Green v. Harris

• Decision Date: 20 May 2003
• Docket Number: No. 97,679.,97,679.
• Citation: 2003 OK 55,70 P.3d 866
• Parties: Lita Kay GREEN, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Casey John HARRIS, Johnny Paul Harris and Lisa L. Harris, Defendants/Appellees.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

70 P.3d 866

2003 OK 55

Lita Kay GREEN, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Casey John HARRIS, Johnny Paul Harris and Lisa L. Harris, Defendants/Appellees.

No. 97,679.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

May 20, 2003.

Mark A. Herndon, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff/Appellant.

John R. Hargrave, Michael S. Ryan, Oklahoma City, OK, for Defendants/Appellees.

KAUGER, J.

¶ 1 The issue presented on certiorari is whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because the evidentiary materials do not support a claim for negligent entrustment as a matter of law. We hold that it did.

FACTS

¶ 2 This cause concerns the liability of parents who provide a vehicle to their child, when they allegedly either knew or should have known that the child was an incompetent, careless, and reckless driver. The appellant, Lita Kay Green (Green), filed this negligent entrustment action against the appellees, Johnny Paul Harris and Lisa L. Harris (Harrises/parents/father/mother) after she was involved in an automobile accident with the Harrises' son, Casey John Harris (Harris/son), who was seventeen and a half at the time of the accident.

¶ 3 The son received his driver's license in March of 1997, and his parents provided him with a Chevrolet Camaro to drive. By June 27, 1997, Harris received his first speeding ticket. One month later, on July 27, 1997, the son received citations for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), driving left of center within 100 feet of an intersection, and failing to stop at a stop sign. Harris' driver's license was revoked on August 26, 1997. After the license was revoked, the parents sold the Camaro.

¶ 4 On December 10, 1997, Harris was given notice that, effective January 9, 1998, his driver's license would be cancelled because he had dropped out of school. Harris did not get his license reinstated until September 4, 1998. By October 6, 1998, Harris was back on the road, this time driving a Ford Mustang. The record indicates that the parents essentially provided the car for the son. The title of the car and the financing papers were in the father's name, although he insists that the son worked for him and made the payments. The mother indicated that the son worked for the father, but she really didn't know what he did or how much he was paid.

¶ 5 The son got another speeding citation on October 30, 1998. Less than two months later, on December 9, 1998, Harris was involved in the accident which gave rise to this lawsuit. The accident occurred when Green and her minor daughter were stopped behind a stop sign at the intersection of a county road known as Old U.S. Highway 69 just outside of Durant, Oklahoma. According to the police report, Harris was traveling approximately 93 miles an hour when he lost control of the car, skidded off the highway, and struck Green's vehicle in the front and left side.¹ The posted legal speed limit where the accident occurred was 45 miles per hour.

¶ 6 In an attempt to recover for the injuries she received in the accident, Green filed a lawsuit against Harris and his parents on May 22, 2000. She alleged that: 1) the son's intentional and wilful misconduct, gross negligence, negligence, reckless, malicious, wanton and careless actions were the cause of the accident and her injuries; and 2) because the parents, as legal and/or beneficial owners of the car, unlawfully and negligently entrusted the vehicle to their son, they were also liable. The parents moved for summary judgment on April 18, 2001.² They argued that: 1) they had no knowledge, at the time of the accident, that their son was a careless, reckless or an otherwise incompetent driver; and 2) the mother could not be held liable because the title was not in her name.

¶ 7 On April 8, 2002, the trial court issued a final order pursuant to 12 O.S.2001 § 994,³ sustaining the parents' motion for summary judgment. Green appealed on May 6, 2002, and on December 23, 2002, the Court of Civil Appeals, in an unpublished opinion, affirmed the trial court. We granted certiorari on April 7, 2003, to determine whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment.

¶ 8 BECAUSE SUFFICIENT EVIDENTIARY MATERIALS EXIST CONCERNING THE PARENTS' LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENT ENTRUSTMENT, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

a. Material fact issues concerning the parents alleged negligence.

¶ 9 Green's negligent entrustment claim against the parents concerns the alleged fact that they provided their son with an automobile and allowed him to drive it, when they either knew or should have known that he was an incompetent, careless and reckless driver. The parents argue that the undisputed facts show that they were not negligent⁴ because there is no relevant evidence which shows that they had notice that their son was a careless, reckless or otherwise incompetent driver. Green asserts that: 1) the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the parents because her evidence, which includes circumstantial evidence, establishes an actionable negligent entrustment claim against the parents; and 2) the issue of negligent entrustment is a fact question to be determined by the jury.

¶ 10 An actionable, common law claim for negligent entrustment exists when a person who owns or has possession and control of an automobile allows another driver to operate the automobile when the person knows or reasonably should know that the other driver is careless, reckless and incompetent, and an injury results therefrom.⁵ The question of negligent entrustment is one of fact for the jury.⁶ Such facts may be proved by circumstantial as well as positive or direct evidence.⁷

¶ 11 A motion for summary judgment should be sustained only when the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions or other evidentiary materials establish that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.⁸ All conclusions drawn from the evidentiary materials submitted to the trial court are viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.⁹ Even when basic facts are undisputed, motions for summary judgment should be denied, if under the evidence, reasonable persons might reach different conclusions from the undisputed facts.¹⁰

¶ 12 The evidentiary materials show that just after the son received his driver's license and his parents provided him with a car, he received a speeding ticket. One month later he was cited for driving under the influence of alcohol, driving left of center and failing to stop at a stop sign. His license was revoked and later cancelled because he dropped out of school. After his license was reinstated and his parents provided him with another car, he got another speeding ticket. Deposition testimony from the parents indicates that they often revoked their son's driving privileges as a form of discipline and that he was "grounded" anywhere from 30 to as much as 50 times between the ages of 15 to 18.

¶ 13 Additionally, an affidavit of the local trooper who investigated the accident provides that, although his son had been a friend of Harris' for at least 10 years, he was not permitted to ride in a motor vehicle driven by Harris and that Harris had a reputation in the community for using alcohol and drugs while driving. Direct and circumstantial evidence shows that Harris' relationship with his parents was such that they either had knowledge or should have known that Harris was a reckless and careless driver, and that he should not have been provided with a vehicle or allowed to drive. It is unlikely that the parents did not know of the son's driving propensities.

¶ 14 The parents insist that pursuant Anderson v. Eaton, 1937 OK 216, 68 P.2d 858 and Barger v. Mizel, 1967 OK 38, 424 P.2d 41, their son's prior conduct as a driver is not relevant to determine their knowledge at the time of entrustment. However, neither Anderson nor Barger are dispositive of this cause and we decline to apply either of these cases to the facts presented. Anderson is distinguishable on its facts from the present cause, and the language the parents rely on in Barger is inconsistent and contrary to language found in McCarley v. Durham, 1954 OK 35, 266 P.2d 629.

¶ 15 Anderson involved a grandfather who purchased a car for his grandson. After the grandson was involved in an accident, the other driver sued the grandfather for negligent entrustment. The only evidence regarding the grandfather's knowledge of the grandson's driving propensities was from testimony of an attorney who said that, after the grandson had been involved in a prior accident, the grandfather had stated to him that he knew the boy was a fast driver.

¶ 16 The Court recognized that: 1) the statement constituted a voluntarily made statement in another matter; 2) there was no information regarding the circumstances under which the prior accident arose; and 3) the statement only showed that the grandfather knew that the boy was a fast driver, but not necessarily reckless. Accordingly, the Court held that knowledge that a person is merely a fast driver is not sufficient to attach liability. Here, in addition to evidence that Harris was a fast driver, the evidence also shows that Harris was cited for driving under the influence, driving left of center and failing to stop. The deposition testimony of the parents shows that Harris was careless and irresponsible, and that they often "grounded" him and withheld driving privileges. The affidavit submitted by the local state trouper reflects that Harris' reputation in the community was that of an illegal drug and alcohol user and that it was general knowledge in the law enforcement community in the Durant area that he used drugs and alcohol and poor judgment while driving.

¶ 17 Barger involved the potential liability of a sports car owner who permitted an alleged inexperienced driver, whose judgment was impaired by alcohol, to drive the car. After the driver was...