Greater Bridgeport Transit Dist. v. Local Union 1336, Amalgamated Transit Union, 13529

• Decision Date: 13 June 1989
• Docket Number: No. 13529,13529
• Citation: 211 Conn. 436,559 A.2d 1113
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: GREATER BRIDGEPORT TRANSIT DISTRICT v. LOCAL UNION 1336, AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION, et al.

Page 1113

559 A.2d 1113

211 Conn. 436

GREATER BRIDGEPORT TRANSIT DISTRICT v. LOCAL UNION 1336, AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION, et al.

No. 13529.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Feb. 7, 1989.

Decided June 13, 1989.

Thomas J. Weihing, with whom was John T. Bochanis, Bridgeport, for appellant (plaintiff).

Burton S. Rosenberg, with whom, on the brief, was Douglas Taylor, for appellee (named defendant).

Joseph M. Celentano, Asst. Counsel, for appellee (defendant, State Bd. of Labor Relations).

Before PETERS, C.J., and SHEA, GLASS, COVELLO and HULL, JJ.

HULL, Associate Justice.

The dispositive issue on this appeal is whether the trial court erred in dismissing, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, an independent action challenging the scope of an administrative agency's jurisdiction and seeking injunctive relief prohibiting the agency from conducting a hearing on a matter involving the complainant. We conclude that the trial court's judgment of dismissal was correct.

The undisputed facts relevant to this appeal are as follows. The plaintiff, Greater Bridgeport Transit District, is a transit district created and governed by General Statutes § 7-273b et seq. The plaintiff provides public transportation for the communities of Bridgeport, Stratford, Fairfield and Trumbull. The defendant, Local 1336, Amalgamated Transit Union (union), is the representative of the plaintiff's unionized employees. On January 1, 1987, the plaintiff instituted a revised attendance policy for its employees. On January 12, 1987, the union filed a complaint with the defendant Connecticut state board of labor relations (board), claiming that the formation of a new employee attendance policy involved a mandatory subject of collective bargaining and that the plaintiff's implementation of such a policy without first negotiating with the union constituted an unfair labor practice. In addition, on February 13, 1987, the union, pursuant to provisions contained in its collective bargaining agreement with the plaintiff, filed a demand for arbitration with the American Arbitration Association. Citing the same reasons as alleged in its complaint to the board, the union in its demand for arbitration claimed that the plaintiff's revised attendance policy was violative of the collective bargaining agreement between the parties and sought to have the policy withdrawn.

On August 27, 1987, the plaintiff received a notice of hearing from the board scheduling a hearing on the union's complaint for November 17, 1987. On November 16, 1987, the plaintiff filed with the Superior Court its own complaint, claiming that the board did not have jurisdiction to hear the union's complaint because arbitration was the exclusive remedy for the union's grievance. In its claims for relief, the plaintiff sought a temporary and permanent injunction prohibiting the board from conducting a hearing on the union's complaint. On November 30, 1987, the board filed an amended motion to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint, claiming, inter alia, that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to issue an injunction on the plaintiff's complaint because the plaintiff had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. On May 27, 1988, the trial court, Harrigan, J., issued a memorandum of decision in which it granted the board's amended motion to dismiss. Relying on the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, the court held that it was "improper and premature for the [plaintiff] to bring this action and the court therefore lacks jurisdiction," i.e., the plaintiff was required to exhaust its administrative remedies by litigating its jurisdictional claim in the first instance before the board. The plaintiff appeals this decision of the trial court dismissing its complaint.

" 'It is a settled principle of administrative law that, if an adequate administrative remedy exists, it must be exhausted before the Superior Court will obtain jurisdiction to act in the matter. Connecticut Life & Health Ins. Guaranty Assn. v. Jackson, 173 Conn. 352, 358-59, 377 A.2d 1099 (1977); State ex rel. Golembeske v. White, 168 Conn. 278, 282, 362 A.2d 1354 (1975); see 3 Davis, Administrative Law § 20.01; General Statutes §§ 4-175, 4-183.' Connecticut Mobile Home Assn., Inc. v. Jensen's Inc., 178 Conn. 586, 588, 424 A.2d 285 (1979)." Cummings v. Tripp, 204 Conn. 67, 75, 527 A.2d 230 (1987). The present appeal requires us to determine whether an administrative agency has exclusive initial power to determine its own jurisdiction in a particular case. The plaintiff maintains that the general rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply to claims challenging the scope of an administrative agency's jurisdiction and that the question of an agency's jurisdiction may be litigated in the first instance in the Superior Court through an independent action. We disagree.

A claim that an administrative agency has acted beyond its statutory authority or jurisdiction properly may be the subject of an administrative appeal. See General Statutes § 4-183(j). ¹ Where there is in place a mechanism for adequate judicial review, such as that contained in § 4-183, "[i]t is [the] general rule that an administrative agency may and must determine whether it has jurisdiction in a particular situation. When a particular statute authorizes an administrative agency to act in a particular situation it necessarily confers upon such agency authority to determine whether the situation is such as to authorize the agency to act--that is, to determine the coverage of the statute--and this question need not, and in fact cannot, be initially decided by a court." 2 Am.Jur.2d, Administrative Law § 332 and cases therein cited. This general rule is in accord with our...