Pierce v. State, 30207
| Decision Date | 23 September 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 30207,30207 |
| Citation | 219 S.E.2d 158,235 Ga. 237 |
| Parties | Firm PIERCE v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
H. Baxter Harcourt, James H. Fort, Columbus, for appellant.
E. Mullins Whisnant, Dist. Atty., William J. Smith, Asst. Dist. Atty., Columbus, Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., John W. Dunsmore, Asst. Atty. Gen., Atlanta, for appellee.
Pierce, convicted of armed bank robbery, appeals from the denial of his new trial motion urging primarily the claimed inadmissibility of his confession.
On October 31, 1974, a branch of the Home Federal Savings & Loan in Columbus, Georgia, was robbed of $3,250 by four blacks wearing ski masks. No positive identifications were ever made by the bank tellers though at trial they described the robbery in detail. On November 4, 1974, Pierce was arrested and advised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. The attorney of his choice was retained and came to see him at the jail, and at the November 5 preliminary hearing he was represented by an associate of his retained counsel. Pierce was bound over and denied bond, and was returned to the city jail. Subsequent events leading to Pierce's confession were disputed at his trial.
Detective Jones testified at Pierce's trial that on November 6th, Pierce had the jailer telephone Jones to ask him to visit Pierce, which he did. Pierce then asked whether Jones had heard from Pierce's attorney, and was told no. There was no further contact between the men until November 12th when Jones was again summoned by Pierce and asked the same thing. Upon again being told no, Pierce stated he wanted to fire his attorney, and at his request was allowed to use the telephone. He tried unsuccessfully to telephone his mother, and then telephoned another person, thought to be his grandmother. Jones heard him tell the person on the other end that he had gotten himself involved in the robbery with the other men and didn't want his mother to pay a retained attorney because he knew that she didn't have much money; that he would be satisfied to be represented by the public defender. Following this telephone call, Pierce was advised again of his rights and then gave police a complete statement confessing his role as primary gunman in the robbery. After giving the statement, Pierce talked to police about numerous other robberies, implicating others and riding about with officers discussing details such as where get-away cars were ditched. Pierce was then transferred from the city jail to the Muscogee County jail.
Pierce, in his testimony, said that when he was returned to jail following the preliminary hearing he was told that he would not be transferred to the county jail until he made a statement; that he was unable to use bath facilities because he was locked up; that he had no bath for eight days; that he never asked for a bath though he did say something about it; that he was allowed no visitors; that he received two meals a day, a breakfast of biscuits and meat and a hot supper; that he had a water fountain in his cell; that the episode on the 6th described by Jones never occurred; and on the 12th he telephoned his grandmother but made no effort to telephone his mother; that the statement as admitted into evidence was in his own words.
Pierce's confession was introduced at trial after a Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908, hearing outside the presence of the jury, and Pierce was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. On this appeal he raises three points.
1. Because the evidence was ample to establish the corpus delicti of armed robbery, there is no merit to the contention that Pierce's confession was not sufficiently corroborated as required by Code Ann. § 38-420. Cooper v. State, 226 Ga. 434, 175 S.E.2d 653; McVeigh v. State,205 Ga. 326, 335, 53 S.E.2d 462; Hilliard v....
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