Green v. State

• Decision Date: 20 January 2015
• Docket Number: No. 2013–KA–01228–COA.,2013–KA–01228–COA.
• Citation: 183 So.3d 78
• Parties: Verenzo Cartrell GREEN a/k/a Verenzo Green, Appellant v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.
• Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals

183 So.3d 78

Verenzo Cartrell GREEN a/k/a Verenzo Green, Appellant
v.
STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.

No. 2013–KA–01228–COA.

Court of Appeals of Mississippi.

Jan. 20, 2015.
Rehearing Denied May 19, 2015.

183 So.3d 79

Office of State Public Defender by Erin Elizabeth Pridgen, attorney for appellant.

Office of the Attorney General by Barbara Wakeland Byrd, attorney for appellee.

Before IRVING, P.J., FAIR and JAMES, JJ.

FAIR, J., for the Court:

¶ 1. Verenzo Green was convicted of three counts of possession of a weapon by a convicted felon and one count of trafficking stolen firearms. He was sentenced as a habitual offender to ten years for each count of felon of possession of a firearm in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, to run consecutively; he also received a concurrent sentence of fifteen years for trafficking stolen firearms. On the day of trial, Green filed a motion to suppress, arguing the police discovered the firearms through an illegal search of his vehicle. The trial court denied the motion. Green claims on appeal that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress, and (2) his conviction for trafficking stolen firearms was not supported by sufficient evidence. Finding no error, we affirm.

FACTS

¶ 2. On February 28, 2012, Agents George Pirkey and David Washington of the Adams County Sheriff's Department spotted Green outside of a grocery store. There was an outstanding warrant for Green's arrest for a burglary committed a month before. When the agents first saw him, Green and several other men were standing by a vehicle with its trunk open. As soon as Green noticed the agents, he closed the trunk and walked towards the entrance to the store. But instead of walking into the store, he threw a set of

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car keys down and ran into some nearby woods. Agent Pirkey attempted to chase Green on foot, while Agent Washington took the police car, but they were unable to catch him. The agents returned to the store a few minutes after the chase began and spoke with the store manager. After Agent Pirkey explained the situation to the manager, she requested that the car be towed. The police called a tow truck and ran the plate of the vehicle, which identified Green as the owner. Additionally, the police conducted an inventory search of the vehicle. During the inventory search, Agent Pirkey used the car keys left by Green to open the trunk of the vehicle. Agent Pirkey discovered three guns on top of two large speakers; the guns included a Colt .38 special revolver, a .22 caliber Ruger revolver, and a .22 caliber Heritage Rough Rider. Green was indicted on three counts of possession of a weapon and one count of trafficking a firearm. He was found guilty at trial. Additional facts pertaining to the trial will be discussed below, as necessary.

DISCUSSION

1. Suppression of Evidence

¶ 3. The court denied Green's motion to suppress introduction and testimony about the handguns found in the trunk, finding that (1) Green abandoned his vehicle on private property, and (2) the police were reasonable in conducting an inventory search before impounding the vehicle. "When reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, we must assess whether substantial credible evidence supports the trial court's finding considering the totality of the circumstances." Shaw v. State, 938 So.2d 853, 859 (¶ 15) (Miss.Ct.App.2005) (citing Price v. State, 752 So.2d 1070, 1073 (¶ 9) (Miss.Ct.App.1999) ). "The standard of review for the admission or suppression of evidence is abuse of discretion." Hughes v. State, 90 So.3d 613, 631 (¶ 53) (Miss.2012).

¶ 4. The Fourth Amendment protects "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. But a person has no standing to complain of a search or seizure of property that he has abandoned. United States v. Quiroz–Hernandez, 48 F.3d 858, 864 (5th Cir.1995) (citation omitted). The abandonment question is one of intent, primarily "whether the person prejudiced by the search had voluntarily discarded, left behind, or otherwise relinquished his interest in the property so that he could no longer retain a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to it at the time of the search." United States v. Williams, 569 F.2d 823, 826 (5th Cir.1978) (citation omitted). Further, "intent may be inferred from words spoken, acts done, and other objective facts.... All relevant circumstances existing at the time of the alleged abandonment should be considered." United States v. Colbert, 474 F.2d 174, 176 (5th Cir.1973) (en banc).

¶ 5. In United States v. Edwards 441 F.2d 749, 751 (5th Cir.1971), the Fifth Circuit held that a defendant abandoned his vehicle, and therefore had no Fourth Amendment protection in regard to the vehicle, when he left his keys in the ignition and fled on foot from the police. The defendant, Edwards, jumped out of his car during a high-speed chase. Id. at 750. The police chased Edwards but were unsuccessful in catching him. Id. Afterwards, the police searched the trunk of his car and discovered untaxed whiskey. Id. The Fifth Circuit ruled Edwards's actions constituted abandonment. Id.; cf. United States v. Smith, 648 F.3d 654, 659 (8th Cir.2011) (finding that the defendant abandoned the Cadillac in the Taco Bell drive-

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through lane when he fled on foot from the police); State v. Branam, 334 Mont. 457, 463, 148 P.3d 635 (Mont.2006) (finding that the defendant's fleeing from the police and leaving an Escalade and its contents on the street constituted abandonment sufficient to justify having the car towed for impoundment).

¶ 6. Similarly, in United States v. Wolfe, No. 91–8603, 983 F.2d 232, 1993 WL 4521 (5th Cir.1993) (unpublished), the Fifth Circuit held the defendant abandoned his rental car. We acknowledge that Wolfe was not selected for publication; the court determined that the case had no precedential value. Id. at *4. But we will address the facts in Wolfe because they are synonymous with the facts in this case. In Wolfe, the officers saw five men gathered around an open trunk in a parking lot known for drug trafficking. Id. at *1. The police asked the men who owned the vehicle, to which the men replied they did not know. Id. After noticing a rental-car sticker on the car, one of the officers called the rental company and discovered the identity of the renters, who were two of the five men questioned by the police. Id. The police then searched the vehicle and recovered a .357 magnum pistol, which had been stolen in a burglary two weeks before. Id. Wolfe was later indicted and found guilty at trial. Id. at *2. On appeal, Wolfe challenged the police's search of the rental car. Id. The court stated that "where a driver walks away from a rental car, disclaims any knowledge of it to the police, and leaves the keys on the dashboard with the windows rolled down, ... he has abandoned that car for Fourth Amendment purposes." Id. at *4. The court found that Wolfe lacked standing because he abandoned the car; the court further noted that when Wolfe abandoned the car, he abandoned the contents of the car as well. Id.

¶ 7. We find the facts of this case akin to the circumstances in Edwards and Wolfe. Here, the imperative issue is whether Green's actions and the surrounding facts indicate that he abandoned the car. The police had a warrant for Green's arrest for another crime. When Green saw the police officers, he eased away from the vehicle, threw the keys to the ground, and ran towards some nearby woods. Based on Green's actions and the relevant circumstances, we agree with the trial judge's determination that Green abandoned the vehicle. As a result, Green had no Fourth Amendment protection in regard to the vehicle.

¶ 8. Even if Green had not abandoned the car and thus had standing to challenge the search, the search was reasonable as an inventory search. We acknowledge that "[w]arrantless searches and seizures are ‘per se unreasonable unless they fall within a few narrowly defined exceptions.’ " United States v. Kelly, 302 F.3d 291, 293 (5th Cir.2002). One such exception is when law enforcement performs an inventory search as part of a bona fide "routine administrative caretaking function." United States v. Skillern, 947 F.2d 1268, 1275 (5th Cir.1991) ; see also South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976).

¶ 9. An inventory search must not be a "ruse for general rummaging" to find incriminating evidence. Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4, 110 S.Ct. 1632, 109 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990) ; O'Connell v. State, 933 So.2d 306, 309 (¶ 9) (Miss.Ct.App.2005). "In order to prevent inventory searches from concealing such unguided rummaging, [the] Supreme Court has dictated that a single familiar standard is essential to guide police officers, who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and balance the social and individual interests involved

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in the specific circumstances they confront." United States v. McKinnon, 681 F.3d 203, 209 (5th Cir.2012) (quotation...