Grimes Box Co., Inc. v. Miguel
| Decision Date | 03 June 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 83-555-A,83-555-A |
| Parties | GRIMES BOX COMPANY, INC. v. Daniel MIGUEL. ppeal. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
This is an appeal by the employee from a decree of the Workers' Compensation Commission granting the employer's petition to review for suspension of benefit payments.
The following facts are not in dispute. The employee, Daniel Miguel, had been working for the employer, Grimes Box Company, for one-and-a-half years when on May 27, 1978, he hit his head on a pipe while straightening up after having bent over to pick up a box. On January 12, 1979, employee was awarded total disability benefits for this injury. He was subsequently compensated for partial incapacity. The employer filed a petition to review on April 9, 1980, alleging that employee's partial incapacity had ended and that he could return to selected light work. The petition was granted, and the commission affirmed.
On appeal, we address the following issues: (1) whether there is any competent legal evidence in the record to support the commission's finding that employee is no longer disabled as a result of his work-related May 27, 1978 head injury and (2) whether the trial commissioner erred in relying upon the medical testimony he found most persuasive.
In the instant case, employee contends that employer failed to meet its threshold burden of proving that employee's incapacity had ceased. Moreover, employee argues that employer failed to prove that his return to work would not result in a material risk of reinjury.
Conversely, employer's main contention on appeal is that there is competent 1egal evidence to support the commission's decree. Further, employer argues that it is responsible only for an incapacity that is work related.
It is well established in workers' compensation cases that findings of fact by a trial commissioner that are affirmed by a final decree of the commission are conclusive if there is any competent legal evidence to support the commission's decision. Simon v. Health-Tex, Inc., 490 A.2d 50 (R.I. 1985); Trotta v. Brown & Sharpe Manufacturing Co., 86 R.I. 247, 134 A.2d 173 (1957). This court shall not intervene in the absence of fraud unless a question of law or a mixed question of fact and law is in issue. Emmett v. Town of Coventry, 478 A.2d 571 (R.I. 1984); Silva v. James Ursini Co., 475 A.2d 205 (R.I. 1984).
In the instant case, medical testimony was elicited from numerous expert witnesses. The employer's medical expert, Dr. David M. Barry, examined employee on two occasions in 1979 and 1980. The doctor testified that employee's illness stemmed from a severe head injury suffered in 1958. He opined that it was unlikely that the relatively minor injury of May 1978 was the cause of any present disability, and he concluded that employee was capable of resuming his former employment tasks.
The testimony of Dr. J. Wallace Conklin was also heard by the commissioner. Doctor Conklin first examined employee shortly after the work-related injury occurred and continued to see him at three-week intervals thereafter. He testified that it is not unusual for such head injuries to result in persistent spells of dizziness and headaches such as those complained of by employee. Doctor Conklin concluded that employee was totally disabled and thus unable to function at his former employment.
As a result of the conflicting medical opinions regarding employee's disability, the commissioner, pursuant to G.L. 1956 (1979 Reenactment) § 28-35-24, appointed Dr. Melvyn Gelch as an impartial medical examiner. In December 1980 the doctor conducted a thorough physical examination of employee. He found that employee's dizziness resulted not from physical injuries but rather from employee's emotional condition. The doctor concluded that "this complaint of head pain is definitely * * * not associated with the accident while in the employ of Grimes Box Company in 1978." He further testified that if employee's other non-work-related difficulties were discounted, then he would allow employee to return to his former employment.
As noted above, factfinding is clearly...
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