Griffin v. Padula

• Decision Date: 14 August 2007
• Docket Number: C.A. No. 2:07-1732-PMD-RSC.
• Citation: 518 F.Supp.2d 680
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina
• Parties: Donald Eugene GRIFFIN, Petitioner, v. PADULA, Warden of Lee Correctional Institution, Respondent.

518 F.Supp.2d 680

Donald Eugene GRIFFIN, Petitioner, v. PADULA, Warden of Lee Correctional Institution, Respondent.

C.A. No. 2:07-1732-PMD-RSC.

United States District Court, D. South Carolina.

August 14, 2007.

Donald Eugene Griffin, Jr., Bishopville, SC, Pro se.

ORDER

PATRICK MICHAEL DUFFY, District Judge.

This matter is before the court upon Petitioner Donald Eugene Griffin, Jr.'s ("Petitioner" or "Griffin") petition for habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The record contains a report and recommendation ("R & R") of a Magistrate Judge made in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). The Magistrate Judge's R & R recommends that the Petitioner's § 2254 petition be dismissed without prejudice and without requiring the Respondent to file a return. If a party disagrees with the recommendation as it stands in the R & R, that party may submit written objections to the court within ten days after being served with a copy of that report. 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1). Petitioner filed timely objections to the R & R.

I. BACKGROUND

At the September 1990 term, the Richland County Grand Jury indicted Griffin for Burglary (dwelling), Kidnapping, Robbery (strong arm), and First Degree Criminal Sexual Conduct. On February 13, 1991, a jury found Griffin guilty of First Degree Burglary, Kidnapping, Strong Arm Robbery, and Aggravated Assault and Battery.¹ The Honorable M. Duane Shuler sentenced Petitioner to confinement for a period of fifteen years for First Degree Burglary; a period of life for Kidnapping; a period of ten years (consecutive) for Strong Arm Robbery; and a period of ten years (consecutive) for Aggravated Assault and Battery. Griffin filed a timely Notice of Appeal, but the South Carolina Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on April 8, 1992.

On February 17, 1993, Griffin filed an application for Post-Conviction Relief ("PCR"), and on July 20, 1994, an evidentiary hearing was held before the Honorable L. Casey Manning. However, Judge Manning denied Griffin's application in an Order dated October 18, 1994. (R & R at 2.) From this Order, Griffin filed a Notice of Appeal, but the South Carolina Supreme Court denied the Petition for Writ of Certiorari on November 2, 1995. (R & R at 2.)

After the dismissal of his first PCR application, he filed two more, one on December 18, 1995, and the other on October 15, 2004. Both met much the same result as the first. The December 18, 1995 PCR application was denied and dismissed by the Honorable L. Henry McKellar by an Order dated January 3, 1998. (R & R at 2.) Petitioner again filed a timely Notice of Appeal, and on September 28, 1999, the Supreme Court of South Carolina remitted the case to the trial court. (R & R at 2.) The Supreme Court of South Carolina subsequently denied certiorari in this case on October 20, 2006. Griffin filed his third application for post-conviction relief on October 15, 2004, but that application was also dismissed by the trial court on March 20, 2006. (R & R at 2.)

Griffin filed his first petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina on March 29, 2007. This petition was dismissed by the District Court on July 6, 2007.

The present petition is Griffin's second writ of habeas corpus filed in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina. (R & R at 3.) Griffin filed this under 28 U.S.C. § 2254² on June 25 2007. Griffin raised two challenges in his petition (verbatim):

1. The State of South Carolina by way of and through the South Carolina Department of Corrections violated prisoner's constitutional protections in ARTICLE 1 § 9(3), ARTICLE 1 § 10, FIFTH and FOURTEENTH Amendments of the United States Constitution, in their application and actions, to apply the State's "DNA" Database Act, retroactively to prisoner's 1991 conviction and sentence.

2. The State of South Carolina by way of and through the South Carolina Department of Corrections, violated prisoner's constitutional protections of the FOURTH; FIFTH and FOURTEENTH Amendments to the United States Constitution, in their actions, to obtain a DNA (blood) sample, from prisoner, for inclusion into the State's DNA Database for Law Enforcement purposes.

(Pet. Attachment at 2, 6.) In his Memorandum, a section entitled "Relief Requested" states (verbatim),

Therefore, prisoner asks that the Court enter judgment against the State of South Carolina and the South Carolina Department of Corrections, in that their application and actions of outrageous conduct to apply the State's DNA Database Act to prisoner, has violated his constitutional provisions to DUE PROCESS of LAW; UNREASONABLE SEARCH and SEIZURE, and EX POST FACTO protected under the United States Constitution, as well as, any other relief to which petitioner may be entitled.

(Pet. Attachment at 9.)

The Magistrate Judge issued an R & R on July 2, 2007, recommending that Griffin's petition be dismissed without prejudice and without requiring the Respondent to file a return.³

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Magistrate Judge only makes a recommendation to the Court. This recommendation has no presumptive weight, and the responsibility for making a final determination remains with the court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-71, 96 S.Ct. 549, 46 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976). The court is charged to review de novo those portions of the R & R that have been specifically objected to, and the court may accept, reject, or modify the R & R, in whole or in part. 28 U.S.C. § 636(h)(1). Courts have held de novo review to be unnecessary when a party makes general and conclusory objections that do not direct the court to a specific error in the Magistrate Judge's proposed findings and recommendations. See, e.g., Howard v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 508-09 (6th Cir.1991); Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir.1982); Pendleton v. Rumsfeld, 628 F.2d 102 (D.C.Cir.1980). Additionally, the court may recommit the matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). After reviewing the entire record, the R & R, and Petitioner's objections, the court finds that the Magistrate Judge fairly and properly summarized the facts. However, the court will modify the R & R.

III. ANALYSIS

Griffin raises four objections to the Magistrate Judge's R & R. Griffin's first three objections concern the case history. These objections are without merit as they are objections simply to the case history and have no bearing on the court's analysis. (Objection to R & R at 5-7.)⁴

Lastly, Griffin objects to the Magistrate Judge's recommendation that the Petitioner's claims are not cognizable as valid habeas grounds. (See R & R at 5.)⁵ Petitioner argues that the claims are cognizable under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The court will discuss the merits of these claims in the foregoing analysis.

Griffin raises two grounds for his writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Griffin claims that the South Carolina DNA Database Act is an ex post facto law and that the Act violates his right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The court will address each one in turn.

1. Ex post Facto Challenge

Griffin argues that South Carolina's DNA Database Act violates the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws, principally because an enforcement mechanism of the statute appears to retroactively authorize an extension of an inmate's sentence. (Pet.Attachment at 2.)⁶ The Ex Post Facto Clause was summarized in Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169-170, 46 S.Ct. 68, 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925), to mean the following:

It is settled, by decisions of this [C]ourt so well known that their citation may be dispensed with, that any statute which punishes as a crime an act previously committed, which was innocent when done, which makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission, or which deprives one charged with crime of any defense available according to law at the time when the act was committed, is prohibited as ex post facto.

The prohibition against ex post facto laws, which "applies only to penal statutes which disadvantage the offender affected by them," Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 41, 110 S.Ct. 2715, 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990), assures that innocent conduct is not made criminal after the fact and that greater punishment is not imposed after the fact. See Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981). A statute that is not penal cannot be ex post facto. In this circuit, requiring prisoners to provide blood samples for DNA testing has been held not to be punitive and not, in itself, a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 309 (4th Cir.1992); see also Ewell v. Murray, 11 F.3d 482, 485-86 (4th Cir.1993). Several other courts have held that DNA testing is not penal and thus does not impose additional punishment for a prior offense. See Shaffer v. Saffle, 148 F.3d 1180, 1182 (10th Cir.1998) (Oklahoma DNA statute has "legitimate, non-penal legislative purpose"); Gilbert v. Peters, 55 F.3d 237, 238-39 (7th Cir.1995) ("Both federal and state courts have uniformly concluded that statutes which authorize collection of blood specimens to assist in law enforcement are not penal in nature.... The [Illinois] blood specimen statute thus does not run afoul of the Ex Post Facto Clause."); Kruger v. Erickson, 875 F.Supp. 583, 589 (D.Minn.1995) (finding that taking blood under Minnesota law did not violate Ex Post Facto Clause because statute "is not penal in nature. Its purpose is to create a DNA database for law enforcement purposes"); Vanderlinden v. Kansas, 874 F.Supp. 1210, 1216 (D.Kan. 1995) (finding that, because DNA law "is not punitive but furthers a governmental interest in law enforcement, it follows that the statute does not violate ex post facto principles").

This court is guided by the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Jones v....