Grier v. Metropolitan Dade County

Decision Date08 March 1995
Docket NumberNo. 93-324,93-324
Citation660 So.2d 273
PartiesJohnnie GRIER, Appellant, v. METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY, Appellee.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

Kutner, Rubinoff, Thompson & Bush and Susan S. Lerner, Richard M. Kirschner, P.A., and Jack B. Woodard, Miami, for appellant.

Robert Ginsburg, County Atty., and Robert G. Davies and Douglas W. Rice, Asst. County Attys., for appellee.

Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and HUBBART and COPE, JJ.

COPE, Judge.

The plaintiff, Johnnie Grier, appeals from an adverse summary judgment on her claim for negligence. We affirm.

Plaintiff walked diagonally across a paved intersection on her way to a McDonald's Restaurant. After taking several steps, her shoe caught on a surveyor's nail which protruded about one-fourth of an inch above the street surface. Plaintiff fell and suffered injuries.

The plaintiff instituted a lawsuit against Metropolitan Dade County for failing to maintain the roadway in a reasonably safe condition for pedestrian travel. Plaintiff also sued two other defendants, alleging that they had negligently installed the surveyor's nail. The trial court granted summary judgment to Dade County, and the plaintiff has appealed. 1

A surveyor's nail is a nail which is hammered into the pavement to serve as a permanent survey reference point. When properly installed, the nail should be flush with the surface of the road and should not protrude. This prevents the nail from becoming dislodged and losing its utility as a reference point. For present purposes it is assumed that the surveyor's nail was negligently installed, allowing the head of the nail to protrude one-fourth of an inch above the pavement.

It is undisputed that Dade County did not place the surveyor's nail in the roadway. This particular intersection is close to Interstate 95. Investigation disclosed that the surveyor's nail was placed in the street in 1988 by the Florida Department of Transportation ("DOT"), or E.N. Bechamps and Associates, Inc., a corporation under contract with DOT, for purposes of construction activity on Interstate 95. 2 DOT is not required to obtain any permit from Dade County or notify the County of work it performs on state roads. 3 Therefore, the County was never notified of the nail's placement nor was it required to conduct any sort of inspection following the installation of the nail.

Dade County moved for summary judgment on the basis that it owed no duty to plaintiff to maintain that portion of the roadway where she fell safe for pedestrian travel because such portion of the roadway was intended for vehicular traffic only. The County further argued at the summary judgment hearing that it was entitled to summary judgment because it had no notice that any sort of defect existed in the roadway prior to plaintiff's fall. The plaintiff asserted that the County had a duty to maintain that portion of the roadway where she fell safe for pedestrian crossing because it was reasonably foreseeable that persons would cross that portion of the street in order to reach the McDonald's or a nearby Winn Dixie supermarket. The trial court granted the County's motion.

The County admits in its answer that it is responsible for the maintenance of county streets including the area of the roadway where plaintiff fell. The County argues, however, that its duty extends only to maintenance of its streets in a reasonably safe condition for vehicular traffic. The County argues such duty does not extend to pedestrians who cross the street at places other than specified crosswalks. The County's reliance on City of Tallahassee v. Coles, 148 Fla. 606, 4 So.2d 874 (1941), for such proposition is misplaced. Coles does not relieve a county of its duty and obligations to pedestrians in such cases. It simply suggests that a lower degree of care is required where a pedestrian is injured while crossing a street other than at a designated crosswalk.

[A] municipality should only be required to keep a specified portion of the street in a condition reasonably safe for the kind of traffic intended for it. It seems to us that sidewalks and crosswalks devoted to the use of pedestrians would require greater care and attention than the remainder of the street given over to the passage of vehicles.

148 Fla. at 610, 4 So.2d at 876; see also Ayers v. City of Miami, 578 So.2d 302, 303 (Fla. 3d DCA) (fact that plaintiff was injured in portion of street outside the crosswalk or intersection did not relieve city of its duty to pedestrians to exercise reasonable care), review denied, 591 So.2d 180, 183 (Fla.1991); cf. 19 Eugene McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, Sec. 54.35.60 (3d ed. 1994) ("[A] city is generally held to a stricter degree of care in respect to sidewalks than ordinary streets.") (citing Coles ). However, "[i]n the absence of regulations to the contrary or obvious defects a pedestrian is entitled to use every part of the street, and is entitled to assume that every part of the street is reasonably safe for crossing. In such use, only ordinary care is required." McQuillin, supra, at Sec. 54.129 (footnote omitted); see also Mullis v. City of Miami, 60 So.2d 174, 176 (Fla.1952); City of Miami v. Lawson, 104 So.2d 600, 601 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958). The plaintiff here was entitled to assume that the street was reasonably safe for her to cross.

Notwithstanding the County's overall duty to plaintiff, we find that there is no liability under the circumstances of this case. In order to establish a prima facie claim for negligence, a plaintiff must show that defendant had either actual or constructive notice of the alleged negligent condition.

[T]o render a municipality liable for injuries for failure to exercise ordinary care to keep its public ways in a reasonably safe condition, it must appear that it knew, or had reasonable cause to know, of the defective condition a sufficient length of time prior to the accident to enable it to put the way in a state of repair.

McQuillin, supra, at Sec. 54.102; see Mullis v. City of Miami, 60 So.2d at 176; City of Jacksonville v. Foster, 41 So.2d 548, 549 (Fla.1949); City of Miami Beach v. Quinn, 149 Fla. 326, 327, 5 So.2d 593, 593 (Fla.1942) (A municipality "is required to exercise reasonable diligence in repairing defects after the unsafe condition of the street ... is known or ought to have been known to the officers thereof having authority to act"); Zuniga v. Metropolitan Dade County, 504 So.2d 491, 492 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987).

The record is clear that the County had no actual notice that the nail was in the roadway prior to plaintiff's fall. It is undisputed that the County did not place the surveyor's nail in the roadway. The County was not involved in the construction project for which the nail was placed nor was it obligated to conduct any inspection subsequent to the survey work performed for the DOT. The County first became aware of the nail's presence after plaintiff's fall.

The plaintiff argues that even though the County had no actual notice of the nail's placement in the roadway, the County was nonetheless placed on constructive notice because the nail was positioned in the street in March, 1988, approximately two years preceding the plaintiff's fall. The plaintiff alleges that because the County has a duty to maintain county streets it should have been aware that the defect existed.

Factors bearing on the question of notice include "size and location of the defect with respect to the surrounding area and lighting conditions and whether it has been the cause of other accidents; ... also such matters as the visibility of the condition, the frequency of travel in the area and the probability, if any, that a reasonable inspection by the appropriate public officials would have discovered its existence and its dangerous character." Antenor v. City of Los Angeles, 174 Cal.App.3d 477, 220 Cal.Rptr. 181, 184 (1985) (citation omitted; emphasis added); see Mullis, 60 So.2d at 176; Foster, 41 So.2d at 549; Zuniga, 504 So.2d at 492. While the County is responsible for damages resulting from a defect which has been in existence for so long that a reasonable inspection would reveal it, the County is entitled to summary judgment where it has no actual or constructive notice of the defect. See Zuniga, 504 So.2d at 492.

In the instant case, the defect is the solitary head of a nail, located in the middle of Northwest 62 Street, which protruded one-fourth of one inch above the pavement surface. This is the proverbial needle in the haystack. Carlos Muller, a Traffic Engineer for Dade County Public Works Department, testified at his deposition that the nail "was very unnoticeable.... There is no way [any person] could have spotted [it] by driving along. It requires a very intentional and purposeful act of taking a close look at it. It was a minuscule defect." Plaintiff's counsel himself referred to the surveyor's nail at the summary judgment hearing as a "minuscule spike in the roadway." The surveyor's nail is simply too small to confer constructive notice on the County. It would be unreasonable to expect the County to inspect hundreds, if not thousands, of miles of streets for one-quarter inch defects. To hold otherwise would render the County an insurer. "We are committed to the rule that cities are not insurers of those who use the streets." City of Tallahassee v. Coles, 148 Fla. at 611, 4 So.2d at 876 Affirmed. 4

HUBBART, J., concurs.

SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge (dissenting).

In my judgment, the issue of whether the county should have discovered and corrected the admitted defect which caused Ms. Grier's accident during the over two years of its existence was one which only a jury could determine.

Until today, the law in Florida was, as expressed in a case cited by the court:

While a city is not an insurer of the motorist or the pedestrian who travels its streets and sidewalks, City of St. Petersburg v. Roach, 148 Fla. 316, 4 So.2d...

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4 cases
  • Jauma v. City of Hialeah, 3D99-0828.
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • January 19, 2000
    ...a non-delegable duty to maintain its roads, sidewalks, and rights-of-way in a reasonably safe condition. See Grier v. Metro. Dade County, 660 So.2d 273, 274 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995),Camillo v. Dept. of Transportation, 546 So.2d 4, 5 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988). The residents complained to the City about t......
  • Miami-Dade County v. Hoyos, No. 3D03-1402
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • April 14, 2004
    ...so that it could have been repaired. See e.g., Castano v. City of Miami, 840 So.2d 412 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003); Grier v. Metropolitan Dade County, 660 So.2d 273 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995). Generally, the issue of constructive notice is best left to a jury when there is evidence presented in support of t......
  • Rivas v. Miami-Dade Cnty.
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • March 28, 2018
    ...SCALES and LINDSEY, JJ.PER CURIAM.Affirmed. Miami–Dade County v. Herndon, 776 So.2d 360 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) ; Grier v. Metropolitan Dade County, 660 So.2d 273, 275 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995). See also Vermeulen v. Worldwide Holidays, Inc., 922 So.2d 271, 273 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) ("The mere happening o......
  • Miami-Dade County v. Herndon, 3D00-208.
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • January 31, 2001
    ...the trip and fall. Because of the utter absence of such evidence, the verdict and judgment cannot stand. See Grier v. Metropolitan Dade County, 660 So.2d 273, 275 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) ("In order to establish a prima facie claim for negligence, a plaintiff must show that defendant had either a......

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