Griggs v. Griggs

• Decision Date: 05 January 1949
• Docket Number: 16165.
• Citation: 51 S.E.2d 622,214 S.C. 177
• Parties: GRIGGS v. GRIGGS.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

51 S.E.2d 622

214 S.C. 177

GRIGGS v. GRIGGS.

No. 16165.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

January 5, 1949

C. B. Ruffin, of Bishopville, and John D. Nock, of Cheraw, for appellant.

J E. Leppard, of Chesterfield, for respondent.

TAYLOR Justice.

For a better understanding of the question presented in this appeal it might be well to state that this court has passed upon other phases of this case on two prior occasions, see Griggs v. Griggs, 199 S.C. 295, 19 S.E.2d 477 and 205 S.C. 272, 31 S.E.2d 505. This litigation was begun by Victoria Griggs (respondent here) bringing an action in the Court of Common Pleas for Chesterfield County against S. J. Griggs (appellant here) wherein she contended that on August 30, 1927, she was seized and possessed, in fee simple, of a tract of land containing 141 and 51/100 acres more or less situated in Chesterfield County, South Carolina and that being such owner she, by her said deed, dated that day conveyed this land to the defendant (appellant here) on the condition that he, his heirs and assigns should furnish to her maintenance and support for the remainder of her life that failing in the performance of such condition the title to the land so conveyed should revert to her. She further contended that such condition had been breached and that she had therefore entered upon the premises and taken possession thereof 'and has been since entirely seized and possessed of the said premises' further that not withstanding the foregoing the defendant continues to claim ownership of such premises by virtue of said deed and has wantonly and forcibly entered into and upon said premises committing various acts of ownership 'and has threatened and continues to threaten to forcibly remove plaintiff from said premises.'

The answer of the defendant was in effect a general denial and a plea that he and his predecessors in title therein were seized in fee simple of the tract land described in the complaint by virtue of certain deeds; beginning with deed from David C. Griggs to C. Q. V. Griggs (C. Q. V. Griggs being the respondent here) dated January 11, 1896 and recorded January 18, 1896. By deed from respondent to Dr. J W. Williamson dated September 18, 1905 recorded October 11 of that year. By deed from the heirs at law of Dr. Williamson to Bright Williamson dated March 12, 1926, and duly recorded, and by deed from Bright Williamson to the appellant dated October 30, 1926 and recorded November 11, 1926. The defendant further alleged that since respondent here conveyed the land involved to Dr. J. W. Williamson in fee simple with general warranty in the year 1905 she is estopped from establishing any claim in said land in that defendant purchased said land from Bright Williamson in October, 1926, entered into possession thereof and has continually remained in sole possession thereof as owner in fee until 'recently when plaintiff wrongfully and maliciously interfered with plaintiffs possession.' A complete analysis of the complaint in the first suit shows that it was drafted upon the assumption that the principal issue would be whether or not the defendant (appellant here) had breached the conditions of the deed, that plaintiff was seized and possessed of the premises, that defendant had trespassed and threatened to continue to trespass and asked damages for such trespassing and that the defendant (appellant here) be permanently enjoined from committing further trespass. On the trial of the issues in the first suit the Master found that the defendant (appellant here) was seized in fee of the premises in question. The conclusion of the Master was modified by the Circuit Judge, however; on appeal to this court, the decree of the Circuit Judge was set aside and the conclusion of the Master that the defendant (appellant here) S. J. Griggs was seized in fee of the premises was sustained, see Griggs v. Griggs, 199 S.C. 295, 19 S.E.2d 477.

Plaintiff (respondent here) filed a petition for rehearing which this court denied, using the following language: 'Adverse possession was not at issue in this case and the Court did not undertake to try such issue, the Court does not consider further comment proper. Petition dismissed.'

S. J. Griggs (appellant here) next appealed to the Circuit Court for a writ of Assistance to obtain possession of these premises. This application was denied by the Circuit Court, which held Mrs. Griggs (the respondent here) had established by affidavit a Prima Facie case of adverse possession therefore the writ should not issue and pointing out that the issue of adverse possession was not made in the first case and therefore not decided. Upon appeal to this court the ruling of the Circuit Judge was sustained. See Griggs v. Griggs, 205 S.C. 272, 31 S.E.2d 505.

This action was then commenced by the appellant to recover the possession of the specific premises. The defendant respondent answered as follows:

'For a First Defense:

'I.

'Defendant denies each and every allegation in the complaint in this action contained not hereinafter expressly admitted.

'For a Second Defense:

'I.

'Defendant admits, upon information and belief, that about October, 1926, the plaintiff procured from one Bright Williamson, a certain paper writing purporting to be a conveyance to him of the lands described in the complaint, but defendant denies that said Bright Williamson at the time owned any right, title, interest, claim or estate in said lands and therefore alleges and shows that said conveyance was and is a nullity and was ineffective to convey to plaintiff any title, interest, claim or estate in or to said lands, and defendant further denies that plaintiff has or has ever had any right, title, interest, claim or estate of any nature or character in or to said lands, or any part or parcel thereof.

'II.

'That at the time of the delivery of the said alleged deed of Bright Williamson to plaintiff under which plaintiff claims to this action the lands described in the complaint were in the actual possession and occupancy of defendant, who was then and is now, claiming under a title by possession and occupation, adverse to that of the grantor in said deed.

'For a Third Defense:

'I.

'That neither plaintiff, nor any ancestor, predecessor or grantor of plaintiff was seized or possessed of the premises described in the complaint, or any part thereof, within ten (10) years last past before the commencement of this action, but that this defendant has held, occupied and possessed said premises adversely to the pretended title of plaintiff for more than ten (10) years last past before the commencement of this action, under a claim of title in fee, exclusive of any other right.

'II.

'That there has been an actual, open, notorious, exclusive, hostile, continuous and unbroken occupation and adverse possession of the said premises by defendant under a claim of title in fee for more than ten (10) years last past before the commencement of this action.

'III.

'That during all of said time said premises so occupied by defendant have been usually cultivated, improved and used for husbandry, for the supply of fuel, timber, lumber and for the ordinary use of the occupant.

'For a Fourth Defense:

'I.

'That neither plaintiff, nor any ancestor, predecessor or grantor of plaintiff was seized or possessed of the premises described in the complaint, or any part thereof, within twenty (20) years last past before the commencement of this action, but that this defendant has held, occupied and possessed said premises adversely to the pretended title of plaintiff for more than twenty (20) years last past before the commencement of this action, under a claim of title in fee exclusive of any other right.

'II.

'That there has been an actual, open, notorious, exclusive, hostile, continuous and unbroken occupation and adverse possession of the said premises by defendant under a claim of title in fee for more than twenty (20) years last past before the commencement of this action.

'III.

'That during all of said time said premises so occupied by the defendant have been usually cultivated, improved, and used for husbandry, for the supply of fuel, timber, lumber and for the ordinary use of the occupant.

'For a Fifth Defense:

'I.

'That the premises described in the complaint were conveyed to the defendant by deed of Daniel C. Griggs dated the 11th day of January, 1896, and recorded in the office of the R. M. C. for Chesterfield County, S. C., on the 13th day of January, 1896, in deed book 13 at page 393; that defendant entered into the possession of said premises under said deed when it was made and delivered, as aforesaid, and that she has been in the actual, open, notorious, exclusive, hostile, continuous and unbroken occupation and adverse possession of the said premises since that time, and that neither the plaintiff nor his ancestor or grantor, was actually in the possession of said premises, or any part thereof, within the forty (40) years last past before the commencement of this action.

'For a Sixth Defense:

'I.

'That on or about the 18th day of September, 1905, a deed was made and entered of record in the office of the Clerk of Court of Chesterfield County, South Carolina, in deed book 22 at page 253, purporting to be a conveyance by the defendant of the lands described in the complaint to one J. W. Williamson, and that said alleged deed constitutes a link in the claim of title of plaintiff; that the said J. W Williamson, did not go into possession of said lands under said deed and was never in the actual possession of any part of the same; that soon after the said alleged deed was made, as aforesaid, the said J. W. Williamson made demand on defendant for the delivery of the possession of...