Griffith v. Sec'y

• Decision Date: 13 June 2011
• Docket Number: Case No. 8:10-cv-1715-T-33AEP
• Parties: CHARLES GRIFFITH, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

CHARLES GRIFFITH, Petitioner,

v.SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent.

Case No. 8:10-cv-1715-T-33AEP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TAMPA DIVISION

DATED: June 13, 2011

ORDER

This cause is before the Court on Petitioner Charles Griffith's timely-filed 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for writ of habeas corpus. Griffith challenges his convictions and sentences entered by the Circuit Court for the Tenth Judicial Circuit, Polk County, Florida. A review of the record demonstrates that, for the following reasons, the petition must be denied.

BACKGROUND

On April 29, 2003, Griffith was charged in the State's Third Amended Information with the following: burglary of a dwelling while armed with a firearm (count one); burglary of a dwelling (count two); grand theft ($100 or more, taken from a dwelling) (count three); felony fleeing or attempting to elude (high speed) (count four); aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer (deadly weapon) (count five); resisting officers without violence (multiple officers) (count six); and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (count seven). Prior to trial, Griffith was noticed as a habitual felony offender, and as a prison release reoffender.

After trial, which commenced November 3, 2003, Griffith was found guilty of counts one, two, three, four, and six. He was found not guilty of count five. At sentencing on December 5, 2003, Griffith was sentenced to life in prison as a prison release reoffender on count one; fifteen years incarceration on count two; five years incarceration on count three; fifteen years incarceration on count four; and one year incarceration in the Polk County Jail on count six. All sentences were consecutive to each other. At sentencing, an oral nolle prosequi was entered on count seven.

The state trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on Griffith's postconviction claims. The state trial court's findings are "presumed to be correct" (28 U.S. C. 2254(e)(1)) and there is no showing that its decision "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. . . ."(28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2)). There are no claims in the habeas petition that permit further factual development. No federal evidentiary hearing is warranted on Griffith's petition.

Given that Griffith has not challenged Respondent's statement of the procedural history of this case, a recitation of the procedural history of Griffith's criminal conviction is unnecessary. The issues are fully briefed and the case is ripe for decision. The record is fully developed and the claims of the petition raise issues of law, not issues of fact. See Breedlove v. Moore, 279 F.23 952, 959 (11th Cir. 2002).

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

AEDPA STANDARD

This petition, initially filed in 2010, is governed by the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202 (2003); Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326-27 (1997). AEDPA affects this Court's reviewof both factual findings and legal rulings entered by the state courts in the rejection of Griffith's federal claims. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254(e)(1), this Court's review of state court factual findings must be highly deferential; such findings are presumed correct, unless rebutted by a petitioner with clear and convincing evidence. Wood v. Allen, 542 F.3d 1281, 1285 (11th Cir. 2008), affirmed, ___ U.S. ___, 2010 WL 173369 (Jan. 20, 2010); Crawford v. Head, 311 F.3d 1288, 1295 (11th Cir. 2002); Robinson v. Moore, 300 F.3d 1320, 1342 (11th Cir. 2002). Moreover, relief which was denied in state court due to asserted factual error can only be granted on habeas where the state court resolution turned on a determination of facts which was not just incorrect but unreasonable. Wood, 542 F.3d at 1285; 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(2).

Similarly, the legal rulings of claims adjudicated in state courts only provide a basis for federal relief where the state court adjudication was either "contrary to" clearly established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court, or involved an "unreasonable application" of such law. See 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1); Haliburton v. Secretary, Dept. of Corrections, 342 F.3d 1233, 1238 (11th Cir. 2003). In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000), the United States Supreme Court discussed these standards at length. The Court explained that a state court decision is "contrary to" clearly established federal law if either (1) the state court applied a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth by Supreme Court case law, or (2) when faced with materially indistinguishable facts, the state court arrived at a result different from that reached in a Supreme Court case. The question is whether the state court correctly identified the proper rule of law to be applied. Robinson, 300 F.3d at 1344-45; Putman v. Head, 268 F.3d 1223, 1241 (11th Cir. 2001). A state court decision is not "contrary to" established federal law even if a federal courtmight have reached a different result relying on the same law. Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06; Robinson, 300 F.3d at 1344-45.

A state court ruling is an "unreasonable application" of clearly established federal law if it identifies the correct legal rule from Supreme Court case law, but unreasonably applies that rule to the facts of the petitioner's case. An unreasonable application may also occur if a state court unreasonably extends, or unreasonably declines to extend, a legal principle from Supreme Court case law to a new context. A federal court does not independently review the correctness of the state court adjudication; the "unreasonable application" analysis requires a showing that the state court ruling is not simply incorrect or erroneous, but objectively unreasonable. Williams, 529 U.S. at 409-410; Robinson, 300 F.3d at 1345; Putman, 268 F.3d at 1241. The measuring stick for both the "contrary to" and "unreasonable application" assessments of the state court merits adjudication is "clearly established federal law," which refers only to the holdings, and not dicta, of the United States Supreme Court at the time of the relevant state law decisions. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412; Putman, 268 F.3d at 1241.

In Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993), the Supreme Court set forth the standard for relief where constitutional error is determined to exist on habeas review. This test is "less onerous" then the harmless error standard enunciated in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). "The test is whether the error 'had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.' Under this standard, habeas petitioners may obtain plenary review of their constitutional claims, but they are not entitled to habeas relief based on trial error unless they can establish that it resulted in 'actual prejudice.' " Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. Although no constitutional error has occurred in this case, anypossible error would clearly be harmless beyond any reasonable doubt based on the facts and the record herein.

AEDPA requires greater deference to state court decisions than the traditional de novo standard of review; Griffith has the burden to overcome the presumption of correctness attached to state court factual findings or to establish that the state court legal rulings were contrary to, or unreasonable applications of, established federal law. Crawford, 311 F.3d at 1295.

In Childers v. Floyd, --- F.3d --- 2011 WL 2162083, at * 10-11 (11th Cir., June 2, 2011), the Eleventh Circuit stated that "unless the state court clearly states that its decision was based solely on a state procedural rule, we will presume that the state court has rendered an adjudication on the merits when the petition's claim 'is the same claim rejected' by the state court." The pertinent portion of the opinion reads:

The concept of an "adjudication on the merits" is the corollary of the long-held requirement that a state prisoner first exhaust his claims in state court. See id. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (requiring exhaustion of state court remedies); Cone v. Bell, —— U.S. ——, 129 S.Ct. 1769, 1780, 173 L.Ed.2d 701 (2009) (calling exhaustion of state remedies prior to seeking federal habeas relief a "longstanding requirement"). Federal-state comity underlies this policy; before asking the federal court to "correct" a state court's mistake, the petitioner must first give the state court an opportunity to rule on the merits of his claim. Cone, 129 S.Ct. at 1780 ("When a petitioner fails to properly raise his federal claims in state court, he deprives the State of 'an opportunity to address those claims in the first instance' and frustrates the State's ability to honor his constitutional rights." (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 732, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2555, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991))).

Implicit in this scheme lies the possibility that the state court—presented with the petitioner's federal constitutional claim—may not rule on the merits of the petitioner's claim. E.g., Cone, 129 S.Ct. at 1784. In those instances, AEDPA deference—that we may not grant habeas relief unless the state court's decision was "contrary to" or an "unreasonable application of" federal law—does not apply and federal courts evaluate the petitioner's claims de novo. Id. (citing Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 380,390, 125 S.Ct. 2456, 2462, 2467, 162 L.Ed.2d 360 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 2542, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003)).

Faced with this possibility, the breadth of what it means to render an "adjudication on the merits" is of paramount importance. Decisions from this circuit and the United States Supreme Court have interpreted "adjudication on the merits" broadly. We have previously noted that § 2254 refers only to "decisions" and not to "opinions." See Wright v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corr., 278 F.3d 1245, 1255 (11th Cir.2002). As such, a summary adjudication—a state court decision denying a petitioner's claim without an accompanying statement of reasons—is an

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