Greco v. Greco
Decision Date | 06 September 2005 |
Docket Number | (SC 17220). |
Citation | 275 Conn. 348,880 A.2d 872 |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Parties | EILEEN N. GRECO v. GEORGE GRECO ET AL. |
Norcott, Katz, Palmer, Vertefeuille and Zarella, Js.
William F. Gallagher, with whom, on the brief, was Barbara L. Cox, for the appellant (plaintiff).
James R. Greenfield, with whom was Kelly P. Mai, for the appellee (named defendant).
The sole issue in this certified appeal is whether the Appellate Court properly concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding the plaintiff in a dissolution of marriage action 98.5 percent of the marital property plus alimony and attorney's fees exceeding the defendant's income. The plaintiff, Eileen N. Greco, appeals following our grant of certification1 from the judgment of the Appellate Court reversing the trial court's judgment as to all financial orders imposed on the named defendant, George Greco.2 Greco v. Greco, 82 Conn. App. 768, 777, 847 A.2d 1017 (2004). We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider adequately the parties' current financial circumstances in forming its judgment. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.
The following background facts and procedural history are set forth in the Appellate Court opinion. "The plaintiff and the defendant were married on September 28, 1974. It was the second marriage for both parties. At the time of the marriage, the defendant had custody of his five children from his prior marriage and the plaintiff had custody of a child born during her prior marriage. In 1997, DNA testing revealed that the defendant is that child's biological father. The parties also had a child together born during their marriage.
4 5 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 769-72.
The defendant appealed from the trial court's judgment to the Appellate Court, claiming the trial court improperly: "(1) overvalued the defendant's stock in Greco's Auto Parts, Inc., (2) improperly awarded the plaintiff 98 percent of the parties' marital assets, (3) improperly relied on gross income, rather than net income, in determining the defendant's alimony obligation, (4) improperly ordered the defendant to pay alimony and other expenses that exceed his available income, and (5) abused its discretion in awarding the plaintiff $100,000 in attorney's fees." Id., 769. The Appellate Court agreed with the defendant's third and fourth claims and reversed the trial court's judgment as to all financial orders, declining to reach the defendant's other claims. Id., 776-77.
On appeal, the plaintiff makes three claims. Specifically, she claims that the Appellate Court improperly: (1) disregarded the trial court's finding that the defendant was not a credible witness and placed the burden on the plaintiff to disprove the defendant's allegedly unsubstantiated allegation that the trial court's award of alimony was based on gross income rather than earning capacity; (2) held the trial court's financial awards unreasonable in light of the evidence presented at trial; and (3) reversed the trial court's $100,000 award of attorney's fees.
The defendant, in response, argues that the Appellate Court properly concluded that the trial court's alimony award was based on gross income rather than net income and properly disregarded the plaintiff's claim that the award reflected earning capacity. He further contends that the Appellate Court properly reversed the trial court's financial awards as unreasonable and contrary to law and held the award of attorney's fees to be an abuse of the trial court's discretion.6 We agree with the defendant's contention that the Appellate Court properly reversed the trial court's judgment, but we affirm the Appellate Court's judgment for different reasons.
At the outset, we note that (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sunbury v. Sunbury, 210 Conn. 170, 175, 553 A.2d 612 (1989). Furthermore, trial courts are endowed with broad discretion to distribute property in connection with a dissolution of marriage. Bornemann v. Bornemann, 245 Conn. 508, 531-32, 752 A.2d 978 (1998). With those caveats in mind, we address in turn the three parts of the trial court's financial award.
Although a trial court is afforded broad discretion when distributing marital property, it must take into account several statutory factors. Lopiano v. Lopiano, 247 Conn. 356, 374-75, 752 A.2d 1000 (1998). These factors, enumerated in General Statutes § 46b-81,7 include "the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability. . . and needs of each of the parties . . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lopiano v. Lopiano, supra, 375. Although the trial court "need not give each factor equal weight . . . or recite the statutory criteria that it considered in making its decision or make express findings as to each statutory factor," it must take each into account. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
It is true that "trial courts are empowered to deal broadly with property and its equitable division incident to dissolution proceedings." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Jewett v. Jewett, 265 Conn. 669, 682, 830 A.2d 193 (2003). Generally, we will not overturn a trial court's division of marital property unless it "misapplies, overlooks, or gives a wrong or improper effect to any test or consideration which it was [its] duty to regard." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bornemann v. Bornemann, supra, 245 Conn. 532. We must, however, consider, the paramount "purpose of a property division pursuant to a dissolution proceeding [which] is to unscramble existing marital property in order to give each spouse his or her equitable share at the time of dissolution." Smith v. Smith, 249 Conn. 265, 275, 752 A.2d 1023 (1999). Under the circumstances of this case, an award of 98.5 percent of the marital estate, or $720,936.56 of the $731,870.21 estate, fails to capture this maxim.
Although the trial court stated that it had considered all of the statutory criteria when it fashioned the financial award, its final judgment indicates otherwise. As the trial court acknowledged, ...
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