Grizzell v. State, 28480

• Citation: 298 S.W.2d 816,164 Tex.Crim. 362
• Decision Date: 21 November 1956
• Docket Number: No. 28480,28480
• Parties: Robert GRIZZELL, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas. Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas

Page 816

298 S.W.2d 816

164 Tex.Crim. 362

Robert GRIZZELL, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 28480.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Nov. 21, 1956.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 13, 1957.

Alex P. Pope, Tyler, for appellant.

Harry Loftis, Crim. Dist. Atty., R. S. Burruss, Asst. Crim. Dist. Atty. Tyler, and Leon B. Douglas, State's Atty., Austin, for the State.

BELCHER, Commissioner.

The offense is statutory rape; the punishment, 15 years in the penitentiary.

The state's testimony shows that the appellant married the mother of the prosecutrix about six years before the return of the indictment in this case and that the prosecutrix and a younger half-sister had lived with them during this time. The proof shows that the prosecutrix was fourteen years of age at the time of the trial of this case.

The prosecutrix testified that her mother worked most of the time and the appellant operated a business where she went almost daily. She further testified that on November 7, 1955, she went with the appellant to take an employee who lived in the country home after work hours, that on their return the appellant stopped the automobile, placed his private parts in hers and had intercourse with her, and that he had had sexual intercourse with her frequently for the past two years. She also stated that she had not told of his conduct with her because she was afraid of him as he had told her he would kill her and her mother if she did and that she told her mother for the first time on November 17, and they then went to the district attorney's office.

The state introduced appellant's written statement in evidence wherein he stated that at a time when he and the prosecutrix had taken an employee home from work that he had sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix; that he used a 'rubber' and threw the empty package away, and identified an empty package shown him during the taking of the statement as looking like the one he discarded. He also stated therein that he had had frequent acts of sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix.

Dr. Bundy testified that he made an examination of the prosecutrix on the morning of the day (January 26, 1956) he was testifying and found her sexual parts capable of being penetrated by a male organ.

Appellant did not testify, but offered testimony showing that he had been kind and attentive to the prosecutrix and that she had constantly been in contact with other persons in appellant's absence and had many opportunities to complain of any abuse or mistreatment by him, but that she had never complained before November 17, 1955. He further offered proof that his wife was mad at him because she thought he was taking all the profit from the business and hiding it; and that she had said that if the grand jury did not indict him for this offense that she was going to give him trouble for tax evasion or something.

In support of Bills of Exception Nos. One and Two, appellant takes the position that he had a right to inquire fully into and explore the state of mind of a prospective juror and should be allowed a wide latitude in such examination.

The bills reflect that the court refused to allow appellant to relate to each juror except the first two examined a summary of the law pertaining to certain phases of the trial of the case and then elicit his answer as to what he would do under such circumstances.

The court certified in the bills that appellant was permitted to inform and examine each juror as to the law governing the burden of proof, reasonable doubt, and the failure of the appellant to testify.

The action of the trial court in controlling the interrogation of prospective jurors on voir dire is subject to review only to ascertain whether the court abused his discretion. Livingston v. State, 152 Tex.Cr.R. 302, 214 S.W.2d 119. Under the record we are unable to reach the conclusion that an abuse of discretion is shown.

Appellant complains of a question directed by the state's attorney to the assistant district attorney, while testifying as a witness, inquiring if the appellant made a voluntary statement to him in writing because the voluntary character of the statement was a question of fact and the question was therefore improper. To which question the witness replied that he could not answer yes or no. In view of the answer we see no reversible error because of the question.

The complaint presented by Formal Bill of Exception No. 11 to the introduction in evidence by the state of the following printed matter: 'A-1323 Voluntary Statement While in Custody--Class 4' which appeared in the upper portion of the printed form of the written statement of the appellant cannot be sustained because the trial court certified in said bill that the printed matter was not read or exhibited to the jury.

By Bill of Exception No. 17, appellant contends that Dr. Bundy was not competent to testify to the condition of the prosecuting witness on November 7, 1955, on the ground that he did not make an examination of her until January 26, 1956, which was too remote.

As the court certifies in the bill, the objection went to the weight and not to the admissibility of such testimony. We perceive no error in this bill.

By Bill of Exception No. 20, complaint is made of Deputy Sheriff Shelton being permitted to testify that he had a conversation with the appellant when appellant told him 'that he was glad he had his business straightened out; that he did it for the girl's sake and that he didn't want to hurt the girl; didn't want the girl drug into court.' When such testimony was offered the appellant objected thereto and requested the court to retire the jury so he could examine Deputy Sheriff Shelton to ascertain if appellant was in custody at the time he made the oral statement to him, and such request was refused.

The court certifies that at the time of the request the witness Shelton was tendered to the appellant for voir dire examination before he was permitted to testify to any conversation with the appellant.

The bill fails to show what the witness Shelton would have testified concerning the custody of the appellant at the time such oral statements were made. It was incumbent upon the appellant to show by his bill the facts on which he relies which make the evidence inadmissible. Hence the bill does not reflect error. Curry v. State, 161 Tex.Cr.R. 283, 276 S.W.2d 832.

By Bill of Exception No. 22, appellant contends that the trial court erred in refusing his motion to exclude the testimony of James Hardin because, after he had testified, it was brought out during the examination of his wife, Irene Hardin, that the state's attorney had talked with them in the presence of each other about the testimony in this case and after the rule as to witnesses had been invoked and they had been so instructed.

In order to require a reversal under appellant's contention, it must be made to appear that injury may have been done to the appellant because of a violation of the rule by the state's attorney and the witnesses. 42 Tex.Jur. 64-69, Sections 45-47.

Upon an examination of the testimony of both James and Irene Hardin we fail to see how their testimony could have injured the appellant. Obviously they were uneducated and did not comprehend the questions propounded to them by the prosecution or the defense which accounts for their unequivocal answers. Our ruling herein is based primarily upon such examination.

In the absence of a showing by the bill of the facts discussed between the state's attorney and the two witnesses we are unable to conclude that such discussion was harmful to the appellant and that the trial court abused his discretion in declining to exclude said testimony.

By Bill of Exception No. 25, it is urged that after a witness called by the appellant had testified that his general reputation as a peaceful and law-abiding citizen was good that the trial court erred in permitting the state's attorney on cross-examination to ask said witness the following question: 'You don't know whether or not this defendant, Robert Grizzell, had carnal knowledge of Garie Bennett at any time?' To which the witness answered, 'No'.

The court certified in the bill that appellant's objection to the question and answer was, 'Your Honor, we object, Your Honor, improper cross-examination, and not in the purview of this witness' testimony.'

The question and answer did not bring before the jury any new information. Garie Bennett is named in the indictment as the assaulted party in this case. We see no harm to appellant in such examination.

By Bill of Exception No. 29, appellant complains of certain argument to the jury by the state's attorney.

The court certifies in the bill that appellant made a general objection to such argument, took no exception to the court's ruling, and made no request to have same...