Gribble v. State
| Citation | 284 S.E.2d 277,248 Ga. 567 |
| Decision Date | 13 November 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 37552,37552 |
| Parties | GRIBBLE v. The STATE. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Georgia |
M. Gene Gouge, Dalton, for Perry Gribble.
Stephen A. Williams, Dist. Atty., Dalton, Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., for the State.
Appellant was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. In this appeal, he raises seven enumerations of error. We affirm.
Appellant resided in a house owned by his mother. His aunt, Ruby Chasteen Brock, shared the residence with him. The two did not get along well and had frequent arguments about various domestic matters. Appellant made numerous statements to a friend that he was going to kill his aunt.
On the night of July 10, 1980, appellant and his aunt had an argument. He picked up a gun, and while his aunt lay on the sofa, he shot her in the head.
Appellant testified that, after the shooting, he changed his bloody clothes, went to a nearby store and telephoned a friend named Phil for assistance. 1 Phil arrived a short time later. Appellant thought the victim was already dead because "she didn't move any more and there was blood all over the place." Phil tied a sheet around the victim's neck in order to stop blood from flowing. The two then carried the victim downstairs, and appellant pulled a car around to the back of the house. Phil placed the body in the trunk and left.
A friend testified that he went to appellant's home the next day, July 11, to borrow some money. Appellant told him that Ms. Brock "was gone" and "wouldn't be returning." He said "he had killed her" and pointed out the bullet hole in the sofa. According to the witness, 2
According to appellant, Phil returned to appellant's residence on July 12. 3 Appellant planned to dispose of the body, and they drove the car to a wooded area. Appellant testified that, although Phil actually disposed of the body, he threw the trunk mat as far as he could away from the car. A quilt was placed with the body. Upon returning to the residence, the car was cleaned, and Phil left.
The police received a report from those who talked with appellant that someone had been shot. When the police arrived at the scene, they found a green Chevrolet that "had a strong odor about it". A substance which looked like blood had drained out of the vehicle and onto the pavement.
The police found appellant on a nearby street. He voluntarily accompanied them back to the residence. The police obtained keys to the Chevrolet and opened the trunk. 4 It smelled like bleach. The spare tire and mat were missing, and a bloodstained cloth was inside. Appellant was given Miranda warnings and taken to the correctional center.
The police remained at the residence with several family relatives, including appellant's stepfather. When the discussion turned to a possible murder weapon, the stepfather showed police a hiding place above a closet from which a .22 caliber pistol was recovered.
A body (along with a trunk mat and quilt) was later found in the area where appellant had taken his aunt. According to a pathologist who testified at trial, the cause of death was "a gunshot wound to the head and asphysia due to ligature strangulation."
1. Appellant contends that there was insufficient evidence to convince a rational trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty of malice murder. He admits shooting the victim, but states he did not intend to kill her. Moreover, appellant argues, Phil bound the victim and placed the ligature around her neck. Finally, appellant asserts there is no evidence that the body recovered was in fact that of Mrs. Brock.
Appellant's contentions are without merit. "The jury had a right to believe that the body found was that of the person alleged to have been murdered, in view of the testimony ..." Wrisper v. State, 193 Ga. 157, 161, 17 S.E.2d 714 (1941); Lowe v. State, 230 Ga. 134, 195 S.E.2d 919 (1973). The evidence clearly shows that appellant shot Mrs. Brock in the head, and the jury could have concluded that it was appellant rather than "Phil" who placed the ligature around her neck. Under the evidence adduced at trial, a rational trier of fact was clearly authorized to find beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant had committed the offense of murder. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
2. In his second enumeration, appellant contends that the court erred in admitting into evidence the .22 caliber pistol. He argues the police had obtained it through an illegal search.
Even assuming that there was a police search and that the search was illegal (but see Park v. State, 154 Ga.App. 348, 268 S.E.2d 401 (1980)), any error in admitting the pistol was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant admitted shooting the victim, and the kind of weapon used was not in dispute. The introduction of the pistol added nothing to the state's case. Hunt v. State, 233 Ga. 329, 211 S.E.2d 288 (1974); Kirkland v. State, 141 Ga.App. 664, 234 S.E.2d 133 (1977). See U. S. v. Hall, 587 F.2d 177 (5th Cir. 1979).
3. Appellant contends that his statements to the police were improperly admitted because no hearing was held to determine their voluntariness and that, under a "totality of the circumstances" test, his confession was involuntary. We cannot agree.
A pretrial hearing was held to determine the voluntariness of appellant's statements. The trial court was clearly authorized to find that the state had shown the voluntariness of appellant's confession by a preponderance of the evidence. See Pittman v. State, 245 Ga. 453, 265 S.E.2d 592 (1980); Pierce v. State, 235 Ga. 237, 219 S.E.2d 158 (1975).
4. In his fourth enumeration of error, appellant asserts that one of the jurors was related to the victim within the sixth degree of consanguinity and should have been disqualified as a matter of law under Code Ann. § 59-716. Appellant presented two affidavits stating that the juror's great grandfather was also the victim's. The juror, however, averred that she was fair and impartial, and that "to the best of [her] knowledge no relationship exists between [her] and the murder victim ..." On this evidence, the trial judge denied appellant's motion for new trial. Reece v. State, 208 Ga. 690, 692, 69 S.E.2d 92 (1952).
5. During police interrogation, appellant stated that "he hated his mother, father, step-father and wished they were dead just like Ruby." Appellant contends that this statement should not have been admitted because it placed his character into issue. He also argues that the statement constitutes evidence of a prior threat against third parties, which the prosecutor had expressly agreed would not be introduced.
We cannot agree that the admission of the above statement constituted a violation of the prosecutor's pretrial agreement. The statement was not a threat in that it does not express any intention of actually harming third parties. Moreover, the statement was admissible to show appellant's bent of mind. See Pittman v. State, 245 Ga. 453, 457, 265 S.E.2d 592 (1980).
6. The trial court charged the jury as follows: ...
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