Griffin v. Long

• Decision Date: 11 May 2011
• Docket Number: NO. 12-09-00260-CV,12-09-00260-CV
• Parties: ROBERT M. GRIFFIN, ROBERT M. GRIFFIN, JR., CHARLES W. CONRAD, MARVIN OLGILVIE, AND MARIE OGILVIE, APPELLANTS/CROSS-APPELLEES v. LARRY T. LONG, L. ALLAN LONG, AND B. VIRGINIA LONG, IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS TRUSTEES OF THE LAWRENCE ALLAN LONG TRUST, THE CHARLES EDWARD LONG TRUST, THE LARRY THOMAS LONG TRUST, AND THE JOHN STEPHEN LONG TRUST d/b/a THE LONG TRUST, APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

ROBERT M. GRIFFIN, ROBERT M.

GRIFFIN, JR., CHARLES W. CONRAD,

MARVIN OLGILVIE, AND MARIE OGILVIE,

APPELLANTS/CROSS-APPELLEES

v.LARRY T. LONG, L. ALLAN LONG,AND B. VIRGINIA LONG, IN THEIR

CAPACITIES AS TRUSTEES OF THE

LAWRENCE ALLAN LONG TRUST,

THE CHARLES EDWARD LONG TRUST,

THE LARRY THOMAS LONG TRUST,

AND THE JOHN STEPHEN LONG TRUST

d/b/a THE LONG TRUST,

APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS

NO. 12-09-00260-CV

COURT OF APPEALS TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT TYLER, TEXAS

Delivered: May 11, 2011.

APPEAL FROM THE 124TH

JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

GREGG COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellants/Cross-Appellees Robert M. Griffin, Robert M. Griffin, Jr., Charles W. Conrad, Marvin Ogilvie, and Marie Ogilvie (collectively the Griffins), in their sole issue, appeal from the judgment of the trial court, challenging its determination of the accrual date for postjudgment interest.

Appellees/Cross-Appellants Larry T. Long, L. Allan Long, and B. Virginia Long, in their capacities as Trustees of the Lawrence Allan Long Trust, the Charles Edward Long Trust, the Larry Thomas Long Trust, and the John Stephen Long Trust d/b/a the Long Trust (collectively the Long Trusts), also appeal the judgment of the trial court, raising three issues in their cross-appeal. We modify the judgment of the trial court, and as modified, affirm.

Background

The Griffins sued the Long Trusts in 1997.¹ The Griffins sought, in part, (1) a share of an $11,000,000.00 settlement of a "take or pay" lawsuit involving the Long Trusts and the Tejas Gas Company (the Tejas settlement), (2) a declaration that the 1978 and 1982 letter agreements the parties operated under were valid and enforceable, (3) an order for specific performance requiring the Long Trusts to assign interests in gas wells to the Griffins in compliance with the letter agreements, and (4) reformation of certain assignments executed on December 20, 2000.

After a bench trial, the trial court signed its "Amended Final Judgment" on February 4, 2003 (the 2003 judgment), awarding most of the relief sought by the Griffins. The Long Trusts appealed to the Texarkana court of appeals, which reversed in part and modified the judgment, but otherwise affirmed the trial court's judgment. The Long Trusts then appealed to the Texas Supreme Court, which reversed the court of appeals' judgment in part and remanded the case to the trial court for the limited purpose of redetermining attorney's fees. As a result of this reversal, the Griffins were entitled to significantly less relief than they had been awarded in the 2003 judgment. For example, they no longer had any interest in the Tejas settlement, and the 1978 and 1982 letter agreements were held to be unenforceable, at least as to future wells that would have otherwise fallen within the letter agreements' provisions. Other portions of the 2003 judgment, such as the order requiring reformation of the December 2000 assignments, continued to be effective and enforceable.

Upon the supreme court's remand to the trial court, a judge was assigned to preside over the remaining attorney's fees issue. On August 20, 2008, the court sent a letter to the parties in which it informed them that neither side would be entitled to attorney's fees. According to a docket sheet notation, the court and the parties participated in a telephonic hearing on October 7, 2008, regarding the attorney's fees issue. The docket sheet also contains an entry on that same date, noting that the "8/20/08 determination [is] modified to award [attorney's] fees to [the Griffins] in the amount of $30,000.00."²

The trial court signed its "Final Judgment After Appeal" on May 30, 2009 (the 2009 judgment). In this judgment, the trial court incorporated all prior judgments, which included the 2003 judgment to the extent it was not reversed on appeal. In addition, the trial court awarded attorney's fees to the Griffins in the amount of $30,000.00 and ordered postjudgment interest atthe rate of 10% to accrue from May 30, 2009. The Griffins appealed and the Long Trusts cross-appealed.

ACCRUAL OF POSTJUDGMENT INTEREST

In their sole issue, the Griffins argue that the trial court erred when it identified the postjudgment interest accrual date in the 2009 judgment as May 30, 2009. The Griffins contend that the correct accrual date was the date the trial court rendered its 2003 judgment.

Standard of Review and Applicable Law

Postjudgment interest is regulated by statute, and as such, its application is a question of law that we review de novo. See Advanced Messaging Wireless, Inc. v. Campus Design, Inc., 190 S.W.3d 66, 71 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2005, no pet.) (citing Columbia Medical Center v. Bush ex rel. Bush, 122 S.W.3d 835, 865 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied)).

Postjudgment interest is compensation allowed by law for the use or detention of money. Sisters of Charity of the Incarnate Word v. Dunsmoor, 832 S.W.2d 112, 119 (Tex. App.— Austin 1992, writ denied). It is recoverable on any money judgment in this state as long as the judgment specifies the postjudgment interest rate. Tex. Fin. Code Ann. § 304.001 (Vernon 2006). Postjudgment interest is computed from the date of rendition of judgment and runs until the date of satisfaction. Tex. Fin. Code Ann. § 304.005(a) (Vernon 2006). Generally, a judgment is rendered when the decision is officially announced orally in open court, by memorandum filed with the clerk, or otherwise announced publicly. Garza v. Tex. Alcoholic Beverage Comm'n, 89 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. 2002).

Discussion

In previously addressing this issue in another case involving the Long Trusts, we stated the general rule that,

after examining the entire procedural history of a dispute, a party that ultimately prevails is entitled to postjudgment interest from the date the original judgment was rendered, irrespective of whether the original judgment was erroneous, because that is the date upon which the trial court should have rendered a correct

judgment.

Long Trusts v. Castle Tex. Prod. Ltd. P'ship, 330 S.W.3d 749, 753 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2010, no pet. h.) (emphasis in original). We see no reason to depart from this general rule here.

The trial court awarded a judgment favoring the Griffins on February 4, 2003. The Long Trusts appealed to the Texarkana court of appeals, which reversed in part, modified portions of the judgment, and affirmed the trial court's judgment in all other respects. See Long Trusts, 144 S.W.3d at 112, aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 222 S.W.3d 412 (Tex. 2006). The Long Truststhen appealed to the Texas Supreme Court, which reversed the award relating to the Tejas settlement, and also held that the 1978 and 1982 letter agreements were not enforceable for future wells because they violated the statute of frauds. Long Trusts, 222 S.W.3d at 415-17. The supreme court then remanded the case to the trial court for the limited purpose of redetermining attorney's fees. Id. at 417. Since the trial court should have issued a correct judgment when it issued its judgment on February 4, 2003, postjudgment interest began to accrue on that date.³ Long Trusts, 330 S.W.3d at 753-54.

We sustain the Griffins' sole issue.

Cross-Appeal

In three cross-issues, the Long Trusts argue that (1) the trial court incorrectly set the postjudgment interest rate at 10%, (2) the trial court abused its discretion by awarding the Griffins $30,000.00 in attorney's fees, and finally, (3) the trial court's 2009 judgment lacks the required specificity and definiteness to be enforceable.

Postjudgment Interest Rate

In their first cross-issue, the Long Trusts argue that, in the 2009 judgment, the trial court erroneously set the postjudgment interest rate at 10%. They contend that postjudgment interest should be calculated from May 30, 2009, the date of the 2009 judgment, and that 10% was not the postjudgment interest rate on that date. The Griffins maintain that postjudgment interest began to accrue on February 4, 2003, and the postjudgment interest rate on that date should apply.

The Griffins argue the proper rate is 10% as found by the trial court in its 2003 judgment, without pointing to any evidence in the record substantiating that assertion. Nevertheless, we exercise our discretion to take judicial notice of the correct rate. See Tex. R. Evid. 201(b)(2), (c), (f) (at any stage of proceeding, court in its discretion and on its own motion can take judicial notice of facts capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned); Pettus v. Pettus, 237 S.W.3d 405, 423 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, pet. denied) (appellate court may take judicial notice of postjudgment interest rate).

When the court issued its judgment in 2003, the postjudgment rate was calculated as follows:

Sec. 304.003. JUDGMENT INTEREST RATE: INTEREST RATE OR TIME PRICE differential NOT IN CONTRACT.

(a) A money judgment of a court of this state... earns postjudgment interest at the rate determined under this section.

(b) On the 15th day of each month, the consumer credit commissioner shall determine the postjudgment interest rate to be applied to a money judgment rendered during the succeeding calendar month.

(c) The postjudgment interest rate is:

(1) the auction rate quoted on a discount basis for 52-week treasury bills issued by the United States government as most recently published by the Federal Reserve Board before the date of computation;

(2) 10 percent a year if the auction rate described by Subdivision (1) is less than 10 percent; or

(3) 20 percent a year if the auction rate described by Subdivision (1) is more than 20 percent.

Act of May 10, 1999, 76th Leg., R.S., ch. 62, § 7.18, 1999 Tex. Gen. Laws 127, 232 (amended 2003, 2005) (current version at Tex. Fin. Code Ann. § 304.003 (Vernon 2006)). We have sustained the Griffins' issue in which they argue that postjudgment interest began to accrue on February 4, 2003, the date of the trial court's original judgment. On February 4, 2003, the auction rate for fifty-two...