Grimes v. Van Hook-Williams

• Decision Date: 19 September 2013
• Docket Number: Docket No. 314723.
• Citation: 839 N.W.2d 237,302 Mich.App. 521
• Parties: GRIMES v. VAN HOOK–WILLIAMS.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

302 Mich.App. 521

839 N.W.2d 237

GRIMES

v.VAN HOOK–WILLIAMS.

Docket No. 314723.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted June 11, 2013, at Detroit.

Decided Sept. 19, 2013, at 9:10 a.m.

Ari Kresch and Blaney & Condon PLLC (by Mary Blaney) for plaintiff.

Family Legal Centers of Michigan, PLC (by LaVonne Banister Jackson, South field), for defendant.

Before: JANSEN, P.J., and MARK J. CAVANAGH and MARKEY, JJ.

JANSEN, P.J.

In this paternity action, plaintiff appeals by right the circuit court's order granting summary disposition in favor of defendant and dismissing plaintiff's claims. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm.

I

At issue in this case is the paternity of defendant's minor child (the child), born November 4, 2011. On September 12, 2012, plaintiff filed a complaint and motion for DNA testing in the circuit court, alleging that he was the biological father of the child. Plaintiff acknowledged that defendant was married to Dante Williams (Williams) “[f]rom the time of conception until the time of the child's birth,” but alleged that defendant and Williams were separated at the time of the child's birth. Plaintiff alleged that he and plaintiff had “held themselves out as a couple” and “discussed plans to marry.” In his attached affidavit, plaintiff averred that the child was conceived in April 2011 and that defendant “did not wear a wedding ring or conduct herself as a married woman.” Plaintiff sought to establish paternity under the Revocation of Paternity Act, MCL 722.1431 et seq. He requested (1) a DNA test to establish paternity,¹ (2) an order acknowledging him as the child's biological father and modifying the child's birth certificate, (3) joint legal and physical custody of the child, and (4) parenting time.

Defendant filed an answer in which she denied that she was ever separated from Williams and denied that she had ever held herself out as plaintiff's girlfriend. She alleged that she and plaintiff merely “had a sporadic, on again, off again relationship” over approximately three years. Defendant contended that plaintiff lacked standing to file an action under the Revocation of Paternity Act because he knew that she was married to Williams at the time of the child's conception and knew that she intended to remain married to Williams.

Plaintiff's motion was referred to a Friend of the Court referee. After reviewing the evidence, the referee found that defendant had informed plaintiff that “she was married at the initiation of their relationship....” Citing MCL 722.1441(3)(a)( i ), the referee recommended that plaintiff's request for DNA testing be denied because an alleged father may only file an action to establish paternity if he did not know or have a reason to know that the mother was married at the time of conception. Plaintiff objected to the referee's recommendations and requested a de novo hearing. Among other things, plaintiff argued that the referee's interpretation of the Revocation of Paternity Act violated his constitutional rights “as it relates to the fundamental right to have a meaningful relationship with one's child.”

On December 3, 2012, defendant moved for summary disposition, arguing that plaintiff lacked standing to bring an action under the Revocation of Paternity Act because it was beyond factual dispute that plaintiff was aware of her marriage to Williams at the time the child was conceived. Plaintiff admitted that he knew defendant was married at the time he started dating her, just as he had told the referee. However, plaintiff maintained that he assumed that defendant had subsequently obtained a divorce from Williams. He argued that the Legislature “did not intend for fathers to engage in a fact finding mission to determine if the woman they slept with was married on paper when all other indications of a traditional marriage [were] absent.” He also argued that a denial of his request to establish paternity would violate his due-process right to “make decisions regarding the care, custody, and control” of his child, as well as his right to equal protection.

At the hearing on defendant's motion for summary disposition, the circuit court remarked from the bench:

It is undisputed that [plaintiff] was aware that he was engaged in a relationship with a married woman, and that at the time of the conception and birth of the child [defendant] was married to another man. Under the statute, that denies him standing, and ... it's unequivocal. It says ... [“]to know or reason to know that the mother [was] married.[”] And so, under that argument, I'm finding in favor of the defendant, and that she is entitled to summary disposition.

As to the constitutional arguments, ... men in the same shoes as [plaintiff] lack standing to bring any kind of action whatsoever if the child was born during the time the woman was married to another man, and there's all sorts of public policy debates that happened, but that's what the statute read, and it was found to be constitutional. I don't find that [plaintiff's] constitutional argument under the new statute has merit. For those reasons, I am granting the motion for summary disposition on the basis that the plaintiff lacks standing, and the case is dismissed.

On January 22, 2013, the circuit court entered an order granting summary disposition in favor of defendant and dismissing plaintiff's claims.

II

We review de novo the circuit court's decision to grant a motion for summary disposition. Spiek v. Dep't of Transportation, 456 Mich. 331, 337, 572 N.W.2d 201 (1998). “Summary disposition is proper under MCR 2.116(C)(10) if the affidavits and other documentary evidence show that there is no genuine issue concerning any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Kennedy v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 274 Mich.App. 710, 712, 737 N.W.2d 179 (2007). “A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record, giving the benefit of reasonable doubt to the opposing party, leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ.” West v. Gen. Motors Corp., 469 Mich. 177, 183, 665 N.W.2d 468 (2003).

We review de novo whether a party has been afforded due process, Elba Twp. v. Gratiot Co. Drain Comm'r, 493 Mich. 265, 277, 831 N.W.2d 204 (2013), and whether a party has been afforded equal protection under the law, USA Cash # 1, Inc. v. Saginaw, 285 Mich.App. 262, 277, 776 N.W.2d 346 (2009). “Matters of constitutional and statutory interpretation and questions concerning the constitutionality of a statutory provision are also reviewed de novo.” Toll Northville Ltd. v. Northville Twp., 480 Mich. 6, 10–11, 743 N.W.2d 902 (2008). “Statutes are presumed constitutional unless the unconstitutionality is clearly apparent.” Id. at 11, 743 N.W.2d 902.

III

Plaintiff first argues that the circuit court erred by granting summary disposition in favor of defendant because there was insufficient evidence to establish that he knew or had reason to know that defendant was married to Williams at the time the child was conceived. We disagree.

The Revocation of Paternity Act was added by way of 2012 PA 159, and took effect on June 12, 2012. Among other things, the Revocation of Paternity Act “governs actions to determine that a presumed father is not a child's father....” In re Daniels Estate, 301 Mich.App. 450, 458–459, 837 N.W.2d 1 (2013). Section 11(3)(a) of the Revocation of Paternity Act, MCL 722.1441(3)(a), provides:

If a child has a presumed father,² a court may determine that the child is born out of wedlock for the purpose of establishing the child's paternity if an action is filed by an alleged father³ and any of the following applies:

(a) All of the following apply:

( i ) The alleged father did not know or have reason to know that the mother was married at the time of conception.

( ii ) The presumed father, the alleged father, and the child's mother at some time mutually and openly acknowledged a biological relationship between the alleged father and the child.

( iii ) The action is filed within 3 years after the child's birth. The requirement that an action be filed within 3 years after the child's birth does not apply to an action filed on or before 1 year after the effective date of this act.

( iv ) Either the court determines the child's paternity or the child's paternity will be established under the law of this state or another jurisdiction if the child is determined to be born out of wedlock.

The only factual issue that is possibly in dispute in this case is whether plaintiff “did not know or have reason to know that the mother was married at the time of conception.” MCL 722.1441(3)(a)( i ). We conclude that it was beyond genuine factual dispute that plaintiff knew or had reason to know that defendant was married to Williams at the time of the child's conception.

According to plaintiff's own complaint, “[f]rom the time of conception until the time of the child's birth, [defendant] was married to Dante Williams.” Plaintiff did allege that defendant and Williams were “separated” and that he believed defendant intended to obtain a divorce from Williams. However, defendant and Williams were never divorced; indeed, defendant apparently remains married to Williams to this day. It is undisputed that defendant never told plaintiff that she had divorced Williams. Nor did plaintiff have any sound reason to believe that defendant had divorced Williams. Even viewing the pleadings, affidavits, and other documentary evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, Kennedy, 274 Mich.App. at 712, 737 N.W.2d 179, no reasonable person could have concluded that plaintiff was unaware of defendant's marriage to Williams at the time of the child's conception, see West, 469 Mich. at 183, 665 N.W.2d 468.

Even assuming arguendo that plaintiff did not actually know that defendant was married to Williams at the time the child was conceived, he had reason to know that defendant remained married to Williams at...