Green v. Zimmerman, 20531
| Decision Date | 19 October 1977 |
| Docket Number | No. 20531,20531 |
| Citation | 238 S.E.2d 323,269 S.C. 535 |
| Parties | George R. GREEN, Respondent, v. John ZIMMERMAN and R.L. McNeil, Appellants |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Gressette & Gressette, St. Matthews, and J.C. Nicholson, Jr., Orangeburg, for appellants.
Williams & Williams, Orangeburg, for respondent.
Plaintiff-respondent, the owner of an 8 1/2 acre fish pond in Calhoun County, recovered judgment in the amount of $3800.00 against the defendant-appellant, R.L. McNeil, operator of an airplane crop spraying service, for a fish kill in 1973 in respondent's pond, allegedly caused by the pollution of the water with chemicals sprayed from appellant's plane while engaged in spraying crops in adjacent fields. This appeal is from the denial of appellant's timely motion for a nonsuit, directed verdict; and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, for a new trial.
This action was brought, under the strict liability provisions of Section 55-3-60 of the 1976 Code of Laws, which provides in pertinent part that:
The owner of every aircraft which is operated over the land or waters of this State is absolutely liable for injuries to person or property on the land or water beneath caused by ascent, descent or flight of the aircraft or the dropping or falling of any object therefrom, whether such owner was negligent or not, unless the injury is caused in whole or in part by the negligence of the person injured or of the owner or bailee of the property injured ... An aeronaut who is not the owner or lessee shall be liable only for the consequence of his own negligence.
While there are other questions raised, the basic ones concern the applicability of the foregoing statute to the aerial application of insecticides and pesticides to crops. Appellant argues, first, that the language of the statute and the absence of aerial application of chemicals in 1929, when it was enacted, sustain his contention that the General Assembly did not intend for the statute to apply to the operation of aircraft in dusting and spraying crops.
Appellant argues that the statutory language ("dropping or falling of any object therefrom") does not contemplate the intentional and controlled application of chemicals from an aircraft, but was intended to apply to the accidental falling or dropping of objects therefrom. We find no basis for such construction.
The statute applies to injuries "caused by ascent, descent or flight of the aircraft or the dropping or falling of any object therefrom." These are general and comprehensive terms and, when given their literal meaning, apply to any injury caused by the "flight of the aircraft" or any object or material that is dropped, or falls, or is ejected from an airplane while in flight, whether done intentionally or unintentionally. There is no language in the statute to indicate an intent to fasten strict liability upon the owner of an aircraft according to the nature of the object falling therefrom or the manner in which the descent is initiated. The terms "dropping" or "falling" clearly include acts of volition as well as accidental occurrences. The spraying or dusting of chemicals from an aircraft in flight, therefore, constitute the "dropping or falling" of an object therefrom within the meaning of the statute.
The terms of the statute are clear and unambiguous and leave no room for construction. They must therefore be applied according to their literal meaning. Jones v. South Carolina State Highway Department, 247 S.C. 132, 146 S.E.2d 166.
Assuming that aerial application of chemicals to crops was not practiced in 1929, when the statute was enacted, an assumption not supported by the record, that fact would not exclude the subsequently developed operation of aerial crop dusting and spraying from the application of the statute. Aerial crop spraying and dusting clearly falls within the purview and scope of the statutory language and is included within its application even though the business might not have been in existence at the time of its enactment. 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 319.
There is no merit in appellant's further argument that the aerial application of chemicals is removed from the application of the statute (Section 55-3-60, supra) by the fact that the State through the Aeronautics Commission licenses aerial applicators. Since the State licenses crop spraying and dusting, appellant contends that such is privileged and not subject to the standards imposed by the statute. We disagree.
No statutory or other support is cited for the foregoing argument. We agree with respondent that the State licensing provisions were designed in an attempt to provide public safety for a hazardous activity. It is evident that in enacting Section...
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