Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Public Utilities Commission

• Decision Date: 29 March 1968
• Docket Number: S.F. 22561
• Citation: 438 P.2d 801,67 Cal.Rptr. 97,68 Cal.2d 406
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 438 P.2d 801 GREYHOUND LINES, INC., Petitioner, v. PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION, Respondent.

Page 97

67 Cal.Rptr. 97

68 Cal.2d 406, 438 P.2d 801

GREYHOUND LINES, INC., Petitioner, v. PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION, Respondent.

S.F. 22561.

Supreme Court of California In Bank.

March 29, 1968.

William W. Schwarzer, Craig McAtee and McCutchen, Doyle, Brown & Enersen, San Francisco, for petitioner.

Mary Moran Pajalich, Roderick B. Cassidy, Timothy E. Treacy and Donald M. Grant, San Francisco, for respondent.

PETERS, Associate Justice.

Petitioner Greyhound Lines, Inc. seeks review of Decision No. 72297 of the Public Utilities Commission which compels extension of commuter bus service over routes in the San Francisco Bay Area. ¹ Greyhound is a passenger stage corporation, as defined in Public Utilities Code, section 226, ² operating buses transporting passengers, baggage, and express pursuant to a certificate of public convenience and necessity issued under section 1031.

The commission ordered that Greyhound extend its passenger stage service over routes in San Mateo County on Skyline Boulevard between a point in Daly City and a point west of Belmont, and in Contra Costa County on Ygnacio Valley Road between a point in Walnut Creek and a point in Concord. The commission found that public convenience and necessity required the establishment of both routes, that both routes were within territories in which Greyhound had dedicated its property to public service, and that section 762 provided the authority to order the service. The commission denied a petition for rehearing, and this court issued a writ of review. We have concluded that the order should be affirmed.

Greyhound contends that the commission has not regularly pursued its authority because section 762 does not authorize it to require the rendition of a service different in scope from that provided before. Section 762 provides in pertinent part: 'Whenever the commission, after a hearing, finds that additions, extensions repairs, or improvements to, or changes in, the existing plant, equipment, apparatus, facilities, or other physical property of any public utility * * * ought reasonably to be made, or that new structures should be erected, to promote the security or convenience of its employees or the public, or in any other way to secure adequate service or facilities, the commission shall make and serve an order directing that such additions, extensions, repairs, improvements, or changes be made or such structures be erected in the manner and within the time specified in the order.' The commission found that this section 'provides the necessary authority * * * to order the additional service.'

There is a strong presumption of validity of the commission's decisions (Market St. Ry. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 24 Cal.2d 378, 399, 150 P.2d 196, affd. 324 U.S. 548, 65 S.Ct. 770, 89 L.Ed. 1171; Western Canal Co. v. Railroad Commission, 216 Cal. 639, 645--646, 15 P.2d 853), and the commission's interpretation of the Public Utilities Code should not be disturbed unless if fails to bear a reasonable relation to statutory purposes and language (see Southern Pac. Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 41 Cal.2d 354, 367, 260 P.2d 70; Netterville, Administrative 'Questions of Law' and the Scope of Judicial Review in California (1956) 29 So.Cal.L.Rev. 434, 451--453; Comment, 'Basic Findings' and Effective Judicial Review of the California Public Utilities Commission (1966) 13 U.C.L.A.L.Rev. 313, 333--334).

Section 762 constitutes a general provision dealing with the power of the commission over the equipment, practices, and facilities of public utilities. The language of section 762 is oriented more to tangible utility property than to service. Thus Greyhound argues that the commission can order it to construct a new bus terminal but cannot order it to reroute its buses from one highway to the next. However, the statute has been applied in ordering service extensions by both stationary and carrier utilities without question of its applicability. (E.g., Atchison etc. Ry. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 173 Cal. 577, 160 P. 828, 2 A.L.R. 975; Del Mar Water, etc. Co. v. Eshleman, 167 Cal. 666, 140 P. 591, 948.) The focal issue in such cases has regularly and properly been the question of dedication. It was early decided and remains the law that the perimeter of commission authority to order service modifications is staked out by the limits of a utility's dedication or devotion of its property to public use. The power to order 'additions, extensions, repairs, improvements' within the scope of dedication is extensive; without the scope of dedication, the commission's power is ineffectual. (E.g., California Water & Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 51 Cal.2d 478, 489, 502, 334 P.2d 887; Southern Pac. Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, supra, 41 Cal.2d 354, 367--368, 260 P.2d 70; Atchison etc. Ry. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 209 Cal. 460, 288 P. 775, affd. 283 U.S. 380, 51 S.Ct. 553, 75 L.Ed. 1128; Hollywood Chamber of Commerce v. Railroad Commission, 192 Cal. 307, 312, 219 P. 983, 30 A.L.R. 68; Atchison etc. Ry. Co. v. Railroad Commission, supra, 173 Cal. 577, 583, 160 P. 828; Del Mar Water, etc. Co. v. Eshleman, supra, 167 Cal. 666, 679--681, 140 P. 591, 948 (concurring opinion); Pacific Telephone etc. Co. v. Eshleman, 166 Cal. 640, 680, 137 P. 1119, 50 L.R.A.,N.S., 652; 41 Cal.Jur.2d, Pub.Util., § 42, pp. 284--287.)

Greyhound asserts another limitation on commission power under section 762. Before any passenger stage corporation can operate over a particular route in California, it must first obtain from the commission a certificate declaring that the public convenience and necessity require such operation. ³ Section 762 does not mention the issuance of certificates. Greyhound concludes that the commission cannot issue amended certificates under section 762 nor order operations requiring certification.

Legislative failure to act or speak on the subject of certificates of passenger stage corporations in section 762 or in the article of which it is a part is unremarkable. Section 762 is a general section in a general article regarding equipment, practices, and facilities of many utilities. By contrast, sections 1031 and 1032 are specially directed to certificates of passenger stage corporations.

The portions of the code controlling equipment, practices, and facilities need not and do not particularize commission power over certificates of passenger stages. The associated power does appear, however. Section 1032 provides that the commission 'may attach to the exercise of the rights granted by the certificate such terms and conditions as, in its judgment, the public convenience and necessity require.' Less directly but not less persuasively, the Legislature has addressed itself to the question of the powers which must pertain to the commission as a regulatory body under the statutes. Section 701 provides: 'The commission may supervise and regulate every public utility in the State and may do all things, whether specifically designated in this part or in addition thereto, which are necessary and convenient in the exercise of such power and jurisdiction.' The conclusion to be drawn is that the commission may issue a certificate, a regulatory document, to conform with orders which it has authority to make. (Cf. Milwaukee & Suburban Transport Corp. v. Public Service Commission (1954) 267 Wis. 144, 64 N.W.2d 856.) Accordingly, we turn to Greyhound's second contention.

Greyhound emphatically denies that it has dedicated its resources to the services ordered. It argues that its certificate of public convenience and necessity is unequivocal evidence of the extent of the duty which it has assumed. Because Greyhound already serves the 'points' or termini involved in the order, the controversy is limited to routes. Greyhound would limit dedication to the streets on which its certificate allows it to travel. The commission, taking a broader view, relies on the proposition that Greyhound has dedicated its operations to serve the public within the Territories in which the proposed additional service would be rendered. Authority for this theory is found, inter alia, in the language of section 1032 which provides that the 'commission may * * * issue a certificate to operate in a Territory already served by a certificate holder * * * only when the existing passenger stage corporation or corporations serving such Territory will not provide such service to the satisfaction of the commission.'

The requirement of dedications as a condition precedent to regulation is not found in the statutes. This judicial doctrine, in its pristine form, was buttressed by constitutional principles which now have passed into history. ⁴ Dedication continues to perform important functions in the interstices of the Public Utilities Code. But its Raison d' e tre is attenuated, and it would be inappropriate to extend its restraining power further than logic and precedent require.

Although there must be an unequivocal intention to dedicate property to a public use (e.g., Richardson v. Railroad Commission, 191 Cal. 716, 721, 218 P. 418; Allen v. Railroad Commission, 179 Cal. 68, 85, 175 P. 466, 8 A.L.R. 249), such dedication may be inferred (Yucaipa Water Co. No. 1 v. Public Utilities Commission, 54 Cal.2d 823, 827, 9 Cal.Rptr. 239, 357 P.2d 295). There is a strong presumption of validity of commission orders (Pub.Util.Code, § 1757; see Comment, 'Basic Findings' and Effective Judicial Review of the California Public Utilities Commission, supra, 13 U.C.L.A.L.Rev. 313), and a finding of dedication will not be disturbed if there is any substantial evidence before the commission to support it. (California Water & Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, supra, 51 Cal.2d 478, 493, 334 P.2d 887.)

Greyhound asserts that both logic and precedent require that the order be annulled because the commission's theory is in direct conflict with California law which makes a 'fundamental...