Grimsley v. Twiggs County, s. 38424

• Decision Date: 22 June 1982
• Docket Number: Nos. 38424,38425,s. 38424
• Citation: 249 Ga. 632,292 S.E.2d 675
• Parties: Patti H. GRIMSLEY, Clerk v. TWIGGS COUNTY, Georgia et al. The BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF TWIGGS COUNTY, Georgia et al. v. Patti H. GRIMSLEY, Clerk.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 675

292 S.E.2d 675

249 Ga. 632

Patti H. GRIMSLEY, Clerk v. TWIGGS COUNTY, Georgia et al.

The BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF TWIGGS COUNTY, Georgia et al. v. Patti H. GRIMSLEY, Clerk.

Nos. 38424, 38425.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

June 22, 1982.

Denmark Groover, Jr., Groover & Childs, Macon, for Bd. of Com'rs of Twiggs County, Georgia, et al.

B. Rabun Faulk, James G. Maddox, Jeffersonville, for Patti H. Grimsley, Clerk.

CLARKE, Justice.

A dispute between the clerk of superior court and the county commissioners of Twiggs County is appealed to this court. In order to resolve it we must treat the issue of inherent power of the superior court and its relationship to statutory law.

The case reaches us as an appeal from a mandamus absolute requiring the county commissioners to pay for temporary clerical help in the clerk's office during a term of court. The trial court also denied the clerk's request for attorney fees, and she appeals. We affirm both orders.

The controversy began when the clerk submitted to the county commissioners a requisition for "two weeks of clerical help" to be performed during the April term of court. The commissioners denied the request. The clerk then secured a letter from the superior court judge authorizing the payment for the services. The help was hired and a new request accompanied by the judge's letter was submitted to the commissioners. Again payment was refused. A third refusal came after the clerk requested payment as part of the overall expense of the term of court. The suit for mandamus followed this.

1. Mandamus is the proper "remedy to compel a public officer or a county board to perform a duty imposed by law," Mattox v. Board of Education, 148 Ga. 577, 97 S.E. 532 (1918); Code Ann. § 64-101. The question is whether the Twiggs County Board of Commissioners had "a duty imposed by law" to expend county funds to provide the clerk of court with additional clerical help during the April term of court. We have reviewed the three possible sources of such a duty cited by the trial judge and the clerk--Ga.Laws 1977, Vol. II, 2721 et seq.; Code Ann. § 24-3005; and the "inherent powers of the superior courts."

2. The first potential source for the alleged duty is Ga.Laws 1977, Vol. II, 2721 et seq., which placed the Clerk of Twiggs Superior Court on an annual salary and provided for the payment of the operating expenses of that office. Because of our holding as to the remaining potential sources it is unnecessary to deal with this special act.

3. Both of the other potential sources of a "duty imposed by law" bear upon this case. Code Ann. § 24-3005 provides: "Any contingent expenses incurred in holding any session of the superior court, including lights, fuel, stationery, rent, publication of grand jury presentments when ordered published, and similar items, such as taking down testimony in cases of felony, etc., shall be paid out of the county treasury of such county, upon the certificate of the judge of the superior court, and without further order."

The concept of inherent power is based upon consideration of separation of powers and has been expressed as follows: "[T]he Judiciary must possess the inherent power to determine and compel payment of those sums of money which are reasonable and necessary to carry out its mandated responsibilities and its powers and duties to administer justice, if it is to be in reality a co-equal, independent branch of government." Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 442 Pa. 45, 274 A.2d 193, 197 (1971).

In Georgia, the concept that a superior court may exercise its inherent power to order a county to pay "necessary operating expenses" has not been as fully developed as in other jurisdictions because Code Ann. § 24-3005 has almost always been utilized as the authority for such action. The construction of the statute has resulted in no clear trend. See and compare Walden v. Smith, 203 Ga. 207, 45 S.E.2d 660 (1947); Walden v. Nichols, 201 Ga. 568, 40 S.E.2d 644 (1946); Freeney v. Geoghegan, 177 Ga. 142, 169 S.E. 882 (1933); Chatham County v. Gaudry, 120 Ga. 121, 47 S.E. 634 (1904); Houston County v. Kersh & Wynne, 82 Ga. 252, 10 S.E. 199 (1888); and In Re Thomas County Commission, 152 Ga.App. 332, 262 S.E.2d 604 (1979).

However, this court has not ignored the inherent power of the superior courts. In Bibb County v. Hancock, 211 Ga. 429, 86 S.E.2d 511 (1955), we affirmed an order requiring the commissioners to pay for the defense of an indigent in a criminal case. Even though the statute was cited, the court recognized that inherent power was the basis of the order.

It is useful to examine the relationship between the statute and the inherent power of the court. We do not view the inherent power as a product of the statute. As a narrower precept of law, the statute cannot give birth to the broader precept of inherent power. The statute is a rule while inherent power is a principle which arises from the doctrine of separation and equality of the branches of government. As such it may not be limited by the legislative branch. We do not view Code Ann. § 24-3005 as a limitation upon the inherent power of the court, nor do we find it to be a grant of authority the court did not already possess. We rather find § 24-3005 to be legislative recognition of the power which the judicial branch must possess because of its constitutional nature as a separate and equal branch of government....