Greater Bible Way Temple v. Jackson, Docket No. 250863.

• Decision Date: 10 November 2005
• Docket Number: Docket No. 255966.,Docket No. 250863.
• Citation: 708 N.W.2d 756,268 Mich. App. 673
• Parties: The GREATER BIBLE WAY TEMPLE OF JACKSON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CITY OF JACKSON, Jackson Planning Commission, and Jackson City Council, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

708 N.W.2d 756

268 Mich. App. 673

The GREATER BIBLE WAY TEMPLE OF JACKSON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CITY OF JACKSON, Jackson Planning Commission, and Jackson City Council, Defendants-Appellants.

Docket No. 250863.

Docket No. 255966.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted April 12, 2005, at Lansing.

Decided November 10, 2005, at 9:00 a.m.

Released for Publication January 23, 2006.

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Hubbard, Fox, Thomas, White & Bengtson, P.C. (by Michael G. Woodworth, Brian W. Surgener, and Mark W. Koerner), Lansing, for the plaintiff.

Julius A. Giglio, City Attorney, Susan G. Murphy, Acting Deputy City Attorney, and John W. Stanowski, Assistant City Attorney, Jackson, for the defendants.

Secrest, Wardle, Lynch, Hampton, Truex & Morley (by Gerald A. Fisher and John J. Martin, III), Farmington Hills, for the Michigan Municipal League.

Before: FORT HOOD, P.J., and METER and SCHUETTE, JJ.

METER, J.

In this case involving the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 USC 2000cc et seq., defendants appeal as of right from a judgment for plaintiff entered after a bench trial. Defendants also appeal as of right from an order awarding plaintiff attorney fees and costs. We affirm in both cases.

Plaintiff purchased eight parcels of land for the purpose of constructing an assisted living center for elderly and disabled people, and it sought a rezoning of the parcels from "single-family residential" (R-1) to "multiple-family residential" (R-3). After the city of Jackson denied the rezoning request, plaintiff sued, alleging, in part, a violation of the RLUIPA. The court, after a bench trial, entered an order that enjoined defendants from preventing plaintiff "from building the originally proposed housing plan of 32 units, or any plan with a lesser burden, on said lots that comports with R-3 zoning as defined in the Jackson Coty [sic] code. . . ." The order also prohibited defendants from implementing or imposing a land use regulation in a manner that would impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of plaintiff in its development and use of the lots, absent compelling interests.

On appeal, defendants first argue that the trial court erred in ruling before trial that defendants' denial of the request for rezoning constituted an individualized assessment within the meaning of the RLUIPA. The court made this ruling in connection with defendants' motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). We review de novo a trial court's ruling with regard to a motion for summary disposition. Shepherd Montessori Ctr. Milan v. Ann Arbor Charter Twp., 259 Mich.App. 315, 324, 675 N.W.2d 271 (2003). "A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests whether there is factual support for a claim." Shepherd Montessori, supra at 324, 675 N.W.2d 271. "[The] court must consider the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions, and other documentary evidence submitted in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Id. "When the burden of proof at trial would rest on the nonmoving party, the nonmovant may not rest upon mere allegations or denials in the pleadings, but must, by documentary evidence, set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id.

As this Court recently explained in Shepherd Montessori, supra at 319, 675 N.W.2d 271, "[the] RLUIPA prohibits a governmental entity from imposing on a person, or on a religious institution or assembly, a land use regulation that substantially burdens the free exercise of religion." See 42 USC 2000cc(a)(1). A plaintiff must meet at least one of the following three jurisdictional tests in order to receive protection under the RLUIPA:

"(A) the substantial burden is imposed in a program or activity that receives Federal financial assistance, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability;

(B) the substantial burden affects, or removal of that substantial burden would affect, commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, or with Indian tribes, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability; or

(C) the substantial burden is imposed in the implementation of a land use regulation, or system of land use regulations, under which a government makes, or has in place formal or informal procedures or practices that permit the government to make, individualized assessments of the proposed uses for the property involved." [Shepherd Montessori, supra at 327, 675 N.W.2d 271, quoting 42 USC 2000cc(a)(2) (emphasis added).]

At issue here is the third jurisdictional test. We conclude that the trial court did not err in concluding that defendants' denial of the request for rezoning constituted an individualized assessment within the meaning of the RLUIPA. Indeed, § 28-183 of the Jackson zoning ordinances within the municipal code provides an extensive procedure for a proposed zoning change; it includes such requirements as a written application, a hearing, and consideration by the city council. Moreover, it was clear that defendants followed the formal procedures of the zoning ordinance. Under the circumstances, the RLUIPA was applicable. See, e.g., Shepherd Montessori, supra at 328, 675 N.W.2d 271 (the township's evaluation and denial of the plaintiff's request for a use variance under the local zoning ordinance constituted an individualized assessment under 42 USC 2000cc [a][2][C]).

Defendants argue that the existence of an individualized assessment is a question of fact, not law, and that the trial court followed nonbinding legal authority in making its ruling. Defendants' arguments are not persuasive because (1) the trial court, in effect, concluded that there was no genuine factual dispute that defendants' conduct constituted an individualized assessment under the RLUIPA and (2) regardless of the law on which the trial court relied, Shepherd Montessori is binding precedent and supports the trial court's decision. It is clear that the government in this case had "in place formal or informal procedures or practices that permit the government to make individualized assessments of the proposed uses for the property involved." 42 USC 2000cc(a)(2)(C). Moreover, the government followed those procedures here. Reversal is unwarranted.

Defendants next argue that the trial court erred in ruling before trial, in connection with their motion for summary disposition, that there was no genuine factual dispute that defendants' zoning decision substantially burdened plaintiff's exercise of its religious beliefs.

"Once the jurisdictional requirements of [the] RLUIPA have been satisfied, [the] plaintiff must establish a substantial burden on religious exercise" Shepherd Montessori, supra at 329, 675 N.W.2d 271 (quotation marks omitted). To show that a governmental regulation imposes a substantial burden on a plaintiff's exercise of religion under the RLUIPA, the plaintiff must show that the regulation "must compel action or inaction with respect to [a] sincerely held belief. . . ." Id. at 330, 675 N.W.2d 271. Inconvenience to the church falls short of a substantial burden. Id.

The RLUIPA defines "religious exercise" as including "any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief." 42 USC 2000cc-5(7)(A). Additionally, "[t]he use, building, or conversion of real property for the purpose of religious exercise shall be considered to be religious exercise of the person or entity that uses or intends to use the property for that purpose." 42 USC 2000cc-5(7)(B). In determining whether plaintiff's operation of an assisted living apartment complex for the elderly and disabled constitutes an exercise of religion, The Jesus Ctr. v. Farmington Hills Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 215 Mich.App. 54, 544 N.W.2d 698 (1996), is instructive. In that case, The Jesus Center had been renting a two-story building in Farmington Hills since 1984 for traditional worship services, but also for a distribution point to supply food and clothing to needy persons. Id. at 55-56, 544 N.W.2d 698. In 1991, The Jesus Center sought to broaden its ministry by providing a shelter service to poor people and the homeless. Id. at 56, 544 N.W.2d 698. Farmington Hills denied the center's application for an "accessory use." Id. at 58, 544 N.W.2d 698. Arguing a violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 USC 2000bb et seq., The Jesus Center contended that "operation of the shelter was part of its religious mission" and that "its provision of shelter services flows from its religious beliefs and is an exercise of those beliefs." The Jesus Center, supra at 58, 63-64, 544 N.W.2d 698. This Court agreed, reasoning that it is "not at liberty to question this position" and that "[i]t is not the job of the courts to second guess what activities are sufficiently religious to qualify for free exercise protection." Id. at 64, 544 N.W.2d 698 (citation and quotation marks omitted).

In the present case, Reverend Ira Combs, the pastor and founder of the Greater Bible Way Temple, averred in his affidavit that providing housing to the elderly and disabled "is central" to plaintiff's ministry in Jackson and that this mission is acknowledged in plaintiff's letterhead. He explained further in the affidavit that this mission is given to the church through the teachings of Jesus Christ "and is a religious belief held by the Greater Bible Way Temple." Thus, the operation of an assisted living apartment complex for the elderly and disabled constitutes an exercise of religion and entails the use and construction of real property for the purpose of religious exercise. We conclude that the proposed project constitutes religious exercise within the meaning of the RLUIPA.

Plaintiff must additionally show that defendants' application of the zoning ordinance and refusal to rezone the area to R-3 constitutes the imposition of a substantial burden on plaintiff's religious...