Greater Bible Way Temple v. Jackson

• Decision Date: 27 June 2007
• Docket Number: Docket No. 130194. Calendar No. 5.,Docket No. 130196. Calendar No. 5.
• Citation: 478 Mich. 373,733 N.W.2d 734
• Parties: THE GREATER BIBLE WAY TEMPLE OF JACKSON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CITY OF JACKSON, Jackson Planning Commission, and Jackson City Council, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

733 N.W.2d 734

478 Mich. 373

THE GREATER BIBLE WAY TEMPLE OF JACKSON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CITY OF JACKSON, Jackson Planning Commission, and Jackson City Council, Defendants-Appellants.

Docket No. 130194. Calendar No. 5.

Docket No. 130196. Calendar No. 5.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued November 13, 2006.

Decided June 27, 2007.

Hubbard, Fox, Thomas, White & Bengston, P.C. (by Mark T. Koerner), Lansing, for the plaintiff.

Julius A. Giglio, City Attorney, Susan G. Murphy, Deputy City Attorney, and Secrest Wardle (by Gerald A. Fisher, Thomas R. Schultz, and Shannon K. Ozga), Jackson, Farmington Hills, for the defendants.

David S. Parkhurst, Washington, D.C., for amici curiae National League of Cities and International Municipal Lawyers Association.

Miller, Canfield, Paddock and Stone, P.L.C. (by William J. Danhof and Bree Popp Woodruff), Lansing, for Michigan Municipal League Legal Defense Fund.

MARKMAN, J.

We granted leave to appeal to consider whether the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq., entitles plaintiff to the rezoning of its property from single-family residential to multiple-family residential to allow plaintiff to build an apartment complex. The lower courts held that RLUIPA does entitle plaintiff to the rezoning of its property. We conclude that a refusal to rezone does not constitute an "individualized assessment," and, thus, that RLUIPA is inapplicable. Further, even if RLUIPA is applicable, the building of an apartment complex does not constitute a "religious exercise," and even if it does constitute a "religious exercise," the city of Jackson's refusal to rezone plaintiff's property did not substantially burden plaintiff's religious exercise, and even if it did substantially burden plaintiff's religious exercise, the imposition of that burden is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and constitutes the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. Therefore, even assuming that RLUIPA is applicable, it has not been violated. For these reasons, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for the entry of a judgment in favor of defendants.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff wants to build an apartment complex across the street from its church on property that it owns in the city of Jackson. The property consists of eight lots totaling 1.13 acres. The property is zoned single-family residential (R-1). One of the lots contains a single-family residence, and the remaining lots are vacant. There are single-family residences on each side of the property. Plaintiff petitioned the city to change the zoning of the property to multiple-family residential (R-3) so that it could construct an apartment complex.

The Region 2 Planning Commission recommended denying plaintiff's rezoning petition. After a public hearing, the city planning commission also voted to recommend that the city council deny plaintiff's rezoning petition. Pursuant to these recommendations, and following another public hearing, the city council voted to deny plaintiff's rezoning petition.

Plaintiff then filed a complaint against defendants, containing two counts: count one directly challenged the city's zoning decision and count two alleged a violation of RLUIPA. The trial court granted defendants' motion for summary disposition with regard to count one, which decision was not appealed. With regard to count two, the trial court denied defendants' motion for summary disposition and granted plaintiff's motion for summary disposition in part. Specifically, the trial court ruled that RLUIPA did apply because the city's zoning decision constituted an "individualized assessment," and the refusal to rezone plaintiff's property imposed a "substantial burden" on the exercise of religion. The trial court then ordered a trial on the issue whether the city had a compelling interest for its refusal to rezone. After a bench trial, the trial court ruled that defendants had failed to demonstrate such an interest. Therefore, it determined that defendants had violated RLUIPA and that plaintiff was entitled to the requested rezoning of its property. The trial court enjoined defendant from interfering in any manner with plaintiff's efforts to construct an apartment complex on its property. After the final order was issued, plaintiff filed a motion for attorney fees and costs and the trial court awarded plaintiff over $30,000 in attorney fees and costs.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court in all respects. 268 Mich.App. 673, 708 N.W.2d 756 (2005). The Court of Appeals also held that the application of RLUIPA to compel the requested rezoning did not render the statute unconstitutional. We granted defendants' application for leave to appeal. 474 Mich. 1133, 712 N.W.2d 723, 728 (2006).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A trial court's ruling on a summary disposition motion is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. Haynes v. Neshewat, 477 Mich. 29, 34, 729 N.W.2d 488 (2007). Questions of statutory interpretation are also questions of law that that this Court reviews de novo. Id.

III. ORIGINS OF RLUIPA

The First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof...." U.S. Const., Am. I. The second clause of this amendment is commonly known as the Free Exercise Clause. The protections provided by the First Amendment, including the Free Exercise Clause, have been "incorporated" and extended to the states and to their political subdivisions by the Fourteenth Amendment. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940); Santa Fe Independent School Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 301, 120 S.Ct. 2266, 147 L.Ed.2d 295 (2000).

In Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963), the plaintiff, a member of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church was discharged by her employer because she would not work on Saturday, the Sabbath Day of her faith. She was unable to obtain other employment because she would not work on Saturdays. The South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Act, S.C. Code, Tit. 68, § 68-1 et seq., provided that a claimant was ineligible for benefits if the claimant had failed "without good cause" to accept available suitable work. The Employment Security Commission determined that the plaintiff's religious belief against working on Saturdays did not constitute "good cause." The United States Supreme Court held that denying the plaintiff unemployment compensation benefits solely because of her refusal to accept employment in which she would have to work on Saturdays contrary to her religious belief imposed a substantial burden on her exercise of her religion that was not justified by a compelling state interest, and, thus, violated the Free Exercise Clause.

In Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990), the United States Supreme Court held that Oregon's prohibition of the use of peyote in religious ceremonies, and the denial of unemployment benefits to persons discharged for such use, does not violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The Court explained that generally applicable, religion-neutral laws that have the effect of burdening a particular religious practice need not be justified, under the Free Exercise Clause, by a compelling governmental interest.¹

In response to Smith, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA),² prohibiting the government from substantially burdening a person's exercise of religion, even by means of a generally applicable, religion-neutral law, unless the government could demonstrate that the burden imposed furthers a compelling governmental interest and that it constitutes the least restrictive means of furthering such interest.

However, in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997), the United States Supreme Court held that Congress, in enacting RFRA, had exceeded its powers under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact legislation enforcing the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment because RFRA proscribes state conduct that the First Amendment itself does not proscribe.³ The Court explained:

Congress' power under § 5, however, extends only to "enforcing" the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court has described this power as "remedial...." The design of the Amendment and the text of § 5 are inconsistent with the suggestion that Congress has the power to decree the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment's restrictions on the States. Legislation which alters the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause cannot be said to be enforcing the Clause. Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right is. It has been given the power "to enforce," not the power to determine what constitutes a constitutional violation. Were it not so, what Congress would be enforcing would no longer be, in any meaningful sense, the "provisions of [the Fourteenth Amendment]."

While the line between measures that remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions and measures that make a substantive change in the governing law is not easy to discern, and Congress must have wide latitude in determining where it lies, the distinction exists and must be observed. There must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end. Lacking such a connection, legislation may become substantive in operation and effect. [Id. at 519-520, 117 S.Ct. 2157.]

The Supreme Court then concluded that the substantial costs that RFRA exacted through its "compelling governmental interest" test "far exceed any pattern or practice of unconstitutional conduct under the Free Exercise Clause as interpreted in S...