Greening v. General Air-Conditioning Corp.

• Decision Date: 12 April 1965
• Docket Number: AIR-CONDITIONING
• Citation: 233 Cal.App.2d 545,43 Cal.Rptr. 662
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Jack W. GREENING and June L. Greening, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. GENERALCORP., a corporation, et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Page 662

43 Cal.Rptr. 662

233 Cal.App.2d 545

Jack W. GREENING and June L. Greening, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. GENERAL AIR-CONDITIONING CORP., a corporation, et al., Defendants and Respondents.

District Court of Appeal, Third District, California.

April 12, 1965.

Peters & Peters, Chico, for appellants.

Newton, Braun & Goodrich by William J. Braun, Redding, for defendant-respondent General Air Conditioning.

William W. Coshow, Redding, for respondent Womack.

FRIEDMAN, Justice.

Plaintiffs had a combination office and guest house constructed on their ranch. As the aftermath of a fire plaintiffs brought this damage action against Womack, the sheet metal subcontractor, and General Air Conditioning Corporation, manufacturer of the combination heating and air conditioning unit (or heat pump) installed in the building by Womack. The action went to trial before the court sitting without a jury. At the close of plaintiffs' evidence defendants moved for judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 631.8. The motion was granted. Findings were then filed and judgment entered. Plaintiffs appeal.

The building was a rectangular structure, divided into four rooms by a wall running from front to rear and an intersecting wall from one side to the other. The four rooms thus created were a carport and an office at the front of the building and a shop and bedroom in the rear. From the front entry a central hallway extended along the interior wall of the office as far as the lateral wall. The office adjoined the hall on one side, the carport on the other. The heat pump was installed under the rafters in the carport adjoining the wall separating the carport and hallway. In the ceiling of the hall a wooden box, called a plenum, was constructed. The heat pump propelled hot or cold air through a wall opening into the plenum, and vents in the plenum directed the air into the rooms. Construction of the plenum was the responsibility of the general contractor, who was not a defendant in the action.

The heat pump was installed in February 1959. It did not work satisfactorily and the Womack firm made a series of calls to service the unit. On June 23, 1959, they replaced a filter. On July 16, 1959, they made a service call in connection with dirty filters and a defrost switch. On August 26, 1959, the defrost switch was changed. On December 23, 1959, a burnt out coil on the evaporator motor was replaced. On January 6, 1960, the evaporator motor had to be replaced. Six days later, on January 12, 1960, a new relay was installed. There was a repair ticket dated January 13, 1960, which did not indicate what work was done but stated, 'Compressor just hums. Won't run.' On January 22 the compressor was replaced. February 17 the defrost switch was replaced. On April 1, 1960, Womack's service man made a service call described by the following entry: 'Checked unit for operation. Found blower motor not functioning, and rewired same. Loose wire.' A few hours after Womack's repairman left the house on April 1 a fire broke out in the interior of the plenum. The inside of the plenum, portions of the wiring in the control box and the rafter from which the heat pump was suspended were all burned.

In conformity with Code of Civil Procedure section 631.8, the trial court made findings. It was found that: (1) the major part of the fire and its starting point were in the plenum; (2) the evidence failed to show that the heat pump produced excessive heat; (3) the evidence failed to show overheating of the heating elements within the heat pump; (4) neither defendant was responsible for the construction or design of the plenum; (5) the heat pump was, in fact, operating during the fire; (6) the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that the heat pump caused the fire; (7) the evidence failed to prove that the heat pump was of improper design or that the design contributed to the fire; (8) the evidence failed to prove that the heat pump was improperly installed or that its installation contributed to the fire; (9) the evidence failed to prove that Womack's maintenance operations were improper or contributed to the fire. As a conclusion of law the trial court found that 'the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply to the present case.'

The complaint was in three counts, framed upon theories of negligence, breach of warranty and breach of contract. Plaintiffs' appellate attack centers mainly on the trial court's conclusion that res ipsa loquitur did not apply as a matter of law. That conclusion, of course, affected only the negligence count. Plaintiffs make a secondary argument that 'a case was also proved' under the breach of contract and breach of warranty theories, the latter in view of Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 27 Cal.Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897, and Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal.2d 256, 37 Cal.Rptr. 896, 391 P.2d 168. The secondary argument overlooks an essential factor in establishing a claim under either theory and pays inadequate heed to the character of the trial judge's role in passing upon a motion for judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 631.8.

The plaintiff a breach of contract action must prove that the breach was the cause of his damage. (Civ.Code, sec. 3300; Automatic Poultry Feeder Co. v. Wedel, 213 Cal.App.2d 509, 515-516, 28 Cal.Rptr. 795.) Similarly, the Greenman theory of strict tort liability arising from defective manufactured products is premised on proof of a causal relationship between the defect and the injury. Nothing in Greenman or Vandermark dispenses with proof of proximate cause. (See Greenman v. Yuba Power Products Co., supra, 59 Cal.2d at p. 62, 27 Cal.Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897; Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., supra, 61 Cal.2d at p. 263, 37 Cal.Rptr. 896, 391 P.2d 168.) As to General Air Conditioning Corporation, manufacturer of the heat pump, the trial judge found that plaintiffs' evidence was insufficient to support a finding that the heat pump or its design caused the fire. Assuming--but certainly not deciding--that the strict liability doctrine obtaining in defective products cases might be dilated to embrace defective buildings, we confront a trial court finding of an absence of proof that installation or maintenance by defendant Womack caused the fire. If these findings are impervious to factual attack, plaintiffs have lost their action for breach of warranty (or strict tort liability) and breach of contract.

The 1961 enactment of Code of Civil Procedure section 631.8 substituted the 'motion for judgment' for the nonsuit motion formerly available in nonjury trials. On the nonsuit motion the truth of the plaintiff's evidence had to be assumed and all inferences drawn in the plaintiff's favor. (2 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, Trial, secs. 125-127, pp. 1857-1860.) The new motion-for-judgment procedure requires the trial judge to weigh the evidence. Section 631.8 declares: 'The court as trier of the facts shall weigh the evidence and may render a judgment in favor of the moving party, in which case the court shall make findings * * *.' In weighing the evidence, the trial judge may exercise the prerogatives of a fact trier by refusing to believe witnesses and by drawing conclusions at odds with expert opinion. If the motion is granted, his findings are entitled to the same respect on appeal as any other findings and are not reversible if supported by substantial evidence. (Woolliscroft v. Starr, 225 Cal.App.2d 667, 669-670, 37 Cal.Rptr. 570; Estate of Sharff, 219 Cal.App.2d 128, 132, 33 Cal.Rptr. 52).

Application of the substantial evidence rule to findings made under section 631.8 is not without its difficulties. In the present case, for example, the findings are drawn in negative rather than positive terms. They do not say that the damage was not caused by the claimed defect, but rather that there was no proof that the damage was so caused. After a successful defense motion under section 631.8, it is quite logical to draw findings in terms of the absence of affirmative proof rather than the presence of negative proof. of the latter sort usually awaits the defendant's case, and the very purpose of the motion is to eliminate the necessity of defense evidence.

However logical at the trial court level, findings so drawn pose some difficulty on appeal. To find substantial evidence in support of a finding of no evidence draws the reviewing court into a kind of juridical shell game. There is a more palatable approach. Frequently the real crux of the argument on appeal is the plaintiff-appellant's claim that the trial judge refused to draw all available inferences from the plaintiff's evidence. Such a claim is quite in order on appellate review of a nonsuit motion, because there the trial judge is obliged to draw inferences favorable to plaintiff. Where, as here, the trial judge is directed by statute to weigh the evidence and make findings, he has no such obligation. Rather, he may draw such inferences as seem reasonable to him. The following then becomes the appropriate rule on appeal: "When two or more inferences can be reasonably deduced from the facts, the reviewing court is without power to substitute its deductions for those of the trial court * * *." (Callahan v. Gray, 44 Cal.2d 107, 111, 279 P.2d 963, 965; 3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, Appeal, sec. 88, pp. 2251-2252.)

In granting defendants' motion for judgment, the trial judge filed an opinion which assists materially in appraising his view of the evidence. He noted from photographic exhibits that a large amount of smoke was blown from the plenum into the office, from which he drew the inference that the fire had progressed substantially in the plenum while the heat pump was operating. Although an expert witness had testified that the heat pump was not Underwriter Laboratory approved and that heat made it dangerous to place the equipment to close to the wooden rafter, the trial court noted that the heating...