Gregory v. State, 584S205
| Decision Date | 06 January 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 584S205,584S205 |
| Citation | 487 N.E.2d 156 |
| Parties | Eddie D. GREGORY, Appellant (Petitioner Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Respondent Below). |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Susan K. Carpenter, Public Defender of Indiana, Melanie C. Conour, Deputy Public Defender, Indianapolis, for appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Lee Cloyd, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
As the result of participating in the escape of a prisoner who was paying an escorted visit to a funeral home in 1974, Eddie Gregory was charged with Robbery and two counts of Aiding Escape of Prisoners. The prosecutor further alleged that he was an habitual offender.
On the morning of his trial in 1977, Gregory reached an agreement with the prosecutor and pleaded guilty to the three felonies in return for a recommendation of three concurrent thirty year sentences. The prosecutor also agreed to drop the habitual offender charge.
Six years later, Gregory filed a pro se Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, which was later amended after the Public Defender entered an appearance. The Petition sought to vacate Gregory's conviction on the grounds that the trial judge who accepted it had not complied with Ind.Code Sec. 35-4.1-1-3 (now recodified as Ind.Code Sec. 35-35-1-2). The trial judge held an evidentiary hearing, concluded that the advisements given by the trial court had been adequate, and denied the individually alleged grounds for relief. She further found that Gregory's petition was barred by laches. Gregory appeals from those findings.
Appellant raises three issues on appeal. He claims that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he had been advised of various rights at the time he pleaded guilty, namely, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses and the right to a public and speedy trial. He asserts that he was not told that by pleading guilty he was admitting the truth of the facts alleged in the information and that thereupon the court would proceed with sentencing. Finally, he claims that the post-conviction court erred in finding laches.
We find the last of these issues to be dispositive and affirm the denial of Gregory's Petition.
Laches is an equitable doctrine which is available to the State as an affirmative defense. This Court has defined laches as:
... the neglect for an unreasonable or unexplained length of time, under circumstances permitting diligence, to do what in law should have been done. It is an implied waiver arising from knowledge of existing conditions and an acquiescence in them, the neglect to assert a right, as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time, more or less great, and other circumstances causing prejudice to the adverse party and thus operating as a bar in a court of equity. [Citations omitted.]
The question of laches is one to be determined by the court in the exercise of its sound discretion from the facts and circumstances of each case. State ex rel. Harris v. Mutschler (1953), 232 Ind. 580, 115 N.E.2d 206. Although an element thereof, the lapse of time alone does not constitute laches. Sinclair v. Gunzenhauser (1913), 179 Ind. 78, 98 N.E. 37, rehearing denied 179 Ind. 78, 100 N.E. 376. Other factors also bear substantially upon the determination, among them the reasonableness of a delay and the prejudice, if any, to the adversary.
Frazier v. State (1975), 263 Ind. 614, 335 N.E.2d 623, 625.
The burden to prove laches lies with the State. Twyman v. State (1984), Ind., 459 N.E.2d 705. Generally, a petitioner who appeals from an adverse judgment rendered by the trial court stands in the shoes of one who appeals from a negative judgment. Carr v. State (1983), 455 N.E.2d 343. In this case the proper standard of appellate review is as follows:
It is only where the evidence is without conflict and leads to but one conclusion, and the trial court has reached an opposite conclusion, that the decision will be disturbed as being contrary to law.
Neville v. State (1982), Ind., 439 N.E.2d 1358, 1360.
However, when the petitioner did not have the burden of proof upon the challenged issue our standard of review on appeal is the sufficiency of the evidence. Williams v. State (1985), Ind., 480 N.E.2d 953; Gentry v. State (1984), Ind., ...
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Brown v. State
...with attorneys and incarceration in a penal institution with legal facilities." Baxter, 636 N.E.2d at 152; see also Gregory v. State, 487 N.E.2d 156, 158 (Ind. 1986) (evidencing that petitioner had been in and out of penal institutions for thirteen years, had heard talk about "getting a P.C......
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Brown v. State, PM-2004-2769
...with attorneys and incarceration in a penal institution with legal facilities." Baxter, 636 N.E.2d at 152; see also Gregory v. State, 487 N.E.2d 156, 158 (Ind. 1986) (evidencing that petitioner had been in and out of penal institutions for thirteen years, had heard talk about "getting a P.C......
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Brown v. State
...with attorneys and incarceration in a penal institution with legal facilities." Baxter, 636 N.E.2d at 152; see also Gregory v. State, 487 N.E.2d 156, 158 (Ind. 1986) (evidencing that petitioner had been in and out of penal institutions for thirteen years, had heard talk about "getting a P.C......
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Brown v. State
...with attorneys and incarceration in a penal institution with legal facilities." Baxter, 636 N.E.2d at 152; see also Gregory v. State, 487 N.E.2d 156, 158 (Ind. 1986) (evidencing that petitioner had been in and out of penal institutions for thirteen years, had heard talk about "getting a P.C......