Green v. Montgomery

• Citation: 95 N.Y.2d 693,723 N.Y.S.2d 744
• Decision Date: 13 February 2001
• Docket Number: No. 6,6
• Court: New York Court of Appeals
• Parties: (Ct.App. 2001) Vernon Green, Appellant, v. Phillip Montgomery, et al., Respondents. USCOA, 2

Page 744

723 N.Y.S.2d 744 (Ct.App. 2001)

Vernon Green, Appellant, v. Phillip Montgomery, et al., Respondents.

USCOA, 2 No. 6

NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS

February 13, 2001

Siben & Ferber, L.L.P., Hauppauge (Leonard G. Kapsalis of counsel), for appellant.

Robert J. Cimino, County Attorney of Suffolk County, Hauppauge (Robert H. Cabble of counsel), for respondents.

OPINION OF THE COURT

KAYE, CHIEF JUDGE:

After receiving a tip that stolen automobiles were being kept in the parking lot of an apartment complex in North Babylon, Suffolk County police staked out the location. Plaintiff Vernon Green, then 15 years old, arrived at the parking lot along with his brother and a few friends. Green and one of his friends got into a stolen Jeep Wrangler, with Green driving. The police blocked the exits with their vehicles and pursued Green and the others on foot. During the pursuit, Green drove the vehicle toward Police Officer Montgomery, who was attempting to stop his escape. There are two versions as to what next occurred. According to Montgomery, Green drove the Jeep at him, and he and another officer responded by firing at Green, wounding him in the head. According to Green, the officers began firing at him, without provocation, as the Jeep was coming to a stop.

A Grand Jury charged Green with attempted murder in the second degree and reckless endangerment in the first degree, for driving the Jeep at Montgomery. The Grand Jury also charged Green with third-degree grand larceny and criminal possession of stolen property. Because Green was charged with attempted murder - an offense for which a juvenile may be held criminally responsible - the trial took place in Supreme Court rather than Family Court. Following a bench trial, the court found that Green had committed acts that, if committed by an adult, would constitute reckless endangerment in the first degree and criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree, and found in Green's favor on the remaining counts. The court adjudicated Green a juvenile delinquent and imposed an unconditional discharge, stating in the commitment order that Green had been "convicted of/adjudicated a Juvenile Delinquent" for the crimes of reckless endangerment in the first degree and criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree.

Green then commenced the present damages action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, alleging, among other things, that the police used excessive force in apprehending him. The District Court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case, holding that Green's excessive force claim was precluded by the juvenile delinquency finding that he had committed acts constituting reckless endangerment. Since an element of the reckless endangerment charge was that Green created a "grave risk of death," in the court's view the officers' use of deadly force was justified. The court further ruled that, since Green had "put at issue facts determined in his previous juvenile delinquency adjudication" by bringing a civil action, the juvenile delinquency adjudication could be used for collateral estoppel purposes despite Family Court Act § 381.2(1), which bars its use against the juvenile "in any other Court."

On Green's appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit noted that it is an open question whether, under New York law, a juvenile delinquency adjudication may be used as collateral estoppel in a subsequent civil suit. In addition, the Second Circuit questioned whether Supreme Court's commitment order in the juvenile proceeding qualified as the equivalent of a Family Court delinquency adjudication for purposes of the confidentiality provisions of the Family Court Act. Thus, the court certified to us the following questions:

"(1) Is the New York Supreme Court's commitment order stating that Green was 'convicted of/adjudicated a Juvenile Delinquent for the crime[] of Reckless Endangerment 1st Degree' to be treated as the equivalent of a Family Court adjudication of juvenile delinquency for the purpose of §§ 380.1 and 381.2 of the Family Court Act?"

"(2) By bringing a § 1983 suit that places into question issues that were necessarily resolved by the Supreme Court in its decision that Green recklessly endangered Officer Montgomery, has Green waived any and all rights under New York state law not to have those determinations held against him, with the result that he can be collaterally estopped from relitigating the Supreme Court's findings?"

We accepted certification (95 N.Y.2d 829), and now answer both questions in the affirmative.

As a rule, a juvenile delinquency adjudication cannot be used against the juvenile in any other court for any other purpose. Section 381.2(1) of the Family Court Act provides that "[n]either the fact that a person was before the family court under this article for a hearing nor any confession, admission or statement made by him to the court or to any officer thereof in any stage of the proceeding is admissible as evidence against him or his interests in any other court." The only statutory exception is that a court imposing sentence after an adult criminal conviction "may receive and consider the records and information on file with the family court, unless such records and information have been sealed pursuant to section 375.1" (Family Court Act § 381.2[2]). Similarly, section 380.1(1) states that "[n]o adjudication under this article may be denominated a conviction and no person adjudicated a juvenile delinquent shall be denominated a criminal by reason of such adjudication."

These provisions ensure that a juvenile delinquency adjudication is not treated as a crime. Delinquency proceedings are designed not just to punish the malefactor but also to extinguish the causes of juvenile delinquency through rehabilitation and treatment (Matter of A., 49 N.Y.2d 328, 335). Indeed, a hallmark of the juvenile justice system is that a delinquency adjudication "cannot constitute a criminal conviction" and a juvenile delinquent "cannot be denominated a criminal" (Besharov and Sobie, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons Laws of N.Y., Book 29A, Family Court Act § 380.1, at 551). Rather, a Family Court adjudication is a civil proceeding, and its purpose is to "supervise and guide a troubled youth" (Matter of Carmelo E., 57 N.Y.2d 431, 435; but see, People v Gray, 84 N.Y.2d 709, 713-714 [trial court has discretion to permit use of a juvenile's out-of-state conviction for impeachment purposes if the state in which the juvenile was convicted does not provide for the confidentiality of juvenile offenses]).

Supreme Court Commitment Order

The Second Circuit certified to us the question whether Supreme Court's adjudication of Green as a juvenile delinquent qualifies as a Family Court determination for purposes of Family Court Act sections 380.1 and 381.2. As defendants correctly concede, it does.

With limited exceptions, a juvenile under age 16 "is not criminally responsible for conduct" (Penal Law § 30.00[1]). Where a juvenile is charged with an offense for which he or she cannot be held criminally responsible, the Family Court has exclusive original jurisdiction over the delinquency proceedings (see, Family Court Act § 302.1). Here, however, Green was charged with attempted second-degree murder, for which a 14- or 15-year-old can be held criminally responsible (see, Penal Law § 30.00[2]). Therefore, Supreme Court properly assumed jurisdiction over the case (see, CPL 200.20[6]).

Supreme Court acquitted Green of the attempted murder charge and found that he committed only offenses for which he could not, as a juvenile, be held criminally responsible. Under such circumstances, the Criminal Procedure Law states that Supreme Court "must order that the verdict be deemed vacated and replaced by a juvenile delinquency fact determination," and that the "action be removed to the family court" in accordance with CPL 725.00 et seq (CPL 310.85[3]). Supreme Court did - as directed by the Criminal Procedure Law - enter a juvenile delinquency fact determination for the reckless endangerment and criminal possession of stolen property charges. It did not, however, order the action removed to Family Court. Thus, while the final juvenile delinquency adjudication should properly have been entered by the Family Court, it was in fact entered by Supreme Court.

The confidentiality provisions of the Family Court Act apply here, even though the adjudication was entered by Supreme Court rather than Family Court. Under the New York Constitution, Supreme Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Family Court (see, N.Y. Const, Art 6, § 7; see also, Kagen v Kagen, 21 N.Y.2d 532). Thus, Supreme Court had constitutional authority to enter the juvenile delinquency fact determination. Further, as the Practice Commentaries explain, the purpose of CPL 310.85(3) is to ensure that, once juveniles are acquitted of all offenses for which they could be held criminally responsible, "[a]ll...