Hanford v. Davies

• Decision Date: 19 December 1890
• Citation: 1 Wash. 476,25 P. 329
• Parties: HANFORD ET AL. v. DAVIES.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

25 P. 329

1 Wash. 476

HANFORD ET AL. v. DAVIES.

Supreme Court of Washington

December 19, 1890

Appeal from superior court, King county; I. J. LICHENBERG, Judge.

Howe & Corson, for appellants.

Thomas Burke and Junius Rochester, ( Andrew Woods, of counsel,) for appellee.

HOYT J.

Plaintiff for his cause of action, alleged, among other things, that he was the owner, and in possession, of a certain described piece of real estate; that defendants had caused to be recorded certain deeds purporting to cover the same and were asserting rights thereunder, and thereby injuring plaintiff's title. In the progress of the trial plaintiff put in evidence a record of certain proceedings had in the probate court of King county, culminating in a sale of the land in question to the plaintiff. These proceedings were attacked by the defendants, and the rulings of the court, in regard thereto, are relied upon by the appellants as cause for reversal. The proceedings objected to were commenced in the probate court, by the filing of a petition therein by one Finley Holl. The facts set up in said petition, so far as it is necessary for our purpose, may be stated as follows: That one Lumley Franklin was dead; that he died seised of the land in question; that he left a will which had been duly admitted to probate in the county of San Francisco, Cal., and that Phillip Rooch, public administrator, was then administering the estate of said decedent, under the provisions of said will, and the orders of said probate court; that, to the knowledge of the petitioner, there was no personal property in this territory belonging to said estate; and that, to his knowledge, there were no creditors. Under this state of facts appellants contend that there was no authority in the probate court of King county to administer said estate, and that all of its proceedings therein were void for want of jurisdiction. There has been some discussion as to the nature of our courts of probate. It being contended on the one hand that, in matters relating to the sale of lands of deceased persons, it has only a special and limited jurisdiction; while, on the other, it is claimed that in these matters, as in all others relating to the estates of deceased persons, its jurisdiction is general, if not exclusive. However this may be is not important in this case, as it affirmatively appears just what facts were shown to the probate court, upon which it assumed jurisdiction, and, if they were sufficient, for that purpose, that would end the inquiry, even in a court of special jurisdiction, and, if they were insufficient, the presumption in favor of a court of general jurisdiction would be negatived. The material question here then, in either case, is as to the sufficiency of the facts alleged in said petition. This must depend upon the relation which the personal representatives of a deceased person hold to the real estate of which he died seised. Have such representatives, during administration, any duty to perform, as to such real estate, irrespective of the question as to whether or not it is needed to pay debts. This question must be determined largely by the statutes of the state in which the land is...