Grooms v. Morrison
| Decision Date | 08 April 1913 |
| Citation | 155 S.W. 430,249 Mo. 544 |
| Parties | JAMES W. GROOMS v. JOHN MORRISON, Appellant |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from Clinton Circuit Court. -- Hon. John G. Park, Special Judge.
Reversed.
E. C Hall for appellant.
(1) A deed will be construed to convey whatever interest or estate the grantor may have in the land at the time of its execution, unless the deed shows the grantor's intention was to pass a less estate or interest. Bray v Conrad, 101 Mo. 331; 2 Devlin on Deeds, 849. A quit-claim deed simply employing the words "remise release and forever quit-claim" contains sufficient operative words of conveyance to carry whatever interest the grantor has. Wilson v. Albert, 98 Mo. 537; Ins. Co. v. Landis, 50 Mo.App. 116. (2) The nature and quantity conveyed by the deed must be determined by the deed itself. Rutherford v. Tracy, 48 Mo. 325; Thomson v. Thomson, 115 Mo. 56; Johnson v. Johnson, 170 Mo. 34; Brown v. Gibson, 82 Mo. 329. And where the terms of the deed are doubtful the benefit of the doubt should be given to the grantee and the deed construed most strongly against the grantor. Linville v. Greer, 165 Mo. 380; Bray v. Conrad, 101 Mo. 331; Jennings v. Brizadine, 44 Mo. 332; Cochran v. Railroad, 94 Mo.App. 469. (3) The plaintiff contends that the deed to defendant only conveys a life estate, because after the description this language appears: "It being the dower interest in the land belonging to the Grooms estate." The word "it" evidently refers to the description for its antecedent and that sentence is only descriptive and shows that this is the same land that was set off as the dower in the Grooms estate. If taken literally, there was no land belonging to the Grooms estate and the statement would not be true. If the widow had intended to convey only the dower and reserve the homestead the conveyancer would have used apt words to indicate what was not intended to be conveyed; otherwise the deed would convey all the interest of grantor. Rines v. Mansfield, 96 Mo. 399; Davidson v. Mansen, 146 Mo. 618; Teideman on Real Prop., sec. 844. (4) If there is any doubt as to the meaning of the deed as to the estate conveyed, the habendum may be used as an aid to determine the question. Linville v. Greer, 165 Mo. 380. (5) The deed from Mrs. Martin to defendant was made more than twenty years prior to grantor's death and during all that time defendant held possession with his deed on record. No steps were ever taken by grantor to reform the deed. The circuit court held that the deed conveyed a life estate only. The evidence showed that Mrs. Martin, the grantor, had a fee simple title by virtue of having been widow of William Grooms and having a homestead in this land which was set off to her in the partition proceeding as dower and homestead. It is true that she had a freehold estate in the land which was comprised in her fee simple title, but she had no life estate separated from such absolute title upon which a conveyance, without restrictions, could operate to convey; consequently when she makes the deed without restrictions as to the interest conveyed she must be held to have conveyed all the title she had in the premises described. Bray v. Conrad, 101 Mo. 337; 2 Devlin on Deeds, 849; Tygard v. Hartwell, 204 Mo. 205
W. S. Herndon for respondent.
(1) The deed from Mrs. Martin and husband to the appellant, and upon which he relies, only conveyed a life estate, that is, her dower interest. Bruensman v. Carroll, 52 Mo. 313. (2) The deed itself shows that the intention of the parties was only to convey a life estate. The consideration, $ 400, shows this. The purchase by appellant of five-sixths interest from Thomas J. Grooms and paying $ 600 therefor twelve years later shows that he so understood the deed. "The object of a description in a deed is to define what the parties intended, the one to convey, the other to receive, by such deed, and the intention of the parties is to be deduced from the instrument of conveyance, as in the case of any other contract." Long v. Waggoner, 47 Mo. 178; Bruensman v. Carroll, 52 Mo. 313; Davis v. Hess, 103 Mo. 31; Wallace v. Dumtra, 152 Mo. 489; Linville v. Greer, 162 Mo. 380. (3) Language in a deed, not technical, must be taken in its ordinary and usual sense. "It being the dower interest in the lands belonging to the Grooms estate" could only mean the life estate of Martha A. Martin. Bradbury v. Bradbury, 64 Mo. 384. (4) The construction which the parties gave the deed at the time it was executed is binding. The appellant construed the deed and treated it as conveying only a life estate. Wolf v. Dyer, 95 Mo. 595; Carter v. Foster, 145 Mo. 383. (5) The cardinal rule of interpretation of a deed is the true intent and purpose of the maker, as that intent may be discerned from the instrument itself taking it all together, considering every part of it in the light of the circumstances surrounding the maker at the time of its execution. Aldridge v. Aldridge, 202 Mo. 572. The intention of the parties should be gathered from the words used, "It being the dower interest in the land belonging to the Grooms estate," which shows conclusively that only the dower interest was conveyed. Tygard v. Hartwell, 204 Mo. 200.
Ejectment for forty acres of land in Clinton county. Plaintiff recovered an undivided interest in the property sued for and defendant appeals.
William Grooms is the common source of title. He died intestate in May, 1874, leaving a widow; also six children by a former marriage. Plaintiff is one of those children. At the time of his death William Grooms occupied the land as a homestead, and it is established by a preponderance of evidence that said property was not then worth more than $ 1500.
The widow of said William Grooms married a man named Martin, and at a date not shown by the record joined the children of her first husband (Grooms) in an ex parte partition suit. In that suit the land in controversy was set off to Mrs. Martin as her dower. Other lands of deceased were set off to the heirs.
The residence upon the homestead was burned after the partition suit, and Mrs. Martin collected the fire insurance thereon.
In 1882 defendant procured from Mrs. Martin and her husband a quit-claim deed for the property in dispute, which deed recites that in consideration of the sum of four hundred dollars grantors remise, release and forever quit-claim to defendant:
In 1894 defendant, for an expressed consideration of $ 600, purchased from the sister and four brothers of plaintiff what is described in the warranty deeds made by them as an undivided five-sixths interest of the land in dispute.
Martha A. Martin died in 1903.
Such other parts of the evidence and pleadings as are necessary to a full understanding of the case will be noted in our opinion.
OPINION.I. Respondent contends (1) that by accepting the land when it was assigned to her as a dower in the ex parte partition suit, Mrs. Martin was estopped from asserting any other or greater title to the property, and that defendant as her grantee is likewise estopped; (2) that even if the acceptance of the property as dower was not a waiver of her right to claim the whole title to same under the homestead law, the quit-claim deed executed by her and her husband only conveyed her life estate, and that upon her death the plaintiff became entitled to an undivided interest therein as an heir.
The contention of plaintiff that by accepting the forty acres of land in controversy as dower Mrs. Martin was (and the defendant claiming through her is) estopped from asserting that she acquired the whole title to said property as a homestead, cannot be sustained for the reason that said estoppel is not pleaded. The petition of plaintiff contains no allegations except those necessary in an ordinary legal action of ejectment and the answer is merely a general denial and a plea of the ten-year Statute of Limitation. Consequently there are no equitable features in the case.
A Texas judge recently announced the doctrine that the Statute of Limitation when not pleaded, like the prayer of the wicked, "availeth nothing." The same doctrine with a few exceptions applies to estoppels in Missouri, as many decisions of this court bear witness. [Golden v. Tyer, 180 Mo. 196, 79 S.W. 143; Brown Const. Co. v. MacArthur Bros. Co., 236 Mo. 41, 139 S.W. 104, l.c. 50; Keeney v. McVoy, 206 Mo. 42, 103 S.W. 946, l.c. 59; Turner v. Edmonston, 210 Mo. 411, 109 S.W. 33.] The trial court is entitled to know what issues are involved in a case before he hears the evidence.
It seems plausible that a widow by representing that she holds only a dower in the lands of her husband and thereby causing other parties to expend their money in buying such lands from the heirs should be estopped from afterwards asserting that she owned the fee; but it is difficult to see how plaintiff could bring himself into that class. His claim is not based upon a purchase, nor has he expended any money...
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