Gregg v. Hartwick, 87-146
| Decision Date | 29 June 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 87-146,87-146 |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
| Parties | Charles GREGG, Appellant, v. Terry C. HARTWICK, North Little Rock Mayor; Martin Gibson, Aubrey Blanks, Otha Warren, Olen Thomas, William E. George, John Evans, Stuart Vess & Charles Kimbrell, North Little Rock Aldermen, Appellees. |
Charles L. Carpenter, North Little Rock, for appellant.
Jim Hamilton, City Atty. by Thomas J. Pendowski, Asst. City Atty., North Little Rock, for appellees.
This expedited appeal seeks a writ of mandamus ordering the appellees, North Little Rock's mayor and aldermen, to conduct a special referendum election on the voluntary annexation of certain lands by the city. The circuit court denied the request for the writ. It is from that order that this appeal is brought. We find that amendment 7 to the Arkansas Constitution requires the city to hold an election and accordingly, reverse the trial court and direct it to issue the writ of mandamus.
The history of this case is as follows. On October 21, 1986, the Pulaski Circuit Court ordered a petition for the voluntary annexation of approximately 1,500 acres into the City of North Little Rock be granted and approved. That judgment was filed on November 21, 1986. On November 24, 1986, the North Little Rock City Council adopted Resolution No. 3075, accepting the proposed area into the city on the effective date of the circuit court judgment. Appellant, Charles Gregg, and other citizens, filed a referendum petition on December 22, 1986, to refer Resolution No. 3075 to a vote of the people for their approval or rejection. The petition contained a sufficient number of signatures to be a valid petition. The city council has not referred the resolution to a vote of the people because the council does not regard the resolution as "municipal legislation" properly subject to a referendum. When the council refused to act, Gregg filed this action in Pulaski Circuit Court on March 20, 1987, seeking a declaratory judgment that the resolution was "municipal legislation" and therefore subject to the referendum, and a writ of mandamus, directing the council members to call a special election. The trial court denied the requested relief.
The purpose of a writ of mandamus is to enforce an established right or compel the performance of a duty. Lewis v. Conlee, Mayor et al, 258 Ark. 715, 529 S.W.2d 132 (1975). Amendment 7 provides in pertinent part:
The initiative and referendum powers of the people are hereby further reserved to the local voters of each municipality and county as to all local, special and municipal legislation of every character in and for their respective municipalities and counties, ...
....
Every extension, enlargement, grant, or conveyance of a franchise or any rights, property, easement, lease, or occupation of or in any road, street, alley or any part thereof in real property or interest in real property owned by municipalities, exceeding in value three hundred dollars, whether the same be by statute, ordinance, resolution, or otherwise, shall be subject to referendum and shall not be subject to emergency legislation.
We first address whether the city council's resolution must be considered "local, special and municipal legislation" to which referendum powers apply. This court has explained that the test for determining whether a resolution is municipal legislation City of North Little Rock v. Gorman et al., 264 Ark. 150, 568 S.W.2d 481 (1978); Greenlee et al. v. Munn, Clerk et al, 262 Ark. 663, 559 S.W.2d 928 (1978); and Scroggins v. Kerr, 217 Ark. 137, 228 S.W.2d 995 (1950).
In applying this test, however, we are mindful of the fact that we have long held that amendment 7 is to be liberally construed in order that its purposes may be effectuated. Leigh & Thomas v. Hall, Secretary of State, 232 Ark. 558, 339 S.W.2d 104 (1960). In that case we stated:
Amendment No. 7 permits the exercise of the power reserved to the people to control, to some extent at least, the policies of the State, but more particularly of counties and municipalities, as distinguished from the exercise of similar power by the Legislature, and, since that residuum of power remains in the electors, their acts...
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