Gregoris Motors, Inc. v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S. A.

• Decision Date: 23 February 1981
• Citation: 436 N.Y.S.2d 90,80 A.D.2d 631
• Parties: GREGORIS MOTORS, INC., Respondent-Appellant, v. NISSAN MOTOR CORPORATION IN U.S.A., Defendant, and Curwood Pontiac-Datsun, Inc., Appellant-Respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 90

436 N.Y.S.2d 90

80 A.D.2d 631

GREGORIS MOTORS, INC., Respondent-Appellant, v. NISSAN MOTOR CORPORATION IN U.S.A., Defendant and Curwood Pontiac-Datsun, Inc., Appellant-Respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.

Feb. 23, 1981.

Ira J. Greenhill, New York City (Vincent Crisci, New York City, of counsel), for appellant-respondent.

Blau & Damadeo, Hicksville (Nicholas J. Damadeo, Hicksville, of counsel), for respondent-appellant.

Before MANGANO, J. P., and GIBBONS, GULOTTA and O'CONNOR, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.

In an action to recover damages and for equitable relief for (1) breach of contract, and (2) intentional interference with contractual relations, plaintiff and defendant Curwood Pontiac-Datsun, Inc. (Curwood) cross-appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, dated November 3, 1980, which (1) denied plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, and (2) denied Curwood's cross-motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Cross appeal by plaintiff dismissed, without costs or disbursements. The cross appeal was not perfected in accordance with the rules of this court.

On the appeal by defendant Curwood, order reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with $50 costs and disbursements, the provision denying Curwood's cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is deleted and the cross motion is granted.

An essential element of a cause of action for intentional interference with contractual relations is the intentional procurement of a breach by the defendant (see, e. g., Israel v. Wood Dolson Co., 1 N.Y.2d 116, 120, 151 N.Y.S.2d 1, 134 N.E.2d 97; Lamb v. Cheney & Son, 227 N.Y. 418, 125 N.E. 817; Prosser, Torts (4th ed), § 129). Plaintiff's pleadings and motion papers failed to establish, for the purpose of withstanding a motion for summary judgment, that Curwood procured a breach of the contract between it and defendant Nissan Motor Corporation (Nissan). It is the responsibility of a court to interpret a written instrument (Mallad Constr. Corp. v. County Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn., 32 N.Y.2d 285, 344 N.Y.S.2d 925, 298 N.E.2d 96; 4 Williston, Contracts (3d ed.) § 601). At bar both parties are in apparent agreement that resort to parol evidence is not necessary to ascertain the meaning of the writing entered into by plaintiff and Nissan. Accordingly, the question is one of law and may appropriately be decided by an appellate tribunal (see Mallad Constr. Corp. v. County Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn., supra ).

The paragraph in the standard Datsun Dealer Sales and Service Agreement, which is at the heart of this litigation, in pertinent part provides:

"4. Determination of Dealer Representation

"A. Appointment of Additional Datsun Dealers Subject to any limitation imposed by applicable law, Seller reserves the right to sell Datsun Products to others and to appoint additional Authorized Datsun Dealers within or without Dealer's...