Griggs v. Board of Trustees of Merced Union H. S. Dist.
| Decision Date | 05 March 1964 |
| Citation | 61 Cal.2d 93,37 Cal.Rptr. 194,389 P.2d 722 |
| Court | California Supreme Court |
| Parties | , 389 P.2d 722 Alberta Lowrey GRIGGS, Plaintiff and Respondent. v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF MERCED UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Defendants andAppellants. S. F. 21455. |
Willard B. Treadwell, County Counsel, C. Ray Robinson and Jonathan H. Rowell, San Francisco, for defendants and appellants.
Ben Curry, Merced, for plaintiff and respondent.
Stanley Mosk, Atty. Gen., Harold B. Haas, Asst. Atty. Gen., Elizabeth Palmer, Deputy Atty. Gen., and Irving G. Breyer, San Francisco, amici curiae.
Alberta Lowrey Griggs, who was serving her third year as a probationary teacher of the Merced Union High School District, was notified by the board of trustees of the district that it intended to terminate her employment at the end of the school year. After a public hearing was held at her request the board decided that she would not be reemployed, and she commenced this proceeding to compel the board to reinstate her as a teacher for the next school year. The court concluded that the findings of the board were not supported by substantial evidence and that Mrs. Griggs was deprived of a fair trial of the accusations against her. The ensuing judgment ordered the board to vacate its decision, reinstate petitioner as a teacher for the ensuing school year, and pay the expenses incurred by her in connection with the hearing, consisting of $1,500 attorney's fees and $33.90 filing and service fees. The board appeals.
We are of the view that the findings of the board were supported by substantial evidence, that on the basis of its findings the board had power to terminate the employment of Mrs. Griggs and that the record does not support the court's determination that she was deprived of a fair trial. It is not disputed that she is entitled to be reimbursed for sums expended for filing and service fees, but we are of the view that she was not entitled to recover attorney's fees.
In Horner v. Board of Trustees of Excelsior Union High School District, Cal., 37 Cal.Rptr. 185, 389 P.2d 713, we held that section 13444 of the Education Code as amended in 1961 is applicable to probationary teachers who are not reemployed at the end of a school year. Insofar as relevant here, section 13444 provides that a refusal to reemploy may be for cause only; that the teacher shall have the right to a hearing to determine the cause for his dismissal; that the determination of the board as to the sufficiency of the cause shall be conclusive and not subject to judicial review but that the cause shall relate solely to the welfare of the school and its pupils; and that the hearing shall be conducted in accordance with the chapter of the Administrative Procedure Act relating to administrative adjudication (Gov.Code, § 11500 et seq.). 1
Under the applicable provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act the hearing is initiated by an accusation stating the charges against the teacher, each party has the right to introduce evidence and to cross-examine witnesses, and the board must make findings of fact and determine the issues presented. (Gov.Code, §§ 11503, 11513, 11518.) This procedure was followed in the present case.
With respect to judicial review, the chapter of the Administrative Procedure Act made applicable by section 13444 of the Education Code provide that review of decisions of administrative boards may be had by petition for a writ of mandate in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. (Gov.Code, § 11523.) The inquiry extends to the questions whether the board has proceeded without or in excess of jurisdiction, whether there was a fair trial, and whether there was any prejudicial abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion is established if the board has not proceeded in the manner required by law, the order or decision is not supported by the findings, or, with regard to local boards like the one before us, the findings are not supported by substantial evidence in the light of the entire record. (Code Civ.Proc. § 1094.5, subds. (b), (c); Atchison etc. Ry. Co. v. Kings Co. Water Dist., 47 Cal.2d 140, 143-144, 302 P.2d 1; Riggins v. Board of Education, 144 Cal.App.2d 232, 237, 300 P.2d 848.) However, section 13444 of the Education Code specifically limits the scope of judicial review, stating, '(t)he determination of the board as to the sufficiency of the cause for dismissal shall not be subject to judicial review,' and '(t)he determination of the board as to the sufficiency of the cause for dismissal shall be conclusive, but the cause shall relate solely to the welfare of the schools and the pupils thereof.'
Nothing in the language of section 13444 prevents the reviewing court from determining whether the board has proceeded in excess of jurisdiction, whether there has been a fair trial, and whether the board's findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. However, where there is evidence to support the board's findings of fact and where the cause for dismissal found by the board can reasonably be said to relate to the 'welfare of the schools and the pupils thereof,' the reviewing court may not consider whether the facts found are sufficiently serious to justify dismissal.
The board found that Mrs. Griggs had shown lack of proper self-control in the presence of pupils and in the disciplining of pupils, lack of courtesy in contacts with co-workers, and poor judgment in handling pupil problems. These findings were supported by substantial evidence. At the hearing before the board, semiannual reports of school principals evaluating Mrs. Griggs' work showed a need of improvement in classroom procedure, emotional stability, teacher-pupil relationship, and in the relationship with parents, other teachers, and administrators. These reports were admissible as business records. (Fox v. S. F. Unified School Dist., 111 Cal.App.2d 885, 891-892, 245 P.2d 603.) Extensive evidence was introduced with respect to specific acts of tactlessness and lack of self-restraint on the part of Mrs. Griggs in her relations with co-workers, pupils, and parents, and it appears that her conflicts with co-workers sometimes occurred in the presence of pupils and parents. The record also shows that Mrs. Griggs' attention had been called to her need for improvement with respect to such matters.
A teacher's lack of self-restraint and tact in dealing with co-workers, pupils, and parents is clearly a matter which relates to the welfare of the school and its pupils, and, as we have seen, where the cause for dismissal can reasonably be said to relate to the welfare of the school and its pupils, it is solely for the board to determine whether dismissal is warranted. Accordingly, the trial court could not properly substitute its own judgment for that of the board on the question of the sufficiency of the cause for Mrs. Griggs' dismissal.
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