Grimshaw v. South Florida Water Management Dist.
| Decision Date | 07 February 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 00-9134-CIV.,00-9134-CIV. |
| Citation | 195 F.Supp.2d 1358 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
| Parties | Herbert J. GRIMSHAW, Plaintiff, v. SOUTH FLORIDA WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT, Defendant. |
Isidro Manuel Garcia, Maria Kate Boehringer, Garcia, Elkins & Carbonell, West Palm Beach, FL, for plaintiff.
James Edward Nutt, South Florida Water Management District, West Palm Beach, FL, for defendant.
ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This is a case about federalism, governmental structure and control, and water. The issue presented is whether the South Florida Water Management District (the "District" or "SFWMD") is immune from suit in federal court by reason of the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Judges of this district have reached opposite conclusions concerning this issue.1 Moreover, in an unpublished opinion, the Eleventh Circuit found it unnecessary to decide the dispute, commenting that whether the District should be considered an arm of the state or a political subdivision is a close question. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 163 F.3d 1359 (11th Cir.1998) (unpublished), cert. denied 528 U.S. 810, 120 S.Ct. 41, 145 L.Ed.2d 37 (1999); see also Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida v. Florida State Athletic Comm'n, 226 F.3d 1226, 1233, n. 9 (11th Cir.2000). In this case, however, the issue is presented squarely and I am mindful of the admonition that Eleventh Amendment immunity is a threshold issue in the nature of a jurisdictional bar. See Bouchard Transportation Co. v. Florida Dep't of Environmental Protection, 91 F.3d 1445, 1448 (11th Cir.1996).
I therefore requested the parties to fully develop the record on this issue, permitted testimony, and was provided the benefit of legal memoranda and oral argument. After review, I conclude that the South Florida Water Management District should be considered an arm of the State for the purposes of the Eleventh Amendment.
Florida is divided into five water management districts established by Chapter 72-299, Laws of Florida, the Florida Water Resources Act of 1972. Legislative authority for the districts is found in Chapter 373 Florida Statutes. The South Florida Water Management District's mission is to manage and protect the water resources within its boundaries by improving water quality, flood control, natural systems, and water supply within the region. The District's jurisdiction contains two primary hydrologic basins: the Okeechobee basin and the Big Cypress Basin.2 The Okeechobee basin is based on the Kissimmee-Okeechobee-Everglades (KOE) ecosystem which stretches from Central Florida's Chain of Lakes to Lake Okeechobee, and south to the Florida Keys. It includes the southeast coast, the Everglades Agricultural Area and the Everglades National Park. The Big Cypress Basin includes Collier county in the south west part of Florida, a part of Monroe county, the Big Cypress National Preserves and the 10,000 Islands. The District includes a population of approximately 6 million people, encompasses all or part of 16 counties in total and covers an area of 17,930 square miles.3
The South Florida Water Management District is governed by a nine member board, appointed by the Governor, subject to confirmation by the Florida Senate. Pursuant to Section 373 of the Florida Statutes, SFWMD has substantial fiscal and regulatory authority, and for the current fiscal year its budget is $728.6 million. The funds are comprised of local property taxes, levied pursuant to the District's ad valorem taxing power, monies paid for licenses, permits and fees, general revenue appropriated by the legislature and federal funds.
The District has a self-insurance fund which it uses to pay worker's compensation, automobile liability and general liability claims and judgments. The District determines the fund amount based upon its loss experience. The current balance of the self-insurance fund is $6,259,508. It is estimated that 80 percent of that fund is currently comprised of revenue from ad valorem taxation.
This action was filed pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq. Plaintiff, Dr. Herbert Grimshaw, II, is currently employed as a Senior Environmental Scientist in SFWMD's Okeechobee Division. (Complaint at ¶ 5). Plaintiff asserts that he was subjected to a number of adverse employment actions by the Defendant due to his age (Plaintiff is over 40 years old), including being placed on probation and being terminated. (Complaint at ¶ 15). The District terminated Dr. Grimshaw in July of 1998. (Complaint at ¶ 23). The Plaintiff was then rehired on June 8, 1999. (Complaint at ¶ 24). Plaintiff filed this two count action on December 22, 2000. Count I charges SFWMD with age discrimination in violation of the ADEA and Count II alleges retaliation. Plaintiff asserts that his termination was based on his age and that the Defendant retaliated against him for filing a grievance of discrimination following his return to SFWMD. The Defendant has filed a motion to dismiss or in the alternative for summary judgment asserting Eleventh Amendment Immunity. A hearing was held on January 29, 2002.
A motion to dismiss is appropriate only when it is demonstrated "beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). For the purpose of the motion to dismiss, the Complaint is construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and all facts alleged by the plaintiff are accepted as true. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984). Regardless of the alleged facts, however, a court may dismiss a Complaint upon a finding in favor of the moving party on a dispositive issue of law. See Marshall County Bd. of Educ. v. Marshall County Gas Dist., 992 F.2d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir.1993).
Summary judgment is appropriate only when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See FED. R.CIV.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The moving party bears the burden of meeting this exacting standard. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). In applying this standard, the evidence, and all reasonable factual inferences drawn therefrom, must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Arrington v. Cobb County, 139 F.3d 865, 871 (11th Cir.1998); Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir.1997). The issue presented in this matter is a dispositive issue of law. Under either analysis, a finding that SFWMD is entitled to immunity would require the Court to dismiss this action.4
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. U.S. CONST. amend XI.
Although the express language of the Amendment encompasses only suits brought against a state by citizens of another state, the Supreme Court has held that it also prohibits suits against a state by its own citizens. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890); see also Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, 506 U.S. 139, 146, 113 S.Ct. 684, 689, 121 L.Ed.2d 605 (1993) (). "The Eleventh Amendment largely shields States from suit in federal courts without their consent, leaving parties with claims against a State to present them, if the State permits, in the State's own tribunals." Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation, 513 U.S. 30, 39, 115 S.Ct. 394, 400, 130 L.Ed.2d 245 (1994).
The Amendment's bar against suits in federal courts extends to the state and its instrumentalities, but it does not extend to counties, municipal corporations, or other political subdivisions of the state. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280, 97 S.Ct. 568, 572, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977). In deciding whether a state instrumentality may invoke the state's immunity, the inquiry focuses on the nature of the entity created by state law in order to determine whether it should be treated as an arm of the state. Regents of the University of California v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429, 117 S.Ct. 900, 904, 137 L.Ed.2d 55 (1997). Ultimately, the question of whether a particular agency has the same kind of independent status as a county or instead is an arm of the State and therefore "one of the United States" within the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment is a question of federal law. However, that federal question can be answered only after considering the provisions of state law that define the agency's character. Id. at n. 5.
In determining whether the Eleventh Amendment provides immunity to a particular entity, the Eleventh Circuit examines the following factors: (1) how the state law defines the entity; (2) what degree of control the state maintains over the entity; (3) where the entity derives its funds from; and (4) who is responsible for judgments against the entity. See Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida v. Florida State Athletic Comm'n, 226 F.3d 1226, 1231; Stewart v. Baldwin County Bd. of Educ., 908 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th Cir.1990); Tuveson v. Florida Governor's Council on Indian Affairs, Inc....
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
United States ex rel. Lesinski v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist.
... ... Michael LESINSKI, Plaintiff–Appellant,v.SOUTH FLORIDA WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT, Defendant–Appellee.No ... arm of the state analysis, is “pervasive and substantial.” Grimshaw v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 195 F.Supp.2d 1358, 1366 (S.D.Fla.2002) ... ...