Griffin v. Warburton

• Decision Date: 15 November 1900
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: GRIFFIN v. WARBURTON et al.

62 P. 765

23 Wash. 231

GRIFFIN v. WARBURTON et al.

Supreme Court of Washington

November 15, 1900

Appeal from superior court, Pierce county; J. A. Williamson, Judge.

Ejectment by Fred L. Griffin, administrator d. b. n. of Sophia D Bacon, deceased, against Stanton Warburton and another. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff for possession, and in favor of defendants as to plaintiff's recovery of rents, both parties appeal. Reversed.

Jesse Thomas and Charles S. Fogg, for plaintiff.

Bates &amp Murray, J. H. McDaniels, and S. Warburton, for defendants.

FULLERTON J.

This is an action of ejectment brought by the plaintiff, Griffin, as administrator de bonis non of the estate of Sophia D. Bacon deceased, to recover the possession of an undivided two-thirds interest in lot 1 in block 1,105 in the city of Tacoma, Pierce county, Wash., from the defendants. Warburton and Sandberg. The trial court instructed a verdict upon the facts admitted by the pleadings, and rendered a judgment in favor of the administrator for the recovery of the possession of the property, together with its rental value from the time of the commencement of the action, but denied the right of the administrator to recover the rental value of the premises from the death of the former administrator. Each side appeals from that part of the judgment unfavorable to its contention.

The facts upon which the judgment is based may be summarized as follows: On March 26, 1878, the lot described was acquired by E. G. Bacon and Sophia D. Bacon, who were then husband and wife, by purchase with community funds; the title thereto being taken in the name of E. G. Bacon. Sophia D. Bacon died intestate on the 28th day of July, 1880, leaving as the sole heirs at law of her interests in the property two daughters by a former marriage, and one daughter the issue of her marriage with E. G. Bacon. In April, 1893, nearly 13 years after the death of his wife, E. G. Bacon applied for, and on the 21st day of that month there was issued to him by the superior court of Pierce county, the county in which the lands are situated, letters of administration of her estate, whereupon he duly qualified as such administrator. Thereafter the administrator caused the statutory notice to creditors to be published for the required time, but no claims were presented to the administrator or to the court against the estate within the year prescribed for the presentation of claims. On the 8th day of April, 1895, the appellant Warburton obtained a judgment against E. G. Bacon in the superior court of Pierce county, and caused execution to be issued thereon, and the interest of E. G. Bacon in the property to be levied upon and sold, at which sale Warburton became the purchaser of such interest. The sale was had on March 2, 1896, and was afterwards duly confirmed by the court, and a sheriff's deed issued to Warburton on May 4, 1897. Between the time of the confirmation of the sale and the issuance of the sheriff's deed, E. G. Bacon died intestate. Warburton thereafter purchased the interest of one of the heirs of Mrs. Bacon, and some time in 1897 began an action to quiet title in himself against all of the heirs of Mrs. Bacon, making them parties defendant, and alleging that he was the owner in fee simple of the whole of the property. Issue was taken on the allegations of his complaint, and trial had before the court upon an agreed statement of facts, from which the court found as conclusions of law that Warburton was the owner and entitled to the possession of an undivided two-thirds interest in the lot, and that one of the heirs, Matilda B. White (she having purchased the interest of the other heir), was the owner and entitled to the possession of the remaining one-third, and entered a decree accordingly. Warburton thereupon appealed to this court from that part of the decree which adjudged Matilda B. White to be the owner of an undivided one-third of the lot, and, on its affirmance by this court ( Warburton v. White, 18 Wash. 511, 52 P. 233, 532), sued out a writ of error to the supreme court of the United States, where the cause was pending at the time the present action was tried in the court below, though subsequently affirmed. Warburton v. White, 176 U.S. 484, 20 S.Ct. 404, 44 L.Ed. 555. On March 4, 1898, upon petition therefor, the respondent was appointed administrator de bonis non of the estate, and on the 10th of that month brought this action to recover possession of the undivided two-thirds of the lot, which the decree of the court had awarded to Warburton, and its reasonable rental value from the death of E. G. Bacon, as before stated. In addition to the allegation that no claims against the estate of Mrs. Bacon were presented to the administrator, it is directly alleged in the answer of the defendant Warburton that there are no debts or claims of any character existing against the estate; also, 'that after the time had elapsed in which creditors might file any claim against the estate of Sophia D. Bacon, as above set forth, said probate proceedings were abandoned and discontinued by agreement and understanding by and between the administrator, said E. G. Bacon,' and the heirs of said estate, and the heirs thereupon took possession of the property. Whether or not Mrs. Bacon died seised of any property other than the property above described does not appear from the record; nor does it appear what representations were made to the superior court which induced it to appoint an administrator de bonis non, nor whether such administrator was appointed upon or without notice to the defendants and the other parties in possession of the real property.

Upon the facts shown by the record, it is apparent that, so far as this real property is concerned, there is no necessity for further administration upon it, or for the appointment of an administrator de bonis non. The causes which usually require the intervention of the probate court are nonexistent. There are no claims of creditors for which it can be held liable. If any ever existed, they were conclusively barred, whether absolute or contingent, by the failure to present them within the year allowed by the statute for the presentation of claims after the first publication of the notice to creditors. Barto v. Stewart, 21 Wash. 605, 59 P. 480. There is no necessity for a decree of the probate court to determine the right of succession to the property. The agreement of the interested parties, and the judgment in the case of Warburton v. White, affirmed by this court, and since the commencement of this action reaffirmed by the supreme court of the United States, conclusively establish, as between the heirs, and the successors in interest to the heirs, this right of succession; and, should the administrator de bonis non be allowed to administer upon the property, it must, if not disposed of to pay the expenses of such administration, be distributed in accordance with the decree entered in that case. There is no necessity for a decree or order of distribution of the probate court in order to pass title to the real property from the ancestor to the heir. It is true that in Balch v. Smith, 4 Wash. 497, 30 P. 648, this court held that, 'as a general proposition, force and effect can only be given to our statutes by holding that the intervention of the probate court, and an adjudication and distribution thereunder, are essential to the passing of the title of the ancestor to the heir so perfected as to make it beneficial to him'; but the legislature has changed the rule. The act of 1895 relating to the descent of real property, passed since that decision was rendered (Laws 1895, p. 197; Ballinger's Ann. Codes & St. § 4640 et seq.), enacts that: 'When a person dies seized of lands, tenements or hereditaments, or any right thereto, or entitled to any interest therein in fee or for the life of another, his title shall vest immediately in his heirs or devisees, subject to his debts, family allowance, expenses of administration and any other charges for which such real estate is liable under existing laws. No administration of the estate of such decedent, and no decree of distribution or other finding or order of any court, shall be necessary in any case to vest such title in the heirs or devisees, but the same shall vest in the heirs or devisees instantly upon the death of such decedent. * * *' The second section of the act provides that the rule 'shall apply to and govern the transmission of title of lands, tenements and hereditaments in the case of estates of persons hereafter dying and of persons already deceased, whether letters testamentary or of administration have been granted on such estates or not, and the title of all heirs and devisees, and their grantees, to any such real property is hereby confirmed and made valid to the same extent as if this act had been passed before the death of such decedent'; and section 5 makes the rule applicable to community as well as separate estate.

This leaves the naked question whether or not the failure of the former administrator to secure a decree of the court directing a distribution renders the distribution made by him so far invalid as to authorize the administrator de bonis non to take possession of the property, where no necessity for such action on his part is shown to exist. It is urged upon us that, inasmuch as the statutes do not expressly provide that an administrator may make distribution without a decree of the court, any distribution made by him without such a decree must necessarily be void, and that the decisions of this court in Hanford v. Davies, 1 Wash. 476, 25 P 329; Dunn v. Peterson, 4 Wash. 170, 29 P. 998; Hazelton v. Bogardus, 8...