attached to the policy, is not sufficiently definite and clear to show that it was the intention of the parties to the policy to provide that an employee might bring a suit directly against the indemnity company, without the necessity of complying with the provisions of the law requiring him to show that his injury was the result of the negligence of his employer or his agents or servants.
And, if such rider was sufficiently definite and clear to show such intention, we are not certain that such a provision would be sufficient to relieve the employee of the necessity of complying with the provisions of article 8306, section 1, subdivision 4, R.S. 1925. Davis v. W. T. Carter & Bro. (Tex. Civ.App.) 19 S.W.(2d) 336, 337 (writ refused).
In other words, we are here confronted with the question of whether or not a municipal corporation, such as the City of Corpus Christi, may enter into a policy of insurance with an indemnity company and thereby secure to itself and its employees all of the benefits and protections that are given to subscribers and their employees under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
While the law does not expressly exclude cities from becoming subscribers under the Workmen's Compensation Act, our courts have definitely held that they are by necessary implication excluded from the provisions of the act. There is no provision in the act that a city may elect to come under the provisions of the act. It, therefore, seems to us that it would be impossible for the city, by the simple method of taking an insurance policy with an indemnity company, containing a rider such as is attached to the policy in this case, to receive all the benefits and responsibilities of subscribers under the Workmen's Compensation Act, when the act, by necessary implication, says in effect that a city cannot become a subscriber.
Another thing occurs to us, and that is, that the city could not be relieved from its common-law liability by reason of its insurance policy in this case. It is clear to our mind that any employee of the city might repudiate the insurance policy and stand on his common-law action against the city for any injuries received by him; thus the employee could accept the...
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