Greathouse v. Board of School Commissioners of City of Indianapolis

• Decision Date: 31 March 1926
• Docket Number: 25,134
• Citation: 151 N.E. 411,198 Ind. 95
• Parties: Greathouse v. Board of School Commissioners of City of Indianapolis
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

151 N.E. 411

198 Ind. 95

Greathouse v. Board of School Commissioners of City of Indianapolis

No. 25,134

Supreme Court of Indiana

March 31, 1926

Rehearing Denied June 10, 1926.

1. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS.---In the absence of fraud, the courts will not interfere with school authorities in matters committed by law to their discretion. p. 101.

2. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS.---All public schools are part of the state system of common schools.---Under Art. 8, 1 of the Constitution (189 Burns 1926), all public schools are part of the state system of common schools, including, of course, the high schools of the state. p. 102.

3. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS.---Statute providing for separate schools for colored children is constitutional.---The act of 1869 (Acts 1869 p. 124, 7072 Burns 1926, 6581 Burns 1914) providing for separate schools for colored children is constitutional. p. 104.

4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.---A state cannot deprive a citizen of the United States of his national rights, privileges and immunities.---Under the provisions of the Thirteenth Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments of the federal Constitution, a state cannot deprive a citizen of the United States of his national rights, privileges and immunities and must give to citizens thereof the same rights, privileges and immunities secured by its Constitution. p. 104.

5. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS.---Classification of scholars on the basis of race or color and their education in separate schools is a matter of legislative discretion. p. 104.

6. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS.---Statute authorizing the organization of separate schools for colored children is still in force.---Section 3 of the act of 1869 (Acts 1869 p 41) as amended in 1877 (Acts 1877 p. 124, 7072 Burns 1926 6581 Burns 1914), authorizing the organization of separate schools for colored children, is still in force, p. 106.

7. STATUTES.---The repeal of statutes by implication is not favored by the courts. p. 106.

8. INJUNCTIONS.---Suit to enjoin school corporation from establishing and maintaining a separate high school for colored children held premature.---A suit to enjoin a school corporation from establishing and maintaining a separate high school for colored children held premature until the school authorities have done some act or made an order concerning such segregation. p. 106.

9. INJUNCTIONS.---Mere apprehensions and fears of a complainant, not sufficient ground for injunction.---The mere apprehensions or fears of a complainant, unsustained by facts, do not constitute sufficient ground for the interference of a court of equity by injunction, and an injunction will not be granted to allay the fears and apprehension of individuals. p. 107.

10. INJUNCTION.---On an application for injunction, whether a wrong is about to be committed which will be irreparable is a question for the court and not for the complainant. p. 107.

11. PLEADING.---A demurrer for want of facts admits as true all facts that are well pleaded, but it does not admit the pleader's conclusions of law or conclusions of fact from the facts pleaded. p. 108.

12. PLEADING.---Pleader's expressions concerning the quality or character of an act referred to in a pleading are not admitted as true by demurrer thereto.---A pleader's expressions concerning the quality or character of an act referred to in a pleading, such as "wrongfully," "unlawfully," "arbitrarily," are not admitted as true by a demurrer thereto, and cannot be considered in determining the sufficiency of the facts alleged therein. p. 108.

13. PLEADING.---Impertinent or immaterial allegations are not confessed by a demurrer. p. 109.

14. PLEADING.---General conclusions cannot have controlling effect when the facts are specifically stated.---In determining the sufficiency of a pleading on demurrer, mere general conclusions cannot have a controlling effect where the facts from which the conclusions were drawn are specifically stated. p. 109.

15. PLEADING.---Statute relevant to the pleading of conclusions refers to conclusions of fact and not to conclusions of law.---Section 360 Burns 1926, 343a Burns'. Supp. 1921, providing that all conclusions stated in a pleading shall be considered as the allegation of the facts required to sustain the conclusion pleaded, refers to. conclusions of fact and not to conclusions of law. p. 109.

From Marion Superior Court (A 24,833); Theophilus J. Moll, Judge.

Suit by Archie Greathouse against the Board of School Commissioners of the city of Indianapolis. From a judgment for the defendant on a demurrer to the complaint, the plaintiff appeals. [Transferred from Appellate Court pursuant to § 1351 Burns 1926.]

Affirmed.

W. E. Henderson, R. L. Bailey and W. S. Henry, for appellant.

Albert Baker, for appellee.

OPINION

Willoughby, J.

This was an action brought by the appellant to enjoin the board of school commissioners of the city of Indianapolis, a school corporation, from erecting and maintaining a separate high school for colored children.

The first paragraph of the complaint alleges, in substance, that the plaintiff is the owner of real estate and personal property located in the city of Indianapolis, county of Marion, and State of Indiana, which is assessed for taxation for school and other purposes in the city of Indianapolis, county of Marion, and State of Indiana, and that he brings this cause of action as a taxpayer, in behalf of himself and in behalf of all other taxpayers in and for said school city of Indianapolis, Indiana. That the defendant is the governing body of the school city of Indianapolis, and has charge and control of the affairs and business of said school city, a municipal corporation located in Marion county, Indiana, and existing under and pursuant to the laws of the State of Indiana. That at a regular meeting of said body, a quorum thereof being present, said board decided to build within the city of Indianapolis one separate consolidated high school for the exclusive use of colored children, to which shall be admitted all colored pupils and only all colored pupils who are sufficiently advanced and otherwise qualified. That pursuant to said action of said board, said school corporation has picked and designated a location for said school, has employed architects to draft plans for the erection of said school and is otherwise planning and threatening to build the said high school for the purpose of separating and segregating all pupils of African descent or Negroes, sufficiently advanced and otherwise duly qualified to matriculate in and attend the high schools of the school city of Indianapolis, and that, unless the said defendant is enjoined from doing so, it will so erect and maintain a separate consolidated high school as aforesaid. That said defendant has no legal right or authority whatsoever to thus expend the taxpayers' money in so erecting and maintaining a separate high school for the exclusive use of colored pupils; that the high schools of the State of Indiana are open to all pupils sufficiently advanced, and that all pupils who are sufficiently advanced shall be admitted to the high schools of the State of Indiana irrespective of the race to which said pupil or pupils may belong. That the defendant is arbitrarily, and without right or power, planning and intending to build a separate high school for colored children as aforesaid, and in so doing, spending wrongfully and unlawfully money belonging to the school city of Indianapolis, for the purpose of paying the cost of so erecting and maintaining said separate consolidated high school, and that unless restrained, said defendant will build, erect and maintain said high school and will thus proceed unlawfully to expend and disburse the funds and moneys of said school city for the erection and maintenance of said building for said purpose exclusively and that, as a result of said unlawful procedure by said defendant, the school city of the city of Indianapolis, will be and become liable at law for the payment of large sums of money of said school city, and of this plaintiff and other taxpayers for such unlawful purpose. That this plaintiff, as a taxpayer and all other taxpayers in said school city, is wholly without any complete or adequate remedy at law to prevent said unlawful waste of the taxpayers' money.

Wherefore, Plaintiff prays that a writ of injunction issue temporarily until hearing may be had and perpetual and permanent injunction thereafter may issue restraining the said school corporation from taking any other actions or steps whatsoever to build, erect and maintain a separate consolidated high school for the sole and exclusive use of the colored pupils of the school city of Indianapolis who are sufficiently advanced and otherwise qualified to attend the high schools of said school city, and that the said defendant be likewise enjoined from issuing bonds to raise money or expending any part of the taxpayers' money of said school city or money which taxpayers will eventually be compelled to pay in executing and carrying out its said unlawful purposes.

The second paragraph is the same as the first except that it contains the additional averments: That the high school facilities of the city of Indianapolis are divided into three separate and distinct classes; that is to say, technical manual and classical and academic, as evidenced by the Arsenal-Technical high school, the Manual Training high school, and the Shortridge high school; that the school property of the city of Indianapolis, has been purchased, erected and equipped at a cost of many millions of dollars and that the said sum has been thus invested for high school purposes for the school city of the city of Indianapolis, and that every high school pupil...