Green v. Watson, 3-92-389-CV
| Decision Date | 11 August 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 3-92-389-CV,3-92-389-CV |
| Citation | 860 S.W.2d 238 |
| Parties | Helen Davis GREEN, Appellant, v. Gloria WATSON, et al., Appellees. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Douglass D. Hearne, Hearne, Knolle, Livingston & Holcomb, Austin, for appellant.
James D. Walker, Austin, for Truman C. Green, Jr., Betty Green Barker, Peggy Elaine Green, William Lewis Green, and James C. Green.
Paul K. Browder, pro se.
Debra L. Becker, pro se.
Before POWERS, KIDD and B.A. SMITH, JJ.
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
The opinion and judgment issued by this Court on May 5, 1993, are withdrawn, and this opinion is filed in place of the earlier one.
This is a suit arising out of and ancillary to a probate matter. The appeal involves the concurrent jurisdiction of district courts and statutory county courts with respect to probate matters. 1 At issue is whether a district court may properly decline to exercise jurisdiction over a suit seeking, among other things, imposition of a constructive trust on estate assets already the subject of a probate proceeding pending in a statutory county court.
The property that is the subject of this dispute passed to Helen Davis Green ("Appellant") as sole beneficiary of her late husband's will, which was probated in the County Court at Law No. 1 of Williamson County ("the Williamson County court"). Appellant sued Truman Green, Jr., Betty Green Barker, Peggy Green, William Green, James Green, Paul Browder, Debra Becker, and Gloria Watson ("Appellees") in the Travis County district court. With the exception of Browder, Becker, and Watson, Appellees are decedent's children from a former marriage (the "Green children"). Browder and Becker are the attorneys who represented the Green children in the contest of their father's will and in execution on the judgment for attorney's fees. Watson is a county constable involved in the seizure and sale of the property underlying this dispute. Appellant filed suit in her individual capacity seeking a declaratory judgment and actual and exemplary damages for wrongful execution, as well as the imposition of a constructive trust. These claims stem from the Green children's alleged wrongful execution of Appellant's exempt personal property. Appellant appeals from the district court's dismissal of her suit for lack of jurisdiction. 2 We will affirm the order of dismissal.
Appellant is the surviving widow and sole beneficiary of Truman C. Green, Sr. ("decedent"). The Green children unsuccessfully contested decedent's will in the Williamson County court, which rendered judgment on a jury verdict finding the will valid. The judgment in that cause admitted decedent's will to probate, appointed Appellant independent executor of decedent's estate, and provided On January 24, 1992, immediately after Appellant received her letters testamentary, Watson served her with a writ of execution on the judgment for the fees and costs. Almost simultaneously, the other appellees seized virtually all the personal property, named in an exhibit attached to the writ of execution, passing to Appellant under decedent's will. The property included home furnishings and appliances, an automobile, firearms, farming and sporting equipment, clothes and jewelry, dishes, and food stuffs.
both Appellant and the Green children with a $145,000 judgment against the estate for their attorney's fees and necessary expenses. 3 No party appealed from the judgment rendered in the will-contest proceeding
The Probate Code, in conjunction with the Property Code, affords Appellant, as independent executor, the opportunity to designate personal property eligible for exemption from creditors' claims within a reasonable time of request and prior to seizure by creditors. See Tex.Prob.Code Ann. § 146 (West 1980); Tex.Prop.Code Ann. § 42.003 (West Supp.1993). Although denied the opportunity to designate such property prior to its seizure, Appellant designated all exempt estate property by letter dated January 26, 1992. On February 4, 1992, Watson served Appellant, through her counsel, with two notices that the seized property would be offered for sale at public auction on February 12, 1992. Watson, at the direction of the other appellees, disregarded Appellant's exempt-property designation and sold the seized property in Austin. The Green children purchased the bulk of the property and still retain possession. Some property was sold to third parties, including Becker, one of the Green children's attorneys.
Before the sale, Appellant filed suit in her individual capacity and as independent executor in the Travis County district court seeking a judgment declaring that (1) Appellant has a superior right to possess the seized property; (2) the seized property is exempt from execution and forced sale; (3) the levy is wrongful and constitutes a conversion; (4) Watson lacks authority to seize and sell the property; and (5) Appellant is entitled to actual and exemplary damages. After the sale, Appellant amended her petition to reflect suit only in her individual capacity, to request that the execution sale be declared void or voidable, and to plead the additional remedy of imposition of a constructive trust on the seized property and proceeds of sale held by the Green children and third parties. Following a nonevidentiary hearing, the district court dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction, explaining in its order, "The probate court of Williamson County has exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of this cause." On appeal, Appellant advances five points of error.
Resolution of the issues presented requires some discussion of the overlapping jurisdictional grants found in the Texas Constitution article V, section 8, and Probate Code sections 5(c), (e), and 5A(b). The Texas Constitution sets out the broad general jurisdiction of district courts. The Probate Code provisions critical to our analysis are sections 5(c) and 5A(b), which provide in pertinent part:
In those counties where there is a statutory probate court,county court at law, or other statutory court exercising the jurisdiction of a probate court, all applications, petitions and motions regarding probate [and] administrations ... shall be filed and heard in such courts ... rather than the district courts, unless otherwise provided by the legislature....
Tex.Prob.Code Ann. § 5(c) (West Supp.1993). 4
In proceedings in the statutory probate courts and district courts, the phrases "appertaining to estates" and "incident to an estate" in this Code include ... the interpretation and administration of testamentary trusts and the applying of constructive trusts, and generally all matters relating to the settlement, partition, and distribution Code § 5A(b) (West Supp.1993).
of estates of wards and deceased persons.
Initially, we must emphasize the distinction between statutory county courts and statutory probate courts. The Williamson County court is a statutory county court vested with general jurisdiction over all civil and criminal matters and with probate jurisdiction as provided by general law for county courts. Tex.Gov't Code Ann. §§ 25.0003, 25.2482 (West 1988 & Supp.1993). A statutory probate court, by contrast, is a court with jurisdiction limited to the general jurisdiction of a probate court as set forth in the Probate Code. Code § 3(ii) (West 1980). Statutory county courts exercising probate jurisdiction are not statutory probate courts under the Code, unless their statutorily designated name includes the term "probate." Id. The Government Code provides that in counties where they exist, statutory probate courts are the only county courts created by statute with probate jurisdiction. Tex.Gov't Code Ann. § 25.0003(e) (West Supp.1993). We construe this to mean that statutory probate courts have probate jurisdiction exclusive of other statutory courts, in counties where they both exist. Williamson County does not have a statutory probate court; therefore, the two Williamson County courts at law exercise probate jurisdiction as authorized by the Probate Code.
Appellant's first and second points of error complain that the district court erred in dismissing her suit on the ground that the Williamson County court has exclusive jurisdiction in this situation. Appellant argues that statutory county courts and district courts have concurrent jurisdiction in certain probate situations, and in this case, the district court has dominant jurisdiction over her suit. Appellees respond that sections 5(e) and 5(c) vest exclusive jurisdiction in the Williamson County court to hear all matters incident to the estate. 5 We disagree.
The Texas Constitution grants district courts general jurisdiction over all matters, although this jurisdiction may be assigned to another adjudicative body in specific situations. Tex. Const. art. V, § 8. Section 5(c) limits the general jurisdiction of certain district courts by granting dominant jurisdiction in probate matters to statutory probate courts and county courts at law, unless the legislature specifically preserves such jurisdiction in the district courts. Code § 5(c). Finally, section 5A(b) grants district courts probate jurisdiction in specific situations by defining matters incident to an estate that the district court may hear. Code § 5A(b). Therefore, section 5(c) vests dominant jurisdiction over probate matters in the statutory county courts, but allows the legislature to create exceptions to this scheme. As we will discuss below, section 5A(b) provides such exceptions.
Although section 5(e) gives all courts exercising original probate jurisdiction, like the Williamson County court, the power to hear all matters incident to the estate, the grant of that power is not exclusive of the probate jurisdiction of other courts. See Goodwin v. Kent, 745 S.W.2d 466, 469 (Tex.App.--Tyler 1988,...
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