Griffith v. Red Oak Community School Dist.

• Decision Date: 08 April 1969
• Docket Number: No. 53304,53304
• Citation: 167 N.W.2d 166
• Parties: Mabel GRIFFITH, Appellant, v. RED OAK COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Successor to the Coburg Consolidated School District, Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 166

167 N.W.2d 166

Mabel GRIFFITH, Appellant, v. RED OAK COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Successor to the Coburg Consolidated School District, Appellee.

No. 53304.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

April 8, 1969.

Davidson & Hemphill, Clarinda, for appellant.

R. John Swanson, Red Oak, for appellee.

MASON, Justice.

In this law action Mabel Griffith seeks $4000, alleging breach of a contract originally made March 17, 1966, with the Coburg Consolidated School District to teach for the school term 1966--67, that the contract was not terminated by the Coburg board under section 279.13, Code, 1966, and thus stood affirmed under section 275.33 for the following term.

Plaintiff taught in the only school building in the Coburg district for one term under the contract. July 1, 1967, the Coburg district was placed int he Red Oak Community School District by the Montgomery County board of education and dissolved by operation on law. Plaintiff's claim is for salary allegedly due under the contract for the school year 1967--68. The Red Oak district as successor to the Coburg district is defendant.

Trial to the court on agreed statement of facts resulted in dismissal of plaintiff's petition at her costs. She appeals from this adverse judgment.

I. It is conceded the Red Oak district was charged with knowledge of the existence and provisions of plaintiff's contract and became obligated thereby when the Coburg area was assigned to it July 1. When no notice of termination was given, plaintiff's contract was automatically continued under section 279.13 which as then in force provided in part:

'Said contract shall remain in force and effect for the period stated in the contract and thereafter shall be automatically continued in force and effect for equivalent periods, except as modified or terminated by mutual agreement of the board of directors and the teacher, unless terminated as hereinafter provided. * * * The board may by a majority vote of the elected membership of the board, cause said contract to be terminated by written notification of termination, by a certified letter mailed to the teacher not later than the tenth day of April; * * * In the event of such termination, it shall take effect at the close of the school year in which the contract is terminated * * * The foregoing provisions for termination shall not affect the power of the board of directors to discharge a teacher for cause under the provisions of section 279.24. * * *.'

The contract was not affected by the school reorganization. Section 275.33 provides:

'Contracts not affected. The terms of employment of superintendents, principals, and teachers, for any current school year shall not be affected by the formation of the new district.'

Plaintiff's contract provided she was to perform the duties 'of elementary teacher and such other duties as may be assigned in the schools of the Coburg Consolidated School District, such other duties to be more specifically as follows: kindergarten duties (1/2 day a.m.), other duties in p.m.--remedial reading and P.E. K-4--or arranged schedule.'

In the contract the Coburg district specifically reserved the right to discharge plaintiff for cause under section 279.24 which provides:

'Discharge of teacher. The board may, by a majority vote, discharge any teacher for incompetency, in attention to duty, partiality, or any good cause, after a full and fair investigation made at a meeting of the board held for that purpose, at which the teacher shall be permitted to be present and make defense, allowing him a reasonable time therefor.'

II. At the time of consolidation, although defendant district had constructive notice, it was without actual notice of plaintiff's contract. There was no copy of it in the Coburg file. Without actual knowledge of plaintiff's contract, the Red Oak district hired a kindergarten teacher for the Coburg school for the 1967--68 term.

In some manner, not entirely clear, the Red Oak district learned of plaintiff's contract and on August 16 invited her in writing to bring it to a conference with the superintendent. August 23 plaintiff appeared at the superintendent's office without her copy of the contract. The superintendent informed her the Red Oak district recognized her contract as one of full-time employment, that she was assigned as a study hall supervisor at the Stennett Educational Center, within the district but about 25 miles from Coburg, her duties would commence August 24 when she would report to a workshop of all teachers in the district to be held in Red Oak August 24 and 25. Plaintiff did not attend the workshop but her name was read out as a Stennett teacher.

August 2,, the first day of school, plaintiff appeared at the Coburg education center and stated she was ready, willing and able to commence her duties as set forth in her contract, set out supra. The superintendent again advised her that her duties were at Stennett and she would go there. Plaintiff did not report at the Stennett Educational Center nor render any service at the Coburg school.

III. September 27, 1967, plaintiff filed petition, October 9 defendant filed motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter. Defendant's motion included details of a special Red Oak school board meeting held August 28 at which by unanimous action of the board, it was concluded to call a special board meeting as provided by section 279.24 to take action on the possibility of discharging plaintiff. Defendant alleged plaintiff was given notice of the time and place of the hearing, she failed to appear in person but did so by counsel at the September 5 hearing, the board determined to discharge plaintiff for inattention to duty and plaintiff was given notice of the board's action. Minutes of the meeting and proof of service of notice were attached to the motion.

Defendant's motion is based on the contention plaintiff's remedy is under section 290.1 which provides:

'Appeal to county superintendent. Any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the board of directors of any school corporation in a matter of law or fact may, within thirty days after the rendition of such decision or the making of such order, appeal therefrom to the county superintendent of the proper county; the basis of the proceedings shall be an affidavit filed with the county superintendent by the party aggrieved within the time for taking the appeal, which affidavit shall set forth any error complained of in a plain and concise manner.'

After plaintiff filed resistance to the motion, it was overruled and defendant filed answer, asserting in a separate division (see rule 79, Rules of Civil Procedure) as a special defense substantially the same facts.

Defendant district alleged plaintiff was not qualified for a portion of the duties called for in the contract, had no approval statement on file as required therein, had no valid certificate to teach a special subject--physical education--under the regulations of the Iowa Department of Public Instruction, failed to attend the teachers meetings and workshop sessions scheduled for all professional personnel of the district and failed to perform assigned duties as an elementary teacher. It further asserted the language in plaintiff's contract, set out supra, referred to 'schools' in the plural and while there was only one school in the Coburg district, there were several in the reorganized Red Oak district.

Plaintiff's motion to strike the eight paragraphs of this separate defense was combined with motion for judgment on the pleadings. Although defendant's certificate of readiness indicated these motions were to be heard March 25, the matter was continued until April 22 when a stipulation of facts, written briefs and oral arguments were presented to the court. Neither of these motions was specifically ruled on although the court calendar entry indicates the case was submitted. The court's judgment dismissing plaintiff's petition was filed April 22.

Defendant argued that each of the matters alleged in its separate defense constituted specific conditions precedent to be performed by plaintiff under the contract; by reason of her failure to perform them as required she has no right of recovery against defendant for breach of contract.

Plaintiff, on the other hand, contended defendant's employment of a kindergartenteacher for the Coburg school and its refusal to permit her to teach kindergarten in that school constituted an anticipatory breach by the school board. She also asserted that because of this breach it was unnecessary for her to do anything more to comply with the contract than present herself at Coburg.

The court found defendant's contention had merit in view of the admitted facts; defendant had not waived these conditions or prevented plaintiff from complying with them; and defendant's failure to assert this legal defense when plaintiff was discharged by administrative procedure under the statutes did not preclude it from relying on it in the present action. It held plaintiff's failure to perform the conditions precedent constituted a proper defense to the action.

IV. Plaintiff assigns nine errors relied on for reversal. The first three complain of the court's treating the April 22 hearing as a trial on the merits when questions of law arising from her motion for judgment on the pleadings and motion to strike had not been ruled on. The next two assert the court erred at the April 22 hearing in considering defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and attached exhibits which had previously been overruled. The remaining assignments challenge the court's finding plaintiff had failed to perform express conditions precedent.

As stated, plaintiff contends her cause of action is for breach of a contract to teach kindergarten, remedial reading and physical education through the fourth grade at Coburg school; defendant's hiring a new kindergarten teacher for Coburg, refusing to permit plain...