Griffith v. Atlantic Refining Co.
| Decision Date | 04 December 1931 |
| Docket Number | 155,156 |
| Citation | 305 Pa. 386,157 A. 791 |
| Parties | Griffith et al. v. Atlantic Refining Co., Appellant |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Argued October 6, 1931
Appeals, Nos. 155 and 156, March T., 1931, by defendant, from judgment of C.P. Lawrence Co., Sept. T., 1929, No. 68, on verdicts for plaintiffs, in case of Ralph D. Griffith, by his father and next friend, George W. Griffith, and George W Griffith et ux., in their own right, v. Atlantic Refining Co. Affirmed.
Trespass for personal injuries. Before CHAMBERS, J.
The opinion of the Supreme Court states the facts.
Verdict and judgment for Ralph D. Griffith, minor plaintiff, for $4,775, and for George Griffith and wife for $1,575. Defendant appealed.
Error assigned, inter alia, was refusal of judgment for defendant n.o.v., quoting record.
The assignments of error are overruled and the judgment is affirmed.
W Walter Braham, of Aiken & Braham, with him William D. Cobau, J. Glenn Berry and Wright & Rundle, for appellant. -- There was no evidence which justified the court in submitting to the jury the question whether the system for the distribution of gasoline installed by defendant was defective: Hogue v. R.R., 85 Pa. 293; Pittsburgh v. Construction Co., 272 Pa. 118; Brashear v. Traction Co., 180 Pa. 392; Bruggman v. York City, 259 Pa. 94; Boggs v. Tea Co., 266 Pa. 428.
Defendant was not liable as a matter of law for Hudson's act in installing the pipe: Dunne v. R.R., 249 Pa. 76; Guille v. Campbell, 200 Pa. 119; Towanda Coal Co. v. Heeman, 86 Pa. 418.
Defendant was not liable as a matter of law for the improper construction of distributing system, including the pipe in question: Fitzmaurice v. Fabian, 147 Pa. 199; Godley v. Hagerty, 20 Pa. 387; Scalise v. Venzie, 301 Pa. 315.
There was no evidence that either of the alleged negligent acts of defendant company were responsible for plaintiff's injury: Stringert v. Twp., 179 Pa. 614; Alexander v. Water Co., 201 Pa. 252; Freedman v. Wager, 73 Pa.Super. 180.
It is a well established rule of law that the jury cannot fix liability by basing a presumption on a presumption: Gorman v. Brahms Sons, 298 Pa. 142; Benson v. Heating Co., 188 Pa. 614.
A. M. Shumaker, with him T. W. Dickey, for appellees. -- Defendant's negligence was a question for the jury: Koelsch v. Phila. Co., 152 Pa. 355, 362; Shirey v. Gas Co., 215 Pa. 399; Gudfelder v. Ry., 207 Pa. 629.
The case does not come within the exception of Curtin v. Somerset, 140 Pa. 70; Fitzmaurice v. Fabian, 147 Pa. 199; Presbyterian Congregation v. Smith, 163 Pa. 561; Stubbs v. Light Co., 84 Pa.Super. 1; Scalise v. Venzie, 301 Pa. 315; Grodstein v. McGivern, 303 Pa. 555; Godley v. Haggerty, 20 Pa. 387; Carson v. Godley, 26 Pa. 111.
Whether the negligence of defendant was the proximate cause of the injuries sustained was a question for the jury: Hartman v. Gas Co., 210 Pa. 19; Koelsch v. Phila. Co., 152 Pa. 355; Shirey v. Gas Co., 215 Pa. 399; Shaughnessy v. R.R., 274 Pa. 413.
Defendant was liable for the failure of its engineer to install a gasoline dispensing system that was reasonably safe: McDermott v. Ice Co., 44 Pa.Super. 445.
Before FRAZER, C.J., WALLING, SIMPSON, KEPHART, SCHAFFER, MAXEY and DREW, JJ.
A recital of the essential facts necessary to an understanding of this case, leaving out all extraneous matters, greatly simplifies it. Runyan Brothers, on land which they owned, had erected a gasoline filling station. They entered into a contract with appellant, Atlantic Refining Company, under which it agreed to lend and install the necessary outfit to store and supply gasoline, in consideration of Runyan Brothers' undertaking to sell only that furnished by it. The equipment consisted in part of four one thousand gallon tanks, sunk in the ground, located alongside the filling station, in which the gasoline supplied from tank wagons of appellant was stored. The tops of the tanks were below the surface of the ground. Above each of them was a brick compartment three feet square and three feet deep, in which was the pipe used in filling the tank. The pipe was permanently attached in the top of each of them. These filling pipes were capped except when gasoline was being run into the tanks. On top of each compartment was a manhole cover, with a hole in it to enable it to be lifted.
The work of installing the appliances was in charge of defendant's engineer, Hudson by name. When he was putting in the tanks, Runyan Brothers suggested to him that he connect each of the four compartments with the other by means of a pipe one and a half inches in diameter, and that he run such a pipe from the compartment nearest the building into its cellar. This he undertook to do and Runyan Brothers furnished the pipes which he installed. Their purpose was to enable the manhole covers to be locked from inside the cellar by means of a rod run through the pipes, all of which were in line, and through rings in the manhole covers. These pipes were not shown on the plans furnished by defendant for the installation of the equipment and from which Hudson worked. The locking device was never used, nor could it ever have been used, because of insufficient space in the cellar of the filling station for inserting and withdrawing an iron rod. Who was responsible for the pipe which ran from the nearest compartment into the cellar, whether appellant or Runyan Brothers, becomes a very material question in the case.
On July 16, 1927, a hot day, at two o'clock in the afternoon, one of appellant's gasoline delivery wagons drew up at the filling station, and by means of a hose leading from it to the intake pipe in the compartment over the tank nearest to the building, proceeded to fill that receptacle with gasoline. The minor plaintiff, an employee of Runyan Brothers, who observed the operation, testified that some gasoline, how much does not appear, was spilled into and remained in the compartment after the manhole was closed. At nine o'clock that night, seven hours later, he was directed to go into the cellar of the building and burn some waste materials in a stove located there. Some of it apparently had been used for wiping up gasoline. The stove was fireless. He placed some of the waste in the stove, put the box in which he had carried it on the floor, struck a match, and thereupon an explosion occurred, which threw him back against the cellar wall and severely burned him. To recover damages for the injuries which he sustained this action was brought against Runyan Brothers and the appellant. The court held it not maintainable against Runyan Brothers, because they were liable for workmen's compensation. The case proceeded to trial against appellant, resulting in a verdict against it.
There is no question that the explosion was from gasoline in the cellar. Appellant's theory on the trial was that the gasoline was on the waste which was put in the stove and testimony was adduced to support this. The jury refused to accede to this view and by their verdict concluded the gasoline came into the cellar through the pipe from the compartment into which it had been spilled in the afternoon. There was testimony supporting this conclusion, that gasoline will vaporize, particularly on a hot day, that so vaporized it would pass from the compartment through the pipe into the cellar and there remain, and that, if in sufficient quantity it would, with the air therein, make an explosive mixture, which could be exploded by lighting a match in the cellar. There was also evidence that after the explosion the fumes of gasoline were smelled at the cellar end of the pipe. Who was responsible for the pipe? Appellant's counsel, who ably argued the case at our bar, there and by printed brief contends, not the appellant, but Runyan Brothers; that they furnished the pipe and arranged for its installation without the knowledge or assent of appellant, and not in pursuance of any plans formulated by it; that in installing it Hudson was acting, not for appellant, but for Runyan Brothers, whose appliance it was; that it was no necessary part of the equipment furnished and installed by appellant, but was for the use and convenience only of the owners of the building. The further argument is made that appellant, after installing the appliances, was in the same legal situation as would exist where a building contractor has turned over a completed building to its owner and injury has occurred to some one as a result of some happening about the building, in which situations the rule of the contractor's...
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