Griffin v. Boston & A.R. Co.

• Decision Date: 01 January 1889
• Citation: 148 Mass. 143,19 N.E. 166
• Parties: GRIFFIN v. BOSTON & A.R. CO.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

148 Mass. 143

19 N.E. 166

GRIFFIN v. BOSTON & A.R. CO.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Hampden.

January 1, 1889

January 1, 1889

HEADNOTES

COUNSEL

W.H Brooks and J.B. Carroll, for plaintiff.

Geo. M Stearns, for defendant.

OPINION

C ALLEN, J.

The two things to be considered are whether in view of the plaintiff's offer of proof he was entitled to go to the jury upon the question of the want of due care on the part of the defendant, and of the exercise of due care on the part of the plaintiff's intestate; and both of these matters must be determined upon the assumption that the plaintiff proved his case according to his offer, and that the defendant offered nothing by way of explanation.

1. Upon the question whether there was enough evidence of a want of due care on the part of the defendant, the difficulty is not so much in the ascertainment of the general rules as in their application. There is no doubt that as a general rule a master is bound to exercise reasonable care in providing suitable machinery, instruments, means, and appliances for his work. It is also well settled that if he has failed to do so, and an injury has resulted to his servant, the master is responsible, although the negligence of a fellow-servant contributed to the accident. Cayzer v. Taylor, 10 Gray, 274; Elmer v. Locke, 135 Mass. 575; Booth v. Railroad Co., 73 N.Y. 38; Cone v. Railroad Co., 81 N.Y. 206; Railway Co. v. Cummings, 106 U.S. 700, 1 S.Ct. 493. It is also clear that the plaintiff must introduce evidence to show that the injury is more naturally to be attributed to the negligence of the defendant than to any other cause. If the accident appears upon the evidence to be as consistent with the absence of negligence for which the defendant is responsible, as with the existence of such negligence, the plaintiff must fail, and the case should not be left to the jury. Kendall v. Boston, 118 Mass. 234; Wakelin v. Railway Co., 12 App.Cas. 41; Scott v. Docks Co., 3 Hurl. & C. 596; Cotton v. Wood, 8 C.B.(N.S.) 568, Hammack v. White, 11 C.B.(N.S.) 588.

In the present case, upon the plaintiff's offer of proof, it is obviously possible that the injury may have sprung either wholly or partly from the defendant's negligence, or from some cause independent of any negligence for which the defendant would be responsible to the plaintiff. But a plaintiff in a civil case is not required to prove his case beyond a doubt. All that the plaintiff upon this branch of his case was required to do was to make it appear to be more probable that the injury came in whole or in part from the defendant's negligence than from any other cause. No general rule can be laid down that the mere occurrence of an accident is or is not sufficient prima facie proof of actionable negligence, for each case must depend upon its own circumstances; and what would be sufficient proof of such negligence in an action brought against a railroad company by a passenger, or by a stranger, might not be so in an action brought by one of its servants. The question is whether this plaintiff, upon his offer of proof, was entitled to go to the jury upon the question of the defendant's negligence.

The general rule as to the defendant's duty in providing means and instruments for the operation of its railroad has been already stated. Clearly, the providing of a sufficient quantity of suitable links for coupling the cars of a train fell within this duty. This is a duty which belonged to the defendant as master, and could not be delegated. If, through a want of reasonable care and diligence, unsafe coupling links were furnished, even though this were done by agents of the railroad company, the neglect is to be treated as the neglect of the company itself. Now it is true that the defendant may have [GRIFFIN V BOSTON & AR CO 19 N.E 166(1889)] used due care, although the particular coupling link which spread or opened, and thereby led to the accident, proved to be unsuitable or unsafe. There may have been a latent defect, which was undiscoverable. The link in question may have come with a car from another railroad, so that the...