Green v. Supreme Council of Royal Arcanum

• Decision Date: 10 December 1912
• Citation: 206 N.Y. 591,100 N.E. 411
• Parties: GREEN v. SUPREME COUNCIL OF ROYAL ARCANUM et al.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

206 N.Y. 591

100 N.E. 411

GREEN

v.SUPREME COUNCIL OF ROYAL ARCANUM et al.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Dec. 10, 1912.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.

Action by Samuel Green against the Supreme Council of Royal Arcanum and another. From a judgment of the Appellate Division, Second Department (144 App. Div. 761,129 N. Y. Supp. 791), reversing on the facts and law a judgment for plaintiff, plaintiff appeals. Reversed, and judgment of the Special Term affirmed.

F. J. Moissen, of Brooklyn, for appellant.

Howard C. Wiggins, of Rome, for respondents.

PER CURIAM.

The defendant is a mutual benefit association organized under the laws of Massachusetts, and the plaintiff is one of its members by virtue of his membership in De Witt Clinton Council No. 419, which is a subordinate division of the association organized and existing within this state. The action is brought to obtain an adjudication of the rights of the parties under the contract between them. The plaintiff became a member of the defendant in 1883. He was then 37 years of age, and the rate of assessment upon members of that age was then $1.80 for each death. In 1898 this rate was changed, with the consent of the plaintiff, to one assessment of $3.16 for each death, and such extra assessments, not exceeding that amount at any one time, as might be properly levied under the constitution and by-laws. In 1905 the defendant again raised its rates, and since then the members of the class to which the plaintiff belongs have each been assessed $6.87 every month until they reach the age of 65, at which time their assessments are automatically fixed at $16.08 per month for the remainder of life. This change in the rate of assessment in 1905 was made without notice to the plaintiff, without his consent, and against his objection and protest. From 1905 until February, 1910, he paid under protest the rates as increased in 1905. Then, in February, 1910, he tendered to the proper officer of the defendant the sum of $3.16, which was the amount of the monthly assessment as fixed with his consent in 1898. The defendant, through its officers, refused to accept the tender and threatened to expel the plaintiff unless he should pay the assessment of $6.87 as fixed in 1905. The plaintiff thereupon brought this action, claiming that the increase in 1905 of the rates of assessment was illegal and in violation of his rights under his contract of membership as modified by the changes made with his consent in 1908, and in this contention he was upheld by the court at Special Term. The Appellate Division took a different view, however, and decided that the defendant in its contract with the plaintiff had effectually reserved the right to bind him to the payment of the increased rate by its subsequent amendments of its by-laws. This conclusion was based upon the assumption that there is a distinction between this case and the cases in which we have held that a membership contract in a mutual benefit association, in which the member agrees to comply with the laws of the order ‘now in force or that may hereafter be adopted,’ does not authorize a subsequent amendment of the by-laws without the member's consent if the effect of such amendment is to increase the rate of assessment or to reduce the amount of the benefit as fixed by the contract. Wright v. Knights of Maccabees, 196 N. Y. 391, 89 N. E. 1078, 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 423, 134 Am. St. Rep. 838; Dowdall v. Supreme Council Cath. Mut. Ben. Ass'n, 196 N. Y. 405, 89 N. E. 1075,31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 417;Ayers v. Grand Lodge United Workmen, 188 N. Y. 280, 80 N. E. 1020;Evans v. So. Tier Mas. R. Ass'n, 182 N. Y. 453, 75 N. E. 317;Beach v. Supreme Tent K. of M., 177 N. Y. 100, 69 N. E. 281;Langan v. Supreme Council Am. L . of H., 174 N. Y. 266, 66 N. E. 932;Shipman v. Protected Home Circle, 174 N. Y. 398, 67 N. E. 83,63 L. R. A. 347;Weber v. Supreme Tent K. of M., 172 N. Y. 490, 65 N. E. 258,92 Am. St. Rep. 753.

We think there is no distinction between the case at bar and the cases cited. In the plaintiff's application he agreed to make punctual payments of all dues and assessments for which he should become liable, ‘and to conform in all respects to the laws, rules and usages of the order now in force or which may hereafter be adopted by the same.’ The certificate issued to him by the defendant was conditioned ‘that the said member complies, in the future, with the laws, rules and regulations now...