Sierra Inv. Corp. v. Sacramento County

Decision Date05 July 1967
Citation252 Cal.App.2d 339,60 Cal.Rptr. 519
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
PartiesSIERRA INVESTMENT CORPORATION, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO et al., Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 764.
OPINION

GARGANO, Associate Justice.

Appellant corporation instituted this action against the respondents in the Superior Court of Sacramento County to recover the county taxes it allegedly paid by mistake on a parcel of real property which it did not own. The respondents filed general and special demurrers to appellant's first amended complaint which were sustained by the trial court with leave to amend. Appellant, however, elected to rest on its complaint; and after it failed to amend, respondents' motion for dismissal of the complaint was granted by the trial court. Appellant appeals from the judgment of dismissal.

Since appellant has elected not to amend its complaint, a strict construction of the pleadings is required. In fact, for the purpose of this appeal at least, we must assume that it pleaded as strong a case as it can (Vaughn v. Certified Life, 238 Cal.App.2d 177, 47 Cal.Rptr. 619). Accordingly, at the very best the facts are essentially as follows: Through no mistake or fault on the part of the respondents, appellant acquired a tax bill covering a parcel of real property which it did not own. 1 The tax bill accurately described the property assessed by numerical code referring to a map in the assessor's office, correctly named the assessee, and apparently was correct in every other detail. 2 Appellant, however, under the mistaken belief that it owned the property designated in the tax bill, paid both installments of taxes as they became due. The first installment was paid on or about November 28, 1962, and the second installment was paid on or about April 10, 1963. Approximately three years later appellant petitioned the respondent board of supervisors pursuant to Revenue and Taxation Code section 5096, subdivision (b), to recover the taxes which it alleged were 'erroneously collected' by respondent Sacramento County. The petition was denied by the board and this suit followed.

Under the 'voluntary payment' doctrine followed in this and most other states, it is settled that taxes freely and voluntarily paid may not be recovered by a taxpayer in the absence of a statute permitting the refund thereof, and that this is so even if the taxes are illegally levied or collected (Southern Service Co., Ltd., v. Los Angeles, 15 Cal.2d 1, 97 P.2d 963). Moreover, it is also settled that one who pays taxes under the mistaken belief that he owns the property against which the taxes are levied is a volunteerer, and that under these circumstances the taxes are freely and voluntarily paid. 3 As stated in Bateson v. City of Detroit, 143 Mich. 582, 106 N.W. 1104, 1105:

'It is apparent that the plaintiff, when he made the payments in question, had before him the description assessed, and could have determined by a comparison of the same with the description in his deed that such assessment covered more land than he or his wife owned. * * * The rule that a tax voluntarily paid cannot be recovered back, and that the taxpayer cannot aver a mistake of fact which results from his own neglect to consult the record, is too well settled to require extended citation of authorities.'

Thus, the only remaining question presented herein is whether Revenue and Taxation Code section 5096, subdivision (b), or any other section of that code or law of this state required the respondent Board of Supervisors of Sacramento County to refund the taxes which appellant paid under the facts alleged in its complaint.

Respondents contend that the only statutory authority which provides a remedy for a taxpayer who mistakenly pays taxes on the wrong parcel of real property (where the taxes are otherwise properly and legally levied and where no mistake has been made by the county in its billing process or otherwise) is that provided by sections 4911--4916 of the Revenue and Taxation Code. They further contend that this remedy is exclusive, and since appellant did not allege compliance therewith, thereby exhausting the administrative remedy specified by the statute as a prerequisite to relief, it cannot now prevail in this appeal. Under these sections of the Revenue and Taxation Code a property owner who by mistake pays a county tax on property other than that intended may petition the county tax collector for relief. If the tax collector is convinced that the taxpayer has done so, he may cancel the credit on the unintended property and transfer the payment to the property intended, refunding the excess if any. Meaningfully, however, no such cancellation and transfer may be made by the tax collector 'if a certificate of title has been issued respecting the intended property or if it was sold to the state.' In addition, also, before transferring the erroneous payment to the intended property, the tax collector must first notify the owner of the unintended property by registered mail. The owner of the unintended property may then demand a hearing before the board of supervisors of the county, and whether a transfer will be made depends upon the decision of the board.

Appellant, on the other hand, contends that the necessary statutory authority (requiring a refund of taxes mistakenly paid by a taxpayer, even though the tax was legally and properly levied and no mistake was made by the county in the billing process or otherwise) is contained in section 5096, subdivision (b), of the Revenue and Taxation Code. The pertinent part of this section reads as follows:

' § 5096. Order of supervisors; grounds

On order of the board of supervisors, any taxes paid before or after delinquency shall be refunded if they were:

(b) Erroneously or illegally collected. * * *'

Thus, while conceding that it has not uncovered any case directly in point, appellant simply argues that since it paid the taxes which it seeks to recover under the mistaken belief that it owned the property against which these taxes were levied, they were also by necessity 'erroneously collected' by the respondent county within the meaning of the terms as used in section 5096, subdivision (b).

We do not agree with appellant's contention. Revenue and Taxation Code section 5096, subdivision (b), does not state that taxes 'mistakenly paid' by a taxpayer shall be refunded. To the contrary, it refers to taxes 'erroneously collected,' and this term connotates a mistake or error on the part of the county or its responsible officers, either it the levy of the tax, or if not in the levy, in the collection process. Significantly, county real property taxes are levied against the real property and constitute an encumbrance against the real property and are not a personal obligation of the assessee (in the event of delinquency the county's remedy is against the real property and not against the assessee). Thus, in collecting real property taxes for which an accurate tax bill has been issued and mailed, the county's primary responsibility is to make certain that the right parcel receives credit when payment is made. In fact, it is common knowledge that the great bulk of county taxes is either paid in person on or about the due date, or by mail, and it would be an insurmountable task for the county to make certain that the person who pays the tax is also the owner of the property described in the tax bill, particularly when the property may have changed hands several times between the assessment date and the due date. Consequently, as to the named assessee, the collection process is in effect completed with the mailing of the tax bill. It is noteworthy, however, that the appellant did not allege in its complaint that the county or its officers made an error of any kind either in levying the taxes, in naming the assessee or in the billing process. Therefore, the real property taxes which appellant paid, although mistakenly paid, were not erroneously collected by the county in the normal sense of the term as that term is necessarily applied to the collection of real property taxes. We conclude that the Legislature intended to use the term 'erroneously collected' in its ordinary and normal sense, and that if it intended to afford relief to a taxpayer who mistakenly paid county taxes, it would have said so.

Furthermore, a careful comparison of the provisions of section 5096, subdivision (b), with the provisions of sections 4911--4916 (which afford...

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