Greater Bridgeport Transit Dist. v. State Bd. of Labor Relations

• Citation: 653 A.2d 229,43 Conn.Supp. 340
• Court: Superior Court of Connecticut
• Decision Date: 05 August 1993
• Parties: , 149 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2370 GREATER BRIDGEPORT TRANSIT DISTRICT v. STATE BOARD OF LABOR RELATIONS et al. CV 91-281896S.

Page 229

653 A.2d 229

43 Conn.Supp. 340, 149 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2370

GREATER BRIDGEPORT TRANSIT DISTRICT v. STATE BOARD OF LABOR RELATIONS et al.

CV 91-281896S.

Superior Court of Connecticut,

Judicial District of Fairfield

at Bridgeport.

Aug. 5, 1993.

Daly, Weihing & Bochanis, Bridgeport, for plaintiff.

Connecticut State Labor Relations Board, for named defendant.

Robert M. Chevrie & Associates, East Hartford, and for defendant Amalgamated Transit Union, Douglas Taylor, pro hac vice, Local 1336, AFL-CIO.

LEHENY, Judge.

The plaintiff Greater Bridgeport Transit District (transit district) appeals pursuant to General Statutes § 4-183 from a decision of the defendant state board of labor relations (board) in which the board ruled in favor of the defendant Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1336, AFL-CIO (union).

On January 1, 1987, the transit district instituted a revised attendance policy for its employees. ¹ At the time of this revision, a On January 12, 1987, the union filed a complaint (Case No. U-10,358) with the board pursuant to the Connecticut State Labor Relations Act (CSLRA) alleging that the transit district had implemented the new attendance policy without negotiating with the union in violation of General Statutes §§ 31-105(6), 7-469 and 7-471(4). Additionally, the union filed a demand for arbitration with the American Arbitration Association on February 13, 1987.

labor agreement, entered into between the transit district and the union in 1979, was in effect.

The board conducted an informal investigation of the complaint pursuant to General Statutes § 31-107(a) of the CSLRA. Assistant agent Harold Lynch met with the transit district and the union on February 25, April 9 and June 4, 1987.

The union, thereafter, filed a complaint (Case No. 39-CA-3387) with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) alleging a violation under § 8 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). On April 15, 1987, the NLRB concluded that the transit district, a political subdivision of the state of Connecticut, was exempt from its jurisdiction under § 2(2) of the NLRA and dismissed the complaint in Case No. 39-CA-3387.

On August 26, 1987, the board sent notice to the parties that a hearing would be held on November 17, 1987. On September 15, 1987, the union filed a second complaint (Case No. MPP-10,843) with the board pursuant to § 7-471(4) of the Municipal Employee Relations Act (MERA) alleging that the transit district had violated General Statutes §§ 31-105(6), 7-469 and 7-471(4). On September 21, 1987, the board notified the parties that the two complaints would be consolidated for hearing on November 17, 1987.

On November 16, 1987, the transit district filed with the Superior Court an application for a temporary and permanent injunction and order to show cause. On the same day, the union filed an answer and motion to dismiss the application for injunction. On November 17, 1987, the board filed a motion to dismiss the transit district's application for injunction.

On November 30, 1987, the board filed an amended motion to dismiss and, on December 4, 1987, the union filed an amended motion to dismiss. On May 26, 1988, the court, Harrigan, J., dismissed the transit district's action on the ground that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction as the transit district had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. On June 13, 1989, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the transit district's action. Greater Bridgeport Transit District v. Local Union 1336, 211 Conn. 436, 440, 559 A.2d 1113 (1989).

Thereafter, on June 24, 1988, the board notified the parties that a hearing on the two consolidated complaints would be held on September 22, 1988. Subsequently, the board conducted evidentiary hearings on September 22 and December 7, 1988. On March 27, 1989, the parties submitted briefs to the board.

Exactly two years later, on March 27, 1991, the board issued a decision concluding that: "1. The Greater Bridgeport Transit District is a political subdivision of the State of Connecticut created pursuant to C.G.S. Section 7-273b et seq. and is a municipal employer within the meaning of Section 7-467(1) of the Municipal Employees Relations Act. 2. A unilateral change in work rules creating disciplinary sanctions and introducing new changes in sick leave and attendance policies during the term of the parties' collective bargaining agreement will constitute a breach of the duty to bargain in good faith under C.G.S. Section 7-470(4), and a violation of the Act. 3. Where employees were discharged or otherwise disciplined as a direct result of certain unilateral changes made by an employer during the term of an existing collective bargaining agreement, the policies The board dismissed the complaint (Case No. U-10,358) brought pursuant to the CSLRA and ordered the transit district to cease and desist from refusing to bargain with the union "over the unilateral changes in the sick leave, discipline for late attendance, and discipline for absences...." In addition, the board ordered the transit district to "[r]einstate Ezell Robinson, Pamela Davis, and any other employees who were discharged under the unilaterally changed provisions ... and make whole said employees together with all accruing back pay and associated benefits...."

of the Act require that they be made whole upon the finding of a violation."

The transit district brings an appeal from this decision pursuant to General Statutes § 4-183. The transit district claims that the board's decision is illegal, arbitrary and an abuse of discretion in that: (1) the board's decision was not timely filed and as such the board exceeded its authority; (2) General Statutes § 7-273j was controlling rather than MERA, and, therefore, the board lacked jurisdiction; (3) the board erred in failing to defer to arbitration which was the primary remedy between the parties; (4) the transit district was given inadequate notice of the nature of the remedies and orders issued by the board; and (5) the board erred in determining that the new attendance policy was a mandatory subject of bargaining rather than a work rule. On May 4, 1991, the board filed an answer.

On September 4, 1991, the transit district filed a memorandum of law in support of its appeal. The board filed a brief on October 2, 1991.

On August 12, 1992, the union entered its appearance. On September 4, 1992, the union, which has not filed an answer, filed its brief.

"Appeals to courts from administrative agencies exist only under statutory authority." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Raines v. Freedom of Information Commission, 221 Conn. 482, 489, 604 A.2d 819 (1992). "A statutory right to appeal may be taken advantage of only by strict compliance with the statutory provisions by which it is created." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. "Such provisions are mandatory, and, if not complied with, the appeal is subject to dismissal." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 490, 604 A.2d 819.

This court has jurisdiction to review the present matter pursuant to MERA. General Statutes § 7-471. Section 7-471(5)(D) provides that: "For the purposes of hearings and enforcement of orders under sections 7-467 to 7-477, [concerning prohibited practices] inclusive, the board shall have the same power and authority as it has in sections 31-107, 31-108 and 31-109, and the municipal employer and the employee organization shall have the right of appeal as provided therein."

General Statutes § 31-109(d) provides in relevant part, that: "Any person aggrieved by a final order of the board granting or denying in whole or in part the relief sought may appeal pursuant to the provisions of chapter 54 to the superior court...." Under chapter 54, "[a] person who has exhausted all administrative remedies available within the agency and who is aggrieved by a final decision may appeal to the superior court...." General Statutes § 4-183(a).

"Unless a plaintiff can establish that he is aggrieved by a decision of an agency, he has no standing to appeal." Kelly v. Freedom of Information Commission, 221 Conn. 300, 308, 603 A.2d 1131 (1992), citing Beckish v. Manafort, 175 Conn. 415, 419, 399 A.2d 1274 (1978). The test for determining aggrievement is two-fold: "[F]irst, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully demonstrate a specific, personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the decision, as distinguished from a general interest, such as is the concern of all members of the community as a whole. Second, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully establish that this specific personal and legal interest has been specially and injuriously affected by the decision." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Munhall v. Inland Wetlands Commission, 221 Conn. 46, 51, 602 A.2d 566 (1992); Mystic Marinelife Aquarium, Inc. v. Gill, 175 Conn. 483, 493, 400 A.2d 726 (1978); Nader v. Altermatt, 166 Conn. 43, 51, 347 A.2d 89 (1974). "Aggrievement is The transit district has a specific personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the board's decision in that the decision involves the legal rights and obligations of the transit district under the collective bargaining agreement and under MERA. The transit district's legal interest in the decision has been specially and injuriously affected in that the labor board ruled against the transit district and in favor of the union. Thus, the transit district is aggrieved.

established if there is some possibility, as distinguished from a certainty, that some legally protected interest ... has been adversely affected." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rose v. Freedom of Information Commission, 221 Conn. 217, 230, 602 A.2d 1019 (1992); Hall v. Planning Commission, 181 Conn. 442, 445, 435 A.2d 975 (1980); O'Leary v. McGuinness, 140 Conn. 80, 83, 98 A.2d 660 (1953).

The July 1, 1989 amendments to the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA), General...