Greater Bridgeport Transit Dist. v. State Bd. of Labor Relations, 15018

• Citation: 653 A.2d 151,232 Conn. 57
• Decision Date: 31 January 1995
• Docket Number: No. 15018,15018
• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut
• Parties: , 153 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2507 GREATER BRIDGEPORT TRANSIT DISTRICT v. STATE BOARD OF LABOR RELATIONS et al.

Page 151

653 A.2d 151

232 Conn. 57, 153 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2507

GREATER BRIDGEPORT TRANSIT DISTRICT v. STATE BOARD OF LABOR RELATIONS et al.

No. 15018.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Nov. 29, 1994.

Decided Jan. 31, 1995.

Thomas J. Weihing, with whom, on the brief, was John T. Bochanis, for appellant (plaintiff).

Joseph M. Celentano, for appellee (named defendant).

Douglas Taylor, with whom was David McCarry, for appellee (defendant Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1336).

Before CALLAHAN, NORCOTT, PALMER, FRANCIS X. HENNESSY and MARY R. HENNESSEY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

The plaintiff, Greater Bridgeport Transit District (transit district), appealed to the Superior Court from a decision of the defendant state board of labor relations (board) in which the board ruled in favor of the defendant Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1336 (union). That court affirmed the board's decision, and the plaintiff appealed from that judgment to the Appellate Court. We transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199(c).

The underlying dispute between the transit district and the union involved the transit district's revised attendance policy for its employees. ¹ The revised policy was instituted unilaterally by the transit district on January 1, 1987. At that time, a collective bargaining agreement, entered into between the transit district and the union in 1979, was in effect.

On January 12, 1987, the union filed a complaint with the board pursuant to the State Labor Relations Act; General Statutes § 31-101 et seq.; alleging that the transit district had implemented the revised attendance policy without negotiating with the union in violation of General Statutes §§ 31-105(6), 7-469 and 7-470(4). ² Additionally, the union filed a demand for arbitration with the American Arbitration Association on February 13, 1987. On the union's motion, the arbitration was held in abeyance pending the outcome of the dispute before the board.

The union also filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) alleging a violation of § 8 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 158. The NLRB concluded that the transit district was a political subdivision of the state of Connecticut and, therefore, was exempt from its jurisdiction pursuant to § 2(2) of the NLRA. Accordingly, the NLRB dismissed the complaint.

On September 15, 1987, the union filed a second complaint with the board, pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1987) § 7-471(4) ³ of the Municipal Employees Relations Act (MERA); General Statutes § 7-407 et seq.; alleging that the transit district had violated §§ 31-105(6), 7-469 and 7-470(4).

On November 16, 1987, the day before a scheduled hearing before the board on the two complaints, ⁴ the transit district filed in the Superior Court an application for a temporary and permanent injunction and an order to show cause to halt the hearing. The court dismissed the transit district's action on the ground that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the transit district had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. This court affirmed the dismissal. Greater Bridgeport Transit District v. Local Union 1336, 211 Conn. 436, 559 A.2d 1113 (1989).

The board thereafter held a hearing on the union's two consolidated complaints. Two years after the hearing, ⁵ the board rendered a decision concluding that the transit district had violated MERA, ⁶ and ordered the transit district to cease and desist from refusing to bargain with the union "over the unilateral changes in the sick leave, discipline for late attendance and discipline for absences." In addition, the board ordered the transit district to "[t]ake the following affirmative steps which the [b]oard finds will best effectuate the purposes of the [a]ct: (a) Reinstate Ezell Robinson, Pamela Davis, and any other employees who were discharged under the unilaterally changed provisions ... and make whole said employees together with all accruing back pay and associated benefits ... (c) Report to the [board] within thirty (30) days of this Decision and Order of the steps taken by [the transit district] to comply therewith."

The transit district appealed from the board's decision to the Superior Court claiming that the board's decision was illegal, arbitrary and an abuse of discretion in that: (1) the board's decision had not been timely rendered; (2) General Statutes § 7-273j, concerning collective bargaining for transit districts, rather than MERA, was controlling and therefore, the board had lacked jurisdiction; (3) the board had erred in failing to defer to arbitration, which was the primary remedy between the parties in the collective bargaining agreement; (4) the transit district had been given inadequate notice of the nature of the remedies and orders issued by the board; and (5) the board had erred in determining that the new attendance policy was a mandatory subject of bargaining rather than a work rule.

The trial court resolved each of these issues in favor of the board, and dismissed the transit district's appeal. The transit district has raised the same issues on appeal before this court. We will briefly summarize seriatim the trial court's reasoning in resolving each issue. First, the trial court found, based on precedent; Jutkowitz v. Dept. of Health Services, 220 Conn. 86, 95, 596 A.2d 374 (1991); that the transit district had waived its right to challenge the timeliness of the board's ruling by not applying to the Superior Court pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1987) § 4-180(b) ⁷ for an order requiring the board to issue its decision. Second, the trial court found that § 7-273j ⁸ would be relevant only if there was a labor dispute "where collective bargaining does not result in agreement." Because the parties in this case had not collectively bargained the disputed issue, the court concluded that application of § 7-273j would not be appropriate. Third, the court found that the plain language of the collective bargaining agreement provided for arbitration only when a dispute is over "the application or interpretation of any of the provisions of this Agreement." The dispute in this case, however, was over the unilateral implementation of a revised attendance policy in violation of the duty to bargain, which is a prohibited labor practice. Therefore, the board did not have to defer to arbitration. Fourth, the court relied on Levinson v. Board of Chiropractic Examiners, 211 Conn. 508, 536, 560 A.2d 403 (1989), citing Harwinton Drilling & Engineering Co. v. Public Utilities Control Authority, 188 Conn. 90, 95-96, 448 A.2d 210 (1982), to conclude that the transit district had waived its right to question the sufficiency of the notice of the relief requested by not requesting a more definite and detailed statement as permitted under General Statutes (Rev. to 1987) § 4-177(b). ⁹ Finally, based on both Connecticut and federal case law, the trial court found that the revised attendance policy, which included disciplinary measures, ¹⁰ was a "condition of employment," and therefore a mandatory subject of bargaining pursuant to §§ 7-469 and 7-470(c). See Board of Police Commissioners v. White, 171 Conn. 553, 560, 370 A.2d 1070 (1976) (defining the term "conditions of employment" as that which "is intended to include the entire spectrum of conditions and benefits which apply to public employment, in addition to the commonly understood basic provisions relating to pay and hours of work, including but not limited to ... discipline and discharge").

"Judicial review of the [board's] action is governed by the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (General Statutes, c. 54, §§ 4-166 through 4-189), and the scope of that review is very restricted.... Neither this court nor the trial court may retry the case or substitute its own judgment for that of the [board].... The court's ultimate duty is only to decide whether, in light of the evidence, the [board] has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally, or in abuse of [its] discretion." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Buckley v. Muzio, 200 Conn. 1, 3, 509 A.2d 489 (1986); see also Starr v. Commissioner of Environmental Protection, 226 Conn. 358, 371, 627 A.2d 1296 (1993); Caldor, Inc. v. Heslin, 215 Conn. 590, 596, 577 A.2d 1009 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1088, 111 S.Ct. 966, 112 L.Ed.2d 1053 (1991).

Our examination of the record and the briefs and arguments of the parties on appeal persuades us that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. The issues raised on appeal were resolved properly in the court's thoughtful and comprehensive memorandum of decision. Greater Bridgeport Transit District v. State Board of Labor Relations, 43 Conn.Sup. 340, 653 A.2d 229 (1993). Because that memorandum of decision fully states and meets the arguments raised in the present appeal, we adopt the trial court's well reasoned decision as a statement of the facts and the applicable law on these issues. It would serve no useful purpose for us to repeat the discussion contained therein. Advanced Business Systems, Inc. v. Crystal, 231 Conn. 378, 380-81, 650 A.2d 540 (1994); Van Dyck Printing Co. v. DiNicola, 231 Conn. 272, 273-74, 648 A.2d 877 (1994); Connecticut Resources Recovery Authority v. Refuse Gardens, Inc., 229 Conn. 455, 458-59, 642 A.2d 697 (1994); Daw's Critical Care Registry, Inc. v. Dept. of Labor 225 Conn. 99, 101-102, 622 A.2d 518 (1993). ¹¹

The judgment is affirmed.

1 The revised policy provides for "attendance-related discipline" in addition to suspension and termination, where the original policy only provided for warnings, suspension and termination. The revised attendance policy provides in relevant part:

"1. 6 absences--Warning, counseling and notification to employee in writing ... that for all subsequent absences a doctor's certificate will be required

"2. 8 absences--3 days foot-of-list for...