School City of Elwood v. State ex rel. Griffin

• Decision Date: 29 March 1932
• Docket Number: 26,145
• Citation: 180 N.E. 471,203 Ind. 626
• Parties: School City of Elwood et al. v. State, ex rel. Griffin et al. [*]
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

180 N.E. 471

203 Ind. 626

School City of Elwood et al. v. State, ex rel. Griffin et al. ^[*]

No. 26,145

Supreme Court of Indiana

March 29, 1932

Rehearing denied June 30, 1932.

1. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS---Dismissal of Teachers---When School Board's Action Conclusive---Exception.---A school board's dismissal of a teacher for a statutory cause is conclusive and not reviewable by the courts unless the board acted in bad faith, arbitrarily, corruptly, fraudulently, or in gross abuse of its discretion. p. 630.

2. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS---Dismissal of Teachers---Grounds for Dismissal.---Where a statute specifically enumerates the causes for which a teacher may be removed or dismissed, a teacher cannot be removed or dismissed for any other cause. p. 630.

3. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS---Dismissal of Teachers---When Action Taken is Outside Board's Jurisdiction or Power.---Where a school board, in removing or dismissing a teacher, acts outside of its jurisdiction or power, the action of the board is not final, but is subject to review by the courts. p. 630.

4. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS---Dismissal of "Permanent" Teachers---For being Married---Not "Good and Just Cause" as Specified in Teachers' Tenure Law.---The dismissal of female "permanent" teachers who held "indefinite" contracts under the Teachers' Tenure Law (6967.1--6967.6 Burns Supp. 1929) merely because they were married was not a dismissal for "other good and just cause" specified as one of the grounds for dismissal under that act. p. 632.

5. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS---Action of Mandate---To Compel School Board to Reinstate Teacher---Contract not Necessary Exhibit with Complaint.---In an action of mandate to compel a school board to reinstate a "permanent" teacher under the Teachers' Tenure Law (6967.1--6967.6 Burns Supp. 1929) who had been wrongfully dismissed, it was not necessary to file with the complaint a copy of the teacher's contract, as it was not the foundation of the action within the meaning of 386 Burns 1926, but the action was for the enforcement of the teacher's rights under the Teachers' Tenure Law. p 634.

6. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS---Action of Mandate---To Compel School Board to Reinstate Teacher---Proper Remedy when Teacher Wrongfully Removed.---A public school teacher who has a fixed statutory tenure or can be removed only for certain causes prescribed by statute may enforce her right to reinstatement by an action of mandate if she has been removed from her position in violation of her statutory rights (1244 1245 Burns 1926). p. 634.

7. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW---Grant of Unequal Privileges---Classification which is Constitutional---Rule Stated.---A classification of persons to which a statute is applicable, to be constitutional, must be reasonable and natural, not capricious or arbitrary; it must embrace all who naturally belong to the class, and there must be some inherent and substantial difference germane to the subject and purpose of the legislation between those included within the class and those excluded. p. 635.

8. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW---Teachers' Tenure Law---Is not Class Legislation---In Violation of "Special Privileges" Section of Constitution.---A classification of teachers as "permanent teachers" as those who have taught five successive years in one school corporation and who shall have contracted for further service with such corporation, as in the Teachers' Tenure Law (6967.1--6967.6 Burns Supp 1929) is not class legislation in conflict with 23, Art. 1, of the State Constitution, 75 Burns 1926. p. 636.

From Madison Circuit Court, Alonzo L. Bales, Special Judge.

Action of mandate on the relation of Mattie Griffin and others against the school city of Elwood, the school board of said city and others. From a judgment for the relatrices, the defendants appealed.

Affirmed.

Ralph Daly and Sid M. Cleveland, for appellants.

Oswald Ryan and Arthur A. Beckman, for appellees.

OPINION

Martin, J.

Mattie Griffin, a teacher in the public schools of the city of Elwood, instituted this action in mandamus to compel the school trustees of that "school city" to restore her to such teaching position. (The action was brought in the name of the State on the relation of Mattie Griffin, as provided in §§ 1244, 1245 Burns 1926, and was later consolidated with two other like actions instituted on behalf of Grace Doerman and Mary L. Records.)

The complaint alleged that relatrix was a "permanent teacher of such school corporation and the holder and possessor of an indefinite contract as a public school teacher under and by virtue of the laws of the state," (ch. 97 Acts 1927, §§ 6967.1-6967.6 Burns Supp. 1929) ^[1] that on February 3, 1931, the school trustees adopted a resolution that in the future no married women should be employed as teachers in the Elwood schools and that necessary steps be taken to terminate the indefinite contracts of all married women teachers in the school corporation, and notified such teachers (including written notice to relatrix on March 4, 1931), that the trustees would, at their regular monthly meeting on April 7, 1931, take up consideration of the cancellation of the indefinite contracts held by them; that on March 28, 1931, at the written request of the relatrix, the trustees notified her in writing that "the reason for said consideration of the cancellation of her said indefinite contract was that . . . the school board . . . had resolved that no married women should be employed as teachers in said school after the end of the school year 1930-1931"; that the meeting and hearing was held and the school board "did then and there unlawfully, unreasonably, arbitrarily and capriciously order that the indefinite contract of relatrix be cancelled and that she be dismissed as a teacher in said school corporation and did . . . give as their reason therefor that the relatrix was a married woman."

It is avered that relatrix has since demanded that she be restored to her rights as a permanent teacher and be allowed to retain her place as a teacher in said school corporation, which demand the defendant trustees refused and still refuse to comply with; that the sole and only reason for the action of the trustees in cancelling the indefinite contract of relatrix and in dismissing and discharging her was that she was a married woman; that such action by the board was unlawful, unreasonable, arbitrary and without good and just cause. That it is the duty of the trustees to reinstate relatrix and restore her rights as a permanent teacher in said corporation, which duty they refuse to perform and that unless they are required and compelled by the court to reinstate her, etc., she will be deprived of her right to continue as a permanent teacher in said corporation. A prayer for an order in mandate followed.

To the complaint, the defendants (appellants) filed a plea in abatement setting up the action of the school board, viz., "the board now hereby cancels said contracts and each of them for the reason that said teachers are married and each of them are married women," which action they allege is final and not subject to any appeal or review by the court and that the court by reason thereof has no jurisdiction in the proceedings. The court sustained a demurrer to this plea in abatement. The defendants then filed a demurrer to the complaint on the grounds that the court had no jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the action, and that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. This demurrer was overruled and upon the refusal of the defendant to plead further to the complaint, the court made a finding in favor of the three relatrices and rendered judgment thereon ordering the defendants to reinstate the relatrices in their indefinite contracts and restore to them their full rights as permanent teachers in said school corporation.

By assigning as error the sustaining of plaintiffs' demurrer to their plea in abatement and the overruling of their demurrer to the complaint, appellants present the question of whether the Madison Circuit Court had jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the action. They contend that exclusive jurisdiction was conferred upon them as a school board by § 2, ch. 97 Acts 1927, § 6967.2 Burns Supp. 1929, to hear and determine the question of cancelling appellees' "indefinite permanent" teaching contracts, and that their decision of such question was final and not subject to appeal to, or review by, the courts. The Teacher's Tenure Law specifically enumerates the causes for which a teacher may be removed or dismissed and provides that "the decision of the school board shall be final." If a school board dismisses a teacher for a cause named in the statute, such action is conclusive and is not subject to review by the courts, unless the board in taking the action acted in bad faith, arbitrarily, corruptly, fraudulently or in gross abuse of its discretion. Greathouse v. Board, etc. (1926), 198 Ind. 95, 151 N.E. 411; Keener School Township v. Eudaly (1931), 93 Ind.App. 627, 175 N.E. 363, 366; 56 C. J. 409, note 69; School District, etc., v. Davies (1904), 69 Kan. 162, 76 P. 409; People, ex rel., v. Hubbell (1899), 38 A.D. 194, 56 N.Y.S. 642; Directors, etc., v. Burton (1875), 26 Ohio St. 421; McCrea v. School Dist. (1891), 145 Pa. 550, 22 A. 1040; Gillan v. Board, etc. (1894), 88 Wis. 7, 58 N.W. 1042, 24 L. R. A. 336. Where the statute specifically enumerates the causes for which a teacher may be removed or dismissed, the teacher cannot be removed or dismissed for any other cause, Kennedy v. San Francisco Bd. of Education (1890), 82 Cal. 483, 22 P. 1042; Butcher v. Charles (1895), 95 Tenn. 532, 32 S.W. 631, and where the school board in removing or dismissing...