Griffis v. State
Decision Date | 30 April 2014 |
Docket Number | No. 04–12–00237–CR.,04–12–00237–CR. |
Citation | 441 S.W.3d 599 |
Parties | Phillip Wayne GRIFFIS, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee. |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Phillip Wayne Griffis, New Boston, TX, pro se.
Michael J. West, Assistant District Attorney, Tyler, TX, for Appellee.
Sitting: CATHERINE STONE, Chief Justice, MARIALYN BARNARD, Justice, PATRICIA O. ALVAREZ, Justice.
Appellant Phillip Wayne Griffis was indicted for the offense of assault on a public servant. On March 8, 2012, the jury found Griffis guilty and assessed punishment at twenty years confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
On September 10, 2007, Griffis was in a motel parking lot when he was approached by Tyler Police Officers Donald Shafer and John Carnes. The officers testified they were on foot patrol when they heard loud music coming from the parking lot. Both officers were in full uniform when they approached Griffis. Griffis was driving a Pontiac Solstice convertible with the top down. According to the officers, Griffis was wearing cutoff shorts, sweating profusely, and appeared to have possibly urinated on himself. Griffis was initially very cooperative and friendly and explained that he was looking for a friend. However, when Officer Shafer checked for Griffis's inspection sticker, Officer Shafer could see, in plain view, a “loaded syringe sticking in the [driver's] seat.”
After confirming that Griffis had no medical need for a syringe and was not diabetic, Officer Shafer suspected the syringe contained a controlled substance. Although Officer Shafer testified that he already had enough probable cause to search Griffis's person, he requested permission to conduct the search. When Officer Shafer asked Griffis if he had anything illegal on his person, Griffis's demeanor changed. “[His demeanor] became eerie, dead silent.” Both officers described Griffis as putting his head down and looking for “somewhere to run” and continuously saying,
Officer Shafer informed Griffis he was going to be detained. As the officers approached Griffis to place him in handcuffs, Griffis started fighting them. Officer Shafer testified Officer Shafer compared the scuffle to a “barroom fight: [Griffis was k]icking, pulling, doing everything he [could] to get away from us.” Officer Shafer also testified Griffis exhibited “incredible strength for his size and stature” and was “basically throwing us around like a rag doll.”
Officer Shafer explained that after he and Griffis ended up on the ground, he performed a “touch stun” with his Taser. The touch stun is intended as pain compliance, meaning “people will usually subdue or stop resisting at the onset of pain.” Even after four or five touches, the Taser had no effect on Griffis. To the contrary, Griffis continued to struggle and kick and prevented the officers from pulling his arms from under his body to handcuff him. Officer Shafer testified that as a result of the struggle, his knees, elbows, and forearms were scratched by the pavement.
In the course of struggling with the officers, Griffis was able to take something from his front pocket and put it in his mouth. Griffis's continued refusal to comply with the officers' instructions resulted in an escalation of force in an attempt to control the situation. Within minutes, Officers Luiz Aparicio and Michelle Brock arrived to assist. Officers Shafer and Carnes were on the ground struggling with Griffis when Officer Brock attempted to use her Taser on Griffis and inadvertently hit Officer Shafer. Griffis continued to fight and only after a fifth officer, Officer Randall Tucker, arrived, were the officers able to gain control over Griffis. The other officers testified similarly to the events.
In his appellate brief, Griffis contends the struggle was misconstrued. He never intended to act in an aggressive manner, but was instead attempting to move his arm up his body to gain access to his shirt pocket. Specifically, Griffis contends he
The jury convicted Griffis of the charge of assault on a peace officer and assessed punishment at twenty-years confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. The jury did not assess a fine. This appeal ensued.
On April 23, 2012, Griffis's notice of appeal was filed by his appellate attorney. After several extensions were granted by this court, Griffis's attorney filed a brief on October 11, 2012 alleging (1) the evidence was legally insufficient to support the use of force, (2) the trial court erred in allowing Griffis to represent himself, and (3) the trial court erred in assessing attorney's fees. On October 22, 2012, Griffis filed a pro se motion to dismiss his appellate counsel and to withdraw the brief filed by his appellate counsel. On November 14, 2012, this court granted Griffis's motions and abated the matter to the trial court for a hearing to address Griffis's concerns. Pursuant to the trial court's findings, on December 18, 2012, this matter was reinstated on this court's docket and Griffis's motions to represent himself on appeal and to strike the brief, filed by appellate counsel on October 11, 2012, were granted. After several more extensions, Griffis filed his pro se brief on May 30, 2013 and the State filed its response on July 17, 2013.
We address each of Griffis's issues separately.
In his first issue, Griffis contends the evidence is legally insufficient to support the jury's finding that (1) Officer Donald Shafer was injured by Griffis struggling and striking with his hand and kicking with his foot and (2) Officer Shafer was lawfully discharging his official duty as a public servant at the time of the alleged assault. In response, the State argues this court need look no further than Officer Shafer's testimony that he received bodily injuries in his struggle with Griffis while attempting to detain Griffis after viewing an apparent controlled substance in plain view.
In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court determines whether, viewing “all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Hardy v. State, 281 S.W.3d 414, 421 (Tex.Crim.App.2009) ; accord Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex.Crim.App.2010) ; see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). We must defer to the jury's assessment of the credibility of the witnesses “and the weight to be given their testimony,” Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899, and allow for reasonable inferences from the evidence presented. Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex.Crim.App.2007) ; see also Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.04 (West 1979) ( ); Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781 ( ). In so doing, an appellate court presumes that the jury “resolved the conflicts in favor of the prosecution and therefore defer[s] to that determination.” Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex.Crim.App.2007).
The key question is whether “the evidence presented actually supports a conclusion that the defendant committed the crime that was charged.” Williams, 235 S.W.3d at 750. Only upon a finding the evidence is legally insufficient will this court reverse the trial court's judgment and order an acquittal.See Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 41, 102 S.Ct. 2211, 72 L.Ed.2d 652 (1982). This legal sufficiency standard applies equally to both direct and circumstantial evidence. Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778 ; King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 565 (Tex.Crim.App.2000).
To prove the offense of assault on a public servant, the State must prove (1) the defendant “intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly cause[d] bodily injury” to a public servant; (2) the defendant knew the other person was a public servant; and (3) the public servant was lawfully discharging his official duties at the time of the assault. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.01(a), (b)(1) (West Supp.2013); see also Hall v. State, 158 S.W.3d 470, 473 (Tex.Crim.App.2005). “Bodily injury” is defined as “physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.” See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(8) (West Supp.2013). The term “public servant” includes a police officer. See Carriere v. State, 84 S.W.3d 753, 757 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. ref'd); McCoy v. State, 932 S.W.2d 720, 723 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1996, pet. ref'd).
Griffis appears to argue the evidence is insufficient to prove his intent to...
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